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Abstract
...it is clear that there is a need to reform
the Stability and Growth Pact.
De Grauwe (2003, p. 219)
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is unique be-
cause it is a currency area of sovereign countries each retaining a
large degree of ﬁscal autonomy, with a single monetary authority —
the European Central Bank (ECB) — managing monetary policy for
the whole zone.
The European Central Bank is mandated by the Maastricht Treaty
of 1992 to maintain primary price stability. Thus the ECB is viewed
as the strongest central bank in the world. But on the other hand the
EMU is built also on strong ﬁscal discipline. The budgetary auton-
omy of the EMU’s members is subject to the numerical constraints
of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP),
since Amsterdam in June 1997. While the numerical parameters of
the Maastricht Treaty (budget deﬁcits and debts should not exceed
3 per cent and 60 per cent of GDP, unless exceptional circumstances
occur) were seen as a typical screening device to select the members
of the euro area in the preliminary phase; the goal of the SGP was
to make ﬁscal discipline and sustainability a permanent feature of the
EMU. The European Council resolution which accompanied the Sta-
bility Pact (EC 1466/97 and 1467/97) underline the importance of
safeguarding sound government ﬁnances as a means to strengthening
the conditions for price stability and strong sustainable growth.
The European Monetary Union generates several new interactions be-
tween the monetary and ﬁscal policy level. For this reason we need
’new’ instruments and methods to analyze the interactions and coor-
dination between monetary und ﬁscal policies. In order to maintain
price stability the ﬁscal framework was needed to ensure budgetary
discipline. Central banks are often accused of being obsessed with
inﬂation. This is totally untrue. If they are obsessed with anything,
it is with ’ﬁscal policy’ (King, 1998).1
An early attempt to model the Stability and Growth Pact is provided
by Beetsma and Uhlig (1999). A second step towards a better under-
standing of ﬁscal–monetary interaction within a Monetary Union were
carried out by Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003) and Dixit (2001)
within a game–theoretic framework. However, the empirical failures
which occurred within the Stability and Growth Pact, are not suﬃ-
cient explained in the recent literature. Therefore it emerges a new
and huge reform debate about the European Stability and Growth
Pact in 2002 until today.2 These debates show again, that no eco-
nomic theory exists on the Stability and Growth Pact or even on the
mechanisms of the Pact. Analyzing the Stability and Growth Pact
theoretically within a full ﬁscal–monetary interaction framework is
one of the primary objectives of my thesis. The statement from the
president of the EU-Commission Romani Prodi in the newspaper Le
Monde´ edition 2003: ‘The Pact is stupid as all rules which are rigid’,
have again induced a discussion about the ﬁscal framework in Europe.
Our theoretical analysis will fertilize the academic and political reform
discussion of the European Stability and Growth Pact. Finally I will
draw up a new reform proposal which incorporates the main critics
and solves the main enforcement and implementation problems in the
current ’Stability and Growth Pact’.
1The empirical evidence that the structure of political institutions plays an important role
is shown by Keﬀer and Stasavage (2002).
2The latest EU council meetings focusing on the reform debate of the Stability and Growth
Pact are: February 5-6, 2004 and November 15-16, 2004. The ECOFIN–Council decided the
current reform of the ”new” Stability and Growth Pact at a special session on March 20, 2005.
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The following thesis is divided into nine main parts. I will start ﬁrst
with a brief introduction. The second chapter deals with the Stability
and Growth Pact and the institutional issues in the European ﬁscal
framework. These new institutional settings have far reaching impli-
cations for the European economies of today. Thus it is necessary
to understand this progress by looking into the history of monetary
unions which will be done in chapter 3. From these general explana-
tions in chapters 2 and 3, I will now focus on the Stability and Growth
Pact theoretically in chapters 4 and 5. In these chapters, I will an-
alyze the Stability Pact in extended and new model frameworks and
several very important questions on the ’political’ agenda today will
be answered including:
1. What is an optimal rule in a heterogenous monetary union?
2. What are internal constraints in ﬁscal–monetary interaction in a
monetary union?
3. Why do larger countries have more problems with the Stability
and Growth Pact?
4. What are the ingredients for an eﬃcient Stability and Growth
Pact?
To ﬁnd some initial answers to these questions, I will extend the ex-
isting model frameworks and analyze their consequences. In the last
part of my thesis (chapter 6 and 7), I will speak more onto the huge
reform discussion of the Stability and Growth Pact and so to the polit-
ical economic part of the Stability Pact. I elaborate a reform proposal
which recognizes nearly all other critics in the current reform discus-
sion on the Stability Pact. On the basis of the previous chapters I will
establish a ’New Stability and Growth Pact’ which not only is a more
realistic alternative in comparison to some other prominent reform
suggestions but also solves some current problems as well as pinpoint-
ing some unknown disadvantages of the current Stability Pact. All
in all it seems to me an excellent alternative for the near future and
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a ”real–reform” of the Stability and Growth Pact. The last, chapter
8 provides concluding remarks and an out look. Last but no least a
German summary is provided in chapter 9.
The target of my work to provide a comprehensive overview of the
ﬁscal architecture of the EMU is only possible by a great split be-
tween pure theoretical economics and pure political science. This
clear interdisciplinary approach enables me to overcome the overt pre–
embryonic discussion in that research ﬁeld. Thus I can examine the
development and the rationale implementation of the SGP, and cover
both its institutional aspects and its economic implications. Assess-
ing the critical and problematic issues and clarifying, evaluating and
remedy the main drawbacks is also a very promising and challenging
task for future research in that ﬁeld.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
(...) ’The deﬁnition of the ﬁscal architecture of EMU
is still in progress. Many aspects will be clariﬁed only as
time goes by. The economic implications of the new rules
are also far from being fully understood. Identifying key
issues and relevant trade-oﬀs is essential for designing ap-
propriate policy responses at the EMU and at the national
level.’
Brunila, A. and Buti, M. and Franco,D. (2001, p. 20)
The unknown answer after the failure of the early warning against Germany
and France in February 2002 and the failure to strengthen the excessive deﬁcit
procedure in the Council of Economic and Finance Minister (ECOFIN–council)
meeting against Germany in November 2003 is as follows:
What is wrong with the current Stability Pact and what will be the
consequences for a reform of the Stability and Growth Pact in the
European Monetary Union?
The actual problems with the Stability Pact — which mostly the bigger coun-
tries have — were also enforced by the political announcement from EU–Commis-
sions President R. Prodi: ’The Pact is stupid as all rules which are rigid’ (Le
Monde´). Furthermore, there seems to be no clear evidence for an expected an-
swer what should be the best reform proposal for the current Stability and Growth
Pact.
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The huge reform discussion about the Stability and Growth Pact which has
been emerging since these events is reason enough to analyze the current Stability
Pact in more detail. To ﬁnd out the relevant trade–oﬀs in the European ﬁscal-
monetary interaction framework has been a new research ﬁeld for a short term.
In a recent published book about ’Monetary and Fiscal Policies in EMU’ Buti
(2003) wrote:
Understanding the functioning of EMU and the interplay between mon-
etary and ﬁscal authorities is and will remain a challenge for both
academic research and policy–making for years to come. From their
diﬀerent perspectives, the contributions in this book provide the ana-
lytical instruments for undertaking a fascinating intellectual journey
into the greatest monetary reform since Bretton Woods.
It is therefore not surprising that there are relatively few models and the-
oretical arguments for the Stability and Growth Pact which was established in
the subspaces of ﬁscal–monetary interaction, since monetary union in 1999. The
most major ﬁndings from qualitative analysis of ﬁscal rules in pre–90ies are that
free-riding, moral hazard and asymmetric information are the main challenges in
the monetary union because of the new interactions. However, it is not known
what is a good and eﬃcient rule to manage ﬁscal–monetary interaction and there
is no economic theory which explains the current 3% to GDP deﬁcit threshold
and the 60% debt threshold (De Grauwe, 2003). Rather it seems non–trivial to
analyze the European ﬁscal framework and especially the Stability and Growth
Pact because it links on the one hand economic monetary and ﬁscal theory as
well as incentive theory with institutional economic analysis. Both theory blocks
are barely linked because the agenda of the last one has to overcome the major
drawbacks of the pure economic theory.
This work focuses on the existing pre–embryonic model frameworks and at-
tempts to extend it to a more appropriate form for policy conclusions. Therefore
you will see immediately in the following thesis a clear interdisciplinary approach
between economics and political science.
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When dealing with monetary–ﬁscal interaction in the monetary union it is a
common practice by Dixit and Lambertini (2003), Beetsma and Jensen (2003)
and Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) to study models which are based on Barro
and Gordon (1983a,b), Kydland and Prescott (1977)1 and thus on simple game
theory. We follow this approach to establish and extend some of the models with
a Stability and Growth Pact. The construction of these models is based on the
idea to model the Stability and Growth Pact as a ﬁxed ﬁne ’ψ’ for each additional
unit of debt that is issued (Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999). The reason to use this
modelling approach is simply because at the moment there is no other real option
to make the Stability Pact traceable in analytical models.
In the second part of my thesis I will discuss some policy conclusions for the
current reform debate of the Stability and Growth Pact. Moreover, I will explain
the law and economics perspective of the European ﬁscal framework in Europe.
My thesis is comprised of a collection of essays and papers and there is there-
fore not a complete and coherent structure as in a monograph. I have tried to
structure it logically and most ﬁtting but sometimes it has been really diﬃcult to
include all the research papers. The next page represents an illustrative ”Plan
of my Thesis”:
1Winning the Nobel price in economics in 2004.
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NO Studied Monetary Unions before? YES
Want a refresher?
Read chapter 2-3 YES NO
Read some advanced 
economic textbook
NO Try chapter 4-5
Economic Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact 
Want
more
details?
NO YES YES
Read chapter 4 and 5
YES
Political Economic Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact?
NO YES
Read Appendix Reform debate? Read chapter 6
YES
Our SGP reform proposal? (chapter 7)
NO YES NO
Withher Stability and Growth Pact? 
Anything right?
YES
YOU HAVE FINISHED !
But before:  Read conclusions in chapter 8
Pure economist
Political scientist or policy maker
Figure 1.1: Getting the most out of this Thesis4
Chapter 2
Fiscal Framework in the
European Monetary Union
”Institutionen sind wie Festungen. Sie mu¨ssen klug an-
gelegt und richtig bemannt sein.”
K.R. Popper (1957,p.33-87)
The ﬁrst chapter looks at the institutional issues of the European Fiscal
Framework especially at the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP ). It sets out the
rationale for the SGP and considers the principles that should guide its future
developments. The departure point is recognizing that eﬀective macroeconomic
policy frameworks can contribute to supporting high and stable levels of growth
and employment. Section 2.1, discusses the basics for eﬀective policy frameworks,
which are characterized by credibility, ﬂexibility and legitimacy. It notes that ex-
perience has pointed countries towards ’constrained discretion’ as a means for
achieving these objectives. Three key principles are important: clear long–term
goals; a pre–commitment to sound institutional arrangements; and maximum
transparency. Section 2.2 sets out the rational for the Stability and Growth Pact.
It considers why the SGP is necessary, and highlights a number of institutional
issues. The current SGP represents a ﬁrst step forward in recognizing long-
term budgetary discipline. However there are also many failures, trade–oﬀ’s and
problems within the current framework which are lead out in section 2.3. After
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2.1 Policy Frameworks in a Monetary Union
describing the institutional framework, we give evidence for some motivation and
recent performance of the SGP. Section 2.4, discusses brieﬂy the current economic
literature in that ﬁeld. The evolution of the Stability and Growth Pact and its
future developments are then discussed after the economic analysis in chapter 6
and 7.
2.1 Policy Frameworks in a Monetary Union
This section outlines the basics for an eﬀective policy framework, focusing in
particular on ﬁscal frameworks. The key objectives that a robust framework
should strive to achieve and the principles through which such a framework can
be operationalized is now discussed (HM Treasury, 2004).
2.1.1 Eﬀective Policy Frameworks
A strong macroeconomic framework is essential for maintaining high and sta-
ble levels of growth and employment and supporting the primary objective in
monetary policy: price stability.1 Therefore, it can help to maintain long–term
economic stability. Stability allows all actors — business, individuals and the
government — to plan more eﬀectively for the long–run and help to raise pro-
ductivity.
Eﬀective macroeconomic frameworks are those which are characterized by
Buti et al. (2003) through:
• credibility, so that policymakers have public trust
• ﬂexibility, allowing a prompt and timely response to economic developments
• legitimacy, meaning there is widespread support for the framework.
1Vice versa, there is no causality. There is a clear interaction between both policy frame-
works (Smithin, 2003).
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A robust policy framework must be both comprehensive and coherent, en-
compassing monetary policy and ﬁscal policy as well as achieving its goals. In
establishing new macroeconomic frameworks, policymakers in Europe have recog-
nized the need to avoid purely discretionary reliance, for a credible framework
that solved the problem of ”time–inconsistency” (Kydland and Prescott, 1977).
Moreover they recognized the need to learn from the failures of rigid rule–based
frameworks such as the Stability and Growth Pact, when the relationship that
these rules were based on broke down (Keﬀer and Stasavage, 2002).
A credible framework will be enhanced where policy objectives are clear and
where the way in which those objectives are to be pursued is transparent, for ex-
ample through well–deﬁned policy rules. Objectives by themselves are, however,
insuﬃcient to ensure credibility. Governments must also demonstrate their com-
mitment to achieving their objectives. This commitment can be more credible
and also be established more quickly through institutional arrangements, and a
ﬁtting disciplining framework with sanctions.
An eﬀective policy framework will also provide appropriate short–term ﬂexi-
bility to allow a response to idiosyncratic and asymmetric shocks in the monetary
union. Despite the clear trade–oﬀ between ﬂexibility and credibility, the ﬁrst one
must not be on the cost of the second. Flexibility can also help enhance credibil-
ity. A strict rigid framework1 may lose credibility if it does not respond eﬀectively
or adequately to country–speciﬁc or changing circumstances.
Macroeconomic frameworks must also demonstrate legitimacy2, which means
that they must have widespread support (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999; Wallace,
2000). This can be achieved through building a consensus with regards to the
necessary goals and institutional arrangements. To ensure legitimacy a large
degree of both transparency and accountability are key ingredients (Amtenbrink
et al., 1997).
Indeed, these three objectives are closely related. For designing eﬀective ﬁscal
frameworks the OECD has also developed some guidelines. The OECD recog-
nizes that ﬁscal rules, are crucial in order to maintain and deliver ﬁscal sustain-
1That is not completely true for the current SGP, because of many exceptional circum-
stances, wider interpretations of the targets and so much free-room to interpret the words.
2cf. Kant (1971) says to legitimize a rule you need only good reasons.
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ability. Alongside highlighting the importance that the rules be credible, the
OECD (Economic Outlook, 2003) also stipulates that rules should not be overly
rigid. Acknowledging the need for ﬂexibility, means that ﬁscal policy can deal
with unforseen events and fulﬁl its stabilization role.
2.1.2 The Importance of Co-ordination
Co–ordination between ﬁscal–ﬁscal authorities and ﬁscal–monetary authorities
are of great importance, particularly where responsibility for monetary and ﬁscal
policies rests with diﬀerent organizations. The monetary and ﬁscal authorities
need to understand each other’s policy objective and reaction function. This
highlights the need for transparency, clear objectives and responsibilities, and
appropriate mechanisms to ensure eﬀective policy co–ordination takes place.
2.1.3 The Principle of Constrained Discretion
The past experience of policy rules in an environment of complete discretion,
and with overly rigid rules that do not allow the ﬂexibility to respond to shocks,
leads countries towards the principle of constrained discretion (Bernanke and
Mishkin, 1997). This approach combines the discretion necessary for eﬀective
economic policy with a credible institutional framework and constraints on policy
makers to deliver clearly deﬁned long–term policy objectives. It rejects the idea of
frameworks based solely on complete discretion or ﬁxed rules. Policymakers have
found it hard to commit to resisting short–term pressures under conditions which
aﬀord complete discretion. This is partly an eﬀect of the ’time–inconsistency’
problem i.e. long–term goals may be sacriﬁced if short–term pressure suggest
a diﬀerent course of action. On the other hand frameworks that are based on
ﬁxed mechanistic rules — and therefore do not permit any discretion — also
have limitations. Rigid rules do not allow any ﬂexibility to respond to economic
shocks and can lead to substantial adjustment costs.
The principle of constrained discretion (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997) focuses
on long–term and sustainable goals, but rejects the idea of frameworks based
8
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solely on complete discretion or ﬁxed rules. Constraint discretion mean that there
is some ﬂexibility in order to respond to economic shocks. In terms of ﬁscal policy,
that rule is only reasonable if the policy is credibly constrained to deliver long–
term stability. This principle of ’constrained discretion’ has been operationalized
by putting the following three key determinants in place (Treasury, 2005):
• clear and well–deﬁned long term policy objectives
• pre–commitment to sound institutional arrangements which allow credible
and ﬂexible policy responses in the face of shocks
• maximum transparency.
Shifting the policy focus towards sustainable long–term goals requires realistic
and clearly deﬁned objectives. To ensure credibility, transparency and account-
ability through an institutional arrangement in the EMU, a ﬁscal system with
regular controlling and reporting is needed.
2.1.4 Delegation or Contract Approach
A growing body of empirical and theoretical literature analyzes the important
determinants of the ﬁscal budget performance with two diﬀerent approaches:
Delegation versus Contract (Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1998). Both can be
found among the budget process in Europe (von Hagen, 1992). The two basic
institutions (approaches) imitate centralization or internalization of budget ex-
ternalities. The delegation approach emphasizes hierarchical relationships, the
contract approach horizontal relationships among the relevant policy–makers.
The delegation approach based on the following key characteristics (von Hagen
et al., 2002):
• A ﬁnance minister vested with strong agenda–setting power relative to the
remaining members of the executive; this typically involves the right to
make binding proposals for the broad budgetary categories.
9
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• A ﬁnance minister vested with strong monitoring capacity with regard to
the implementation of the budget and the power to correct deviations from
the budget plan.
• A strong position of the executive relative to the legislature in the parlia-
mentary phase of the budget process; this involves strict limitations on the
scope of parliamentary amendments to the executive’s budget proposal and
a limited role where necessary the upper house of parliament in the process
where applicable.
Under the contract approach, the participants start the budget process by
negotiating and agreeing on a set of key budgetary parameters. The following
points of the process characterize the contract approach:
• A strong emphasis on budgetary targets negotiated among all members of
the executive at the beginning of the annual budget cycle. Theses targets
are regarded as binding for all ruling parties.
• A ﬁnance minister vested with strong monitoring capacities in the imple-
mentation of the budget; agenda–setting power.
• A weak (limited) position of the executive relative to the parliament exem-
pliﬁed by weak or no limits on parliamentary amendments to the budget
proposal.
Several authors have evaluated the performance of both approaches empir-
ically (von Hagen, 1992; von Hagen and Harden, 1994). The main evidence is
summarized in the following table:
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2.1 Policy Frameworks in a Monetary Union
Table 2.1: Empirical Evidence of Budgetary Institutions
Authors Result
von Hagen and Harden (1994) Countries with the contract approach
are more successful in ﬁscal consolidation
von Hagen and Hallerberg (1998) Centralization of the budget process
reduces the deﬁcit bias of ﬁscal policy
von Hagen et al. (2002) [A] Countries with low degree of centralization
have larger deﬁcits than countries with a high
degree of centralization
[B] Contract approach is not adequate for
countries with single-party governments or
coalition governments
von Hagen and Hallerberg et al. (2004) Fiscal developments were more determined
by the electoral and the business cycle
Source: Herzog, B.
Von Hagen et al. (2002) show that the improvement in ﬁscal discipline was
much greater among those states for which the contract approach is the adequate
one. Therefore the authors suggest that the Stability Pact will work more eﬀec-
tively under the contract approach in states where the domestic budget process is
characterized by a signiﬁcant degree of centralization. Moreover the SGP will be
less eﬀective in assuring ﬁscal discipline in delegation states or states with rather
fragmented budget processes. Furthermore a survey around journalist conﬁrms
that the SGP is less eﬀective among larger countries and in delegation states
(Germany, France) because in those countries the European ﬁscal frameworks
were rejected (von Hagen et al., 2002).
The ’Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure’ and the ’Stability and Growth Pact’ repre-
sent an important institutional framework. However, to follow a clear ’contract
approach’ requires centralizing the national budget process. This is not an ade-
quate mechanism for countries such as Germany, France, UK or Greece because
of the diﬀerent federal ﬁscal structures (von Hagen et al., 2002). A recent em-
pirical evaluation (von Hagen et al., 2004) conﬁrms that ﬁnding. Furthermore,
and most importantly the enforcement power of the SGP will become weaker in
the future, as the threat of missing the EMU membership disappears and the
11
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sanction credibility is low. One can therefore conclude that there are diﬀerent
eﬃcient institutional approaches for the diﬀerent countries in EMU. Before start-
ing with the theoretical analysis, the institutional framework will be described in
more detail below.
2.2 The Fiscal Framework of EMU
The need for a genuine institutional framework to deal with the exceptional de-
gree of ﬁscal decentralization in a monetary area which exists in the EMU was
already recognized in the blueprint for monetary union in Europe (Delors, 1989).
Building on its predecessor, the Werner-Report (1970)1, the Delors Report called
for institutional provisions safeguarding ﬁscal discipline in the EMU, arguing that
a lack of ﬁscal discipline might undermine the stability of the new currency.
The EMU had developed an elaborate ﬁscal framework for this purpose. Ac-
cording to article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), ‘sound public
ﬁnances’ are one of the guiding principles of economic policy in the EU. EU pro-
cedures with relevance to conduct and coordination of ﬁscal policy are the ’Mu-
tual Surveillance Procedure’ (article 99 ECT), the ‘no–bailout clause’ (article 103
ECT), the ’Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure’ (EDP , article 104 ECT), and the SGP
(Council Regulations 1466/97, 1476/97 and Council Resolution 97/C236/01–02).
Article 99 holds that the member states of the EU regard their economic policies
as a matter of common concern and coordinate them through the ECOFIN Coun-
cil on the basis of ‘Broad Economic Guidelines’. The no–bailout clause protects
the Community and the member states from becoming responsible for ﬁnancial
liabilities of other member states against their will. The EDP set up a detailed
process of monitoring the public ﬁnances of the member states with a view to
ensuring that they remain sustainable. It includes the mandate (article 3 of the
Protocol) that the member states of the EMU should implement appropriate
1The Werner Report, published in 1970, was the ﬁrst document outlining the creation of a
monetary union among member states of the European Communities.
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institutions at national level which enable them to fulﬁl their obligation of main-
taining sustainable public ﬁnances. There is, however, no explanation of what
this obligation means in practice. The SGP reﬁnes and lays out more concretely
the procedures of the EDP.
Therefore the Stability and Growth Pact is the key element in the European
Fiscal Framework. It is designed to ensure sustainable public ﬁnance in the
European Monetary Union, in all participating member states — as a prerequi-
site to achieving stable long–term growth. Fiscal sustainability is essential for
macroeconomic stability and growth. Moreover in order to maintain the primary
objective of monetary policy i.e. ’price stability’ a strong support system with a
ﬁscal–framework is essential. Von Hagen (2004) says:
”...the stability of the common currency requires the stability of public
ﬁnance. The fear that high and rising public debts would undermine
the central bank’s ability to deliver price stability has left its mark in
all important documents and political decisions on the way to EMU.”
The Stability and Growth Pact represents a signiﬁcant step forward in recog-
nizing the importance of long–term budgetary discipline. The next subsections
discuss the rationale for the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). It explains the
reasons why collective ﬁscal discipline and co–ordination are vital for a successful
monetary union. Moreover explaining the role of the SGP in ensuring long–term
sustainability, promoting ﬁscal co–ordination, and providing the ﬂexibility to re-
spond to shocks.
2.2.1 The Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure (EDP)
In the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), policy co–ordination and economic
governance is based more generally on the principle of an intergovernmental ap-
proach; that is member states act together to make decisions. The EU ﬁscal
framework, which applies to euro area countries as well as other EU members
including the UK, Denmark, Sweden and all new members since 1 May 2004, has
two arms:
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(A) The Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure and
(B) Multinational surveillance.
Theses arms are set out in articles 99 (ex article 103) and 104 (ex article 104c)
respectively the EC–Treaty as amended at Maastricht in February, 1992 (entered
into force in 1993).
Figure 2.1: Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure
The provisions of the Maastricht Treaty for joining the EMU were of course
especially relevant in 1997–1998 when the monetary union was in the process of
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being established (Rotte, 2004). The main rule was article 104 TEC, which states
that not only all member countries of EMU but all EU countries have committed
themselves to ﬁscal stability according to the Maastricht criteria. In order to se-
cure compliance with this self–commitment and also political acceptance of EMU
in the German public, a collective budget surveillance system was established in
1996–97, which became eﬀective in 1999. The so–called ’Stability and Growth
Pact’ was implemented with the main economic aim of avoiding collective bur-
dens — too high inﬂation and too low growth — via raising interest rates caused
by national deﬁcit spending.
The EDP is one cornerstone of the ﬁscal framework of EMU. It combines
the unconditional obligation on the part of the member states to avoid ‘exces-
sive deﬁcits’ with a procedure aiming at providing a regular assessment of ﬁscal
policies in the EMU, identifying excessive deﬁcits and, if necessary, penalties for
proﬂigate behavior (article 104 TEU). The EDP charges the European Commis-
sion with the task of monitoring budgetary developments and the stock of public
sector debt of the member states, checking in particular their compliance with
two reference values, the ratio of the deﬁcit to GDP and the ratio of public debt
to GDP. The two reference values are set at 3% and 60%, respectively. If a
member state does not comply with these reference values, and unless the deﬁcit
and the debt are approaching their reference values in a satisfactory way, and
unless the excess of the deﬁcit over the limits is exceptional and temporary the
Commission prepares a report to the European Council. This report takes into
account whether the deﬁcit exceeds public investment spending and ‘all other
relevant factors, including the medium term economic and budgetary position’
(article 104(3)) of the country concerned. The Economic and Financial Commit-
tee (EFC), which advises the Council in these matters (article 114), then states
its opinion of this report. Note that, according to article 104(3), the Commission
may also prepare a report to that eﬀect, even if a member state complies with
the criteria, but the Commission foresees the risk of an excessive deﬁcit nonethe-
less. If the Commission considers that an excessive deﬁcit exists, it expresses this
opinion to ECOFIN and makes a recommendation for the Council to decide that
an excessive deﬁcit indeed exists. ECOFIN vote on this recommendation by qual-
iﬁed majority after taking into account any observation the country concerned
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may make and after a broad assessment of the situation. Thus, ECOFIN decides
whether or not an excessive deﬁcit indeed exists.
If ECOFIN decides that this is the case, it makes conﬁdential recommenda-
tions to the country concerned on how to correct the situation within a given
period of time. If the country does not take appropriate action and does not
respond to these recommendations in a satisfactory way, the Council may make
its views and recommendations public,1 ask the government concerned to take
speciﬁc corrective actions and, ultimately, ﬁne the country. In that case, the
country would ﬁrst be required to make a non–interest bearing deposit to the
Community. If the excessive deﬁcit still persists, this deposit would be turned
into a ﬁne paid to the Community (Fatas et al., 2003). ECOFIN can abrogate
its decision under the EDP upon a recommendation from the Commission. All
ECOFIN decisions in this context are made by qualiﬁed majority; once a country
has been found to have an excessive deﬁcit, its votes are not counted in these
decisions.
In the context of the EDP, then, the numerical reference values for deﬁcits
and debts serve as triggers or screening devices for an assessment by the EU–
Commission and by ECOFIN. In the view of the need to balance long–term
objectives with short–run constraints on actual policy, such a trigger role is ap-
propriate for the numerical criteria.
Up to now the European community has never regarded the EDP as a credible
tool to protect the euro against deviating ﬁscal behavior. It lacks credibility
because it is the ﬁnance ministers in ECOFIN who passes the ultimate judgement
on whether or not excessive deﬁcits exist and adjudicates penalties. By assigning
these rights to ECOFIN, the EDP eﬀectively makes a group of ‘sinners’ judge the
performance of fellow ‘sinners’. With regard to the ﬁscal performance of other
member states, ECOFIN members have every reason to accept excuses for weak
discipline and tend to base future ﬁscal outlooks on overly optimistic economic
assumptions.2 Being lenient and avoiding actions that are politically costly for
1So there is a immediately a kind of peer–pressure in the current mechanism. De Grauwe
(2003b) focuses only on that disciplining mechanism.
2This has conﬁrmed in the last two years for the breaching states France and Germany as
well as some of the critical candidates such as Greece and Italy.
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fellow members is a rational strategy for ECOFIN members who might be in a
position of ﬁscal distress in the future. This makes serious judgement and a strict
application of sanctions unlikely.
2.2.2 The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) Framework
During the mid–1990s, public fears arose in Germany throughout that the EDP
would not suﬃce to discipline ﬁscal policies eﬀectively after the start of the EMU.
Germany’s former ﬁnance minister, Theo Waigel, responded to these fears by
proposing in 1995 a Stability Pact for the EMU. It was later adapted in Am-
sterdam as the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ by the European Council (Brunila
et al., 2001). The SGP modiﬁes the EDP in several ways. Firstly, it commits the
member states to the ”new” medium–term objective of achieving budgets ‘close
to balance or in surplus’. This is a more speciﬁc goal than avoiding excessive
deﬁcits and a more ambitious one than the reference value for deﬁcits under the
EDP.
Secondly, it created an early warning system strengthening the surveillance
of the public ﬁnances of member states. Under the SGP, EMU economies sub-
mit annual so–called ‘Stability Programmes’ to the European Commission. Eu-
rogroup participants explaining their intended ﬁscal policies and, in particular,
what they plan to do to reach and maintain the medium–term objective. Stability
Programmes include annual ﬁscal targets as well as an explanation of the main
economic assumptions underlying them.
Thirdly, the SGP gives more emphasis to the notions of exceptional and tem-
porary breaches of the 3% deﬁcit limit. In doing so, it implicitly deﬁnes an
excessive deﬁcit based on the 3% deﬁcit limit. Furthermore, the SGP clariﬁes
the rules for ﬁnancial penalties and speeds up this process by setting speciﬁc
deadlines for the individual steps.
Fourthly, the SGP provides political guidance to the parties involved in the
EDP, calling them to implement the rules of the EDP eﬀectively and in good time.
It commits the Commission, in particular, to using its right of initiative under the
EDP ‘in a manner that facilitates the strict, timely, and eﬀective functioning of
17
2.2 The Fiscal Framework of EMU
the SGP’. This puts severe limits on the Commission’s right to exercise judgement
on each individual case and situation, shifting instead that right to the Council.
The rules of the SGP have been steadily improved. In October 1998, ECOFIN
endorsed a Monetary Committee opinion, the ‘code of conduct’ which speciﬁes
criteria to be observed in the assessment of a country’s medium–term budgetary
position, data standards and requirements for the programmes. In October 1999,
ECOFIN recommended stricter compliance with, and more timely updating of,
the programmes. In July 2001, ECOFIN endorsed an appended code of conduct
proposed by the EFC reﬁning the format and the use of data in the SGP.
Formally, the SGP consists of the relevant decisions of the European Council
of Amsterdam from 1997 and two additional Council Regulations from 1997: ”On
the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance
and co–ordination of economic policies; and on speeding up and clarifying the
implementation of the excessive deﬁcit procedure” (Stability and Growth Pact,
1997). The collective surveillance mechanism of the SGP is based on three el-
ements: the medium–term early warning system, the short–term observation of
national budget programmes, and the excessive budget procedure.
The early warning system basically consists of annual stability programmes
by the submitted EMU member countries and of convergence programmes by the
other EU countries. The oﬃcial programmes are addressed to the Council of EU
ﬁnance ministers (ECOFIN), the EU Economic and Financial Committee (EFC)
with two representatives from each member state, the European Commission and
the ECB (article 114 TEC). The main contents of the stability programmes are:
• medium–term budget plans, which must aim for a balanced budget or even
for budget surpluses (Artis and Buti, 2000).
• include the basic assumptions of budgetary planning as well as the relevant
measures of ﬁscal and economic policy.
• moreover the sensitivity of the plan vis–a`–vis changes in the assumptions
have to be explained.
The period to be covered by the reports is ﬁve years, commencing with the
year previous to the submission. Supported by the ECB, the Commission and
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the EFC compile a comment on the programmes and present it to ECOFIN.
The Council then decides within two months whether the medium–term budget
aims contain an adequate margin of security to prevent an excessive deﬁcit of 3%
of GDP, whether the plan’s assumptions are realistic and whether the planned
measures provide for a stable budgetary development. If this is not the case, the
country has to revise its planning and report once more.
Short–term surveillance is provided in the form of semi–annual reports of
current national budget data on 1 March and on 1 September each year. The
EU–Commission and the EFC examine separately from one another whether
there is an excessive budget deﬁcit. This is normally the case if at least one of
two criteria from the SGP is not met: the budget deﬁcit is higher than 3% of
GDP, or the debt threshold is higher than 60% of GDP or is not approaching this
point of reference with adequate speed. If an excessive deﬁcit has been identiﬁed
or if it is expected, the procedure for an excessive deﬁcit according to article 104
TEC and the SGP is initiated.
Within this procedure, the Commission and the EFC ﬁrst present their con-
siderations to ECOFIN which decides with a qualiﬁed majority of votes whether
there is in fact an excessive deﬁcit or not. Crucial for this decision is whether there
are any exceptional circumstances justifying a higher deﬁcit. Such exceptions are
natural disasters, a solely temporary character of the deﬁcit, or a recession. A
recession is operationalized by a reduction of GDP within a year. A reduction
of less then 0.75% is deﬁned as not exceptional, a reduction of 2% is generally
accepted as such. Percentages within these two reference values are decided on
by the Council, taking into consideration the position of the aﬄicted country as
well as the suddenness and the cumulative eﬀect of the shocks (which are also
part of the Commission’s report).
If the Council concludes that there is in fact an excessive deﬁcit, the instru-
ments of article 104(7–11) TEC come into force. Firstly, the Council gives some
conﬁdential advice to the country, which may be made public after a set impos-
ing detailed measures in order to reduce the deﬁcit. If the country still does not
comply with these directions, the Council may inﬂict sanctions to enforce the im-
plementation of the consolidation measures. These include the requirement need
to give additional information when emitting government bonds, revisions in the
19
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lending policies of the European Investment Bank, the obligation to give a no
interest–bearing deposit bearing no interest to the Union, and the imposition of
ﬁnes. The period between the submission of the budgetary data and the decision
to impose potential sanctions is only ten months.
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The ﬁrst deposit is equivalent to ﬁne of 0.2% of GDP and a variable part of
a tenth of the diﬀerence between the actual deﬁcit quota of the pervious year
and 3%. However the maximal ﬁne may not exceed 0.5% of GDP. In the case of
Germany the hypothetical deposits would have been about 10 billion euro. This
shows that potential sanctions are not negligible but in relation to the states
expenditures they are almost ’peanuts’.
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Figure 2.3: Maximal Sanction Fees of the SGP
The Code of Conduct, as agreed by EFC and endorsed by ECOFIN in October
1998, and subsequently revised in June 2001, clariﬁed the content and format of
the Stability and Convergence Programms as part of the surveillance process.
The main targets were, strengthening and clarifying the implementation of the
SGP. These included that:
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• the medium term should be interpreted over the length of the economic
cycle;
• the medium term objectives of close–to–balance or balance surplus should,
while respecting the government deﬁcit reference values, ensure a rapid
decline in high debt ratios;
• SGP’s should take into account the costs associated with ageing popula-
tions;
• measures aimed at improving the quality of public ﬁnances should be con-
sidered and
• the objectives of SGP should be consistent with the budgetary recommen-
dations of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs).
Despite of the huge European Fiscal Framework and the whole process to-
gether with EU–Commission, ECOFIN and national stability programmes of all
EU member states, the national ﬁscal authority of each member state have the
autonomy over ﬁscal policy. They set speciﬁc objectives of policy and make policy
decisions about the overall stance of ﬁscal- , tax- and spending policies.
Compared with the original EDP, the SGP has achieved two advances: Firstly,
it has shifted the nature of the ﬁscal framework signiﬁcantly towards a rule–
based concept constraining annual deﬁcits and away from a framework based on
informed judgement. Secondly, it has weakened the position of the European
Commission in the process, to the beneﬁt of ECOFIN (Calmfors, 2005; Ruerup
et al., 2005/06).1 While the Maastricht Treaty gave the Commission considerable
discretion in initiating the EDP and advancing it, the SGP, by making the process
‘more automatic’, has reduced the Commission’s role and raised the importance of
ECOFIN judgements. The main task of the EU–Commission — the institutional
guardian of the Treaty — was systematically undermined by all representative
EU member states. As a result, the process and the decisions taken under it have
become more politicized.
1By the way again in the reformed Stability Pact on March 20, 2005.
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The conjuncture of the EDP and SGP has completely changed the role of
the numerical reference values for the annual deﬁcits/debts from a trigger of
assessment process — in the pre–Maastricht period as screening device — into a
‘binding constraint’. Therefore any breaching of the SGP requires swift corrective
actions by the Member State concerned, and a timely activation of the Excessive
Deﬁcit Procedure (Solbes, 2002). Two factors have advanced this development.
The ﬁrst is the lack of credibility in the process. This was already a problem
in the EDP. However has become more subservient due to the increase in the
ministers power against the EU–Commission and hence will tend to more ﬁscal
laxity. The European public and the media have paid increasing attention to and
criticisms on the interpretation of the EMU ﬁscal framework, particularly the
’Stability and Growth Pact’. From the EU–Commission’s perspective, such an
interpretation assures that the ﬁscal framework is applied equally to all member
countries, and it conforms to the Commission’s general role as the institution
watching over the proper implementation of EU law. As a result, however, the
nature of the ﬁscal framework has been transformed from a procedural ruled by
oversight and informed judgement, as foreseen by the Maastricht Treaty, into a
rigid numerical rule for the annual budget deﬁcit.
2.2.3 National Stability Pacts
An important question arising in this context is, to what extent national govern-
ments can eﬀectively commit their countries to compliance with the obligation of
the SGP.1 Several countries have tried to implement a so–called ’Internal Stability
Pact’, between the central and sub–national governments to solve this problem.
A corresponding stability pact (SGP) at a supranational level were imple-
mented in Austria, Belgium and Spain, notwithstanding that in all remaining
countries the ﬁscal rules are diﬀerent. Germany has a kind of ’national stability
pact’ but it is not based on a rule approach due to its federal structure (Hausner,
2004).
1cf. discussion in the German–Federal–Commission on a ‘National Stability Pact’ on De-
cember 16–17, 2004.
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The argument for ﬁscal rules has strengthened over recent decades, as eco-
nomic agents have become increasingly forward–looking and aware of the con-
sequences of public debt developments on their welfare. The ﬁrst objective of
ﬁscal rules is to enhance the transparency and the credibility of ﬁscal policy.
European governments have several ﬁscal policy objectives, including ﬁscal con-
solidation, lower tax burdens, pension reform and macroeconomic stabilization.
In this context, there is a need to clarify how these options are included into a
well–articulated ﬁscal strategy. A formal rule such as the SGP, provides a clear
benchmark against which the performance of ﬁscal policy can be judged: any
deviation from the rule has to be explained in public. The second objective of
ﬁscal rules is to enlarge political support in favor of the ﬁscal strategy. The ﬁs-
cal strategy needs political and institutional support from social partners and
local authorities, which are partly responsible for general government outcomes.
A rule could therefore be the vehicle of an ’internal stability pact’ to enhance
accountability vis–a`–vis National and European criteria for all public authorities.
In Europe, two speciﬁc arguments can be advanced for adopting broad–based
rules at national level:
• Even if the SGP requires corrective measures to be taken when a ’signiﬁcant
divergence’ from budget targets is identiﬁed (EU–Commission, 2000), the
SGP does not foresee formal sanctions in the event of deviations from the
’close to balance or in surplus’ target and does not implement sanctions
against breaching states on the 60% debt threshold.
• Fiscal coordination within the Euro–Zone needs to be strengthened. The
SGP has been designed to limit the negative externalities stemming from
excessive national deﬁcits. Nevertheless, a more active coordination is nec-
essary in Europe. The adoption of the rules by EMU member states could
enhance both the predictability and the consistency of the national policy
reaction functions to shocks and business cycle ﬂuctuations (Pisani-Ferry,
2002).
The debate on ﬁscal rules has focused traditionally on a critical trade–oﬀ
between commitment and the need to retain policy ﬂexibility (cf. section 2.3).
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Rules which lack transparency and are not supported by an institutional frame-
work cannot eﬀectively secure ﬁscal discipline. Drawing from the lessons of past
failures in the SGP, four main desired characteristics would secure ﬁscal discipline
(Mills and Quinet, 2002):
1. they should be intended for application on a permanent basis;
2. the rule should be state–contingent, so as to give the authorities suﬃcient
ﬂexibility to react to unforeseen shocks. However only ”limited” ’state–
contingent’ is eﬃcient (Beetsma and Jensen, 2003);
3. the rule should be both simple and well deﬁned, in order to be transparent
and credible;
4. the rule should be accompanied by some enforcement mechanisms on the
supranational as well as on the national level, including availability of escape
clauses and consequences of non–compliance.
The role of an internal stability pact can play in this context is much harder
to assess, than the European Stability and Growth Pact, because it depends very
much on the constitutional principles, which are speciﬁc in each country. Such
internal pacts may be of small relevance, as the central government is the main
player in public ﬁnance, anyway (von Hagen, et al. 2002). Where sub–national
governments are more independent, as in Germany, so that the governments
can be forced to bear the ﬁnancial consequences of obligations from an ’internal
agreement’, it may be more ineﬃcient, leaving the central government with the
obligation to take all actions necessary to meet the SGP criteria.
2.2.4 Rationale for the Stability and Growth Pact
The SGP is important for ensuring sound public ﬁnance and to prevent high–
debt countries from continuing to run high deﬁcits and debts that could adversely
aﬀect all members in the monetary union (Beetsma, 2001; Herzog, 2004b). The
new phenomenon in the EMU are adverse ﬁscal spill–overs that concern other
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countries (Thygesen, 1999). A country in a monetary union that became unable
to ﬁnance its expenditure would face three options:
• it could default on its debts
• it could receive direct transfers from other members of the monetary union
or another international organization1 or
• it could put pressure on the central bank to relax monetary policy.2
All three alternatives would be very harmful, for both the country involved
and for other member countries in the monetary union. One big problem in the
euro area, is the Treaty explicitly rules out ’bail outs’ of one member state by
another or by the European Central Bank (ECB). Instead of a ﬁscal rule as the
SGP it is sometimes argued that ﬁnancial markets will discipline ﬁscally proﬂigate
countries by increasing their borrowing costs. However, markets may not provide
suﬃcient incentives for restraint and respond in that area with a to large delay.
Moreover, the market response to unsustainable public ﬁnance can be non–linear
and inappropriate because interest rates could therefore be aﬀected adversely by
the actions of one member country.
In principle, policy co–ordination can bring substantial gains. But in the euro
area framework, characterized by a single monetary authority (ECB) with a num-
ber of decentralized ﬁscal authorities (currently 12), policy co–ordination is more
diﬃcult and complex because of the need for information sharing among various
ﬁscal authorities (ﬁscal–ﬁscal co–ordination) as well as eﬀective co–ordination
between the ﬁscal and monetary authority (ﬁscal–monetary co–ordination). The
last prerequisite is categorial rejected by the ECB. So ECB is against each ’pre–
coordination’ (ECB 2000, p. 78):
”The role of the Eurosystem is determined by the stipulations of
the Treaty governing its status and activities, notably its independence
and the primary objective of maintaining price stability. As a conse-
quence, the Eurosystem cannot engage in any form of agreement aimed
1This opportunity is eliminate through the so–called ‘NO-BAIL-OUT-CLAUSE’ art. 103
ECT.
2This is unlikely because of the strong independence of ECB monetary policy.
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at bringing about a predetermined ”policy mix”, since this could com-
mit the Eurosystem to pursue a monetary policy which might conﬂict
with the primary objective of price stability. The clear separation of
policy responsibilities between monetary authorities and governments
is rooted in the belief — conﬁrmed by decades of practical experience
and a substantial body of economic research — that committing mone-
tary policy–makers to the primary objective of maintaining price sta-
bility helps signiﬁcantly to achieve price stability in a credible and
lasting manner. In this way, monetary policy will make the best pos-
sible contribution to the broader economic objectives of the European
Union and its citizens. Since economic policy co–ordination relates
predominantly to co–operation among the Member States themselves,
the ECB’s contribution to the overall co–ordination process lies in a
dialogue with competent European bodies, notably the Council of Min-
isters and the Euro–11 Group, whereby views and information are ex-
changed. In this dialogue, the prerogatives and independence of policy
actors are respected.”
The position of the ECB is clear, but in the current Convention proposal
is there a clear attempt from the political side to take more inﬂuence in that
direction. This development was criticized by the ECB (ECB–Report, 2003).
As a result the ECB stresses that the Stability and Growth Pact is the key
mechanism for ﬁscal policy co–ordination in the euro area. The SGP set up
information sharing through the stability programmes, and thereby aid policy
co–ordination laid down in the BEPG’s. The ﬁscal–monetary co–ordination is the
one opportunity for the EU Commission and the chair of Eurogroup to attend the
ECB Governing Council meetings to enhance understanding of the ECB reaction
function to each ﬁscal or economic development. There is some suggestion that
this mechanism for information sharing is not used to its full potential, and there
is scope for further work on monetary–ﬁscal co–ordination issues (Smaghi and
Casini, 2000).
A couple of other arguments for constrains on national ﬁscal policies have
received serious attention and we will be discussed brieﬂy. The ﬁrst argument
is that unconstrained national ﬁscal policies can put pressure on the monetary
union’s central bank to inﬂate. The idea goes as follows:
Suppose that there is an outstanding stock of nominal government debt. If the
interest rates on this debt are not indexed, then market participants take into
account their expectation of inﬂation when the interest rates are determined.
Once the interest rates are set, the central bank can collect an inﬂation tax by
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inﬂating more than the market participants expected. The resulting inﬂation
is costly, but if direct taxes are distortionary or costly to administer or comply
with, then the cost of the inﬂation may be worth the beneﬁt of lower real debt
payments and, hence, lower direct taxes.
That situation is made worse when national governments choose their ﬁscal
policies independently as in the European Monetary Union. When an individual
government decides how much debt to issue, it knows the motives of the central
bank and the resulting expectations of the public; it knows that an increase in
its debt will lead to union–wide inﬂation. It takes into account the cost to its
own residents of this inﬂation, but not the cost to the residents of the rest of
the monetary union. The result of this free-rider problem is a sub–optimally
large amount of debt and even higher rate of inﬂation than if ﬁscal policies were
coordinated (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999).
Despite the primary objective ’price–stability’ of the ECB, this commitment
is not perfectly credible. The central bank also have an incentive to lower interest
rates and reduce the outstanding stock of real debt, especially if policy is inﬂu-
enced by governments acting in their national interests. De jure the Maastricht
Treaty forbids national governments from pressuring the central bank, however,
this may be diﬃcult to observe and more diﬃcult to verify.
Moreover constraints on ﬁscal policy would reduce a central bank’s incentive
to lower real interest rates, but would not reduce its incentives to lower real
wages. Indeed, if restrictions on ﬁscal policy exacerbate unemployment, they
may increase the central bank’s incentives to lower the real wage.
A further argument for a ﬁscal framework are interest rate and government
spending spill–overs. Increased government spending by one country or a group
of countries may crowd out other forms of spending in the world economy and it
may also stimulate world demand and increase world output. If uncoordinated
ﬁscal policy is sub–optimal because of a negative or positive externality, there are
three standard solutions:
1. The EU can impose a quota on the externality. This would be a rational
for the Pact’s debt ceiling.
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2. The EU can impose a Pigovian tax on the increased debt or give a sub-
sidy. Unfortunately, these two options require knowing the EU–wide social
optimum and therefore a huge information exchange.
3. The Coase–Theorem solution. If an externality exists, then the government
can issue tradable property rights (Cassela, 2001).
In the following we shed some light on the politic–economic perspective of why
governments are following socially undesirable ﬁscal policies? Systematically too
high government spending is sometimes put forward by well–organized interest
groups. A second argument is that governments may run up debt to constrain
their successors. Finally, the political business cycle literature shows several sub–
optimal incentives in consolidation also under a rule–based system like the SGP.
A short related argument in line with that literature illustrates that governments
may not be able to commit themselves to an optimal ﬁscal policy. Therefore,
delegation to a third party or an institution enforce better and may raise their
welfare. Even if this were the case, however, it is unlikely that such uniform rules
for all EU member states are an appropriate solution.
Nearly all the arguments so far have in common that they use either free–rider
or moral hazard problems for their justiﬁcation. A diﬀerent consistent theoretical
argument is shown by Sims (2004). He builds a model of an E type (for ECB) and
an F type (for Fed) central bank and works out the diﬀerences and similarities.
Sims (2004) summarizes the model implications as follows: A type F central
bank depends on ﬁscal cooperation and backup under certain conditions if it is to
guarantee a stable price level. If it can rely on such backup, it will need to invoke
it only very rarely, so its eﬀective degree of independence may be large. A type
E bank can do without ﬁscal backup under certain conditions in which a type F
bank would need it. However a type E bank will ﬁnd that the need to maintain
or attain a positive net worth is a constraint on its ability to tightly control the
price level. That can result because the ECB has no ’lender of the last resort’
function. Therefore, negative net wealth implies liabilities for the treasury and
so higher deﬁcits or taxes in the future. That is a potential source of an increase
in inﬂation and can lead to a more restrictive monetary policy. Hence, monetary
policy attracts again more capital. Now the exchange-rate appreciates in Europe
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and that implies again losses in net wealth for the ECB. Now a — vicious cycle —
starts! The only opportunity to escape such a worse scenario is to constrain ﬁscal
policy so that negative net wealth can be compensated without any problem and
no inﬂationary pressure. The only way to achieve that is to target ﬁscal policy
to a balanced budget in the medium–run as it is done by the SGP. Summing up:
There are plethora of arguments of the necessity of a the ’Stability and Growth
Pact’ from an economical and political perspective.
2.3 Conﬂicting Objectives
In principal there are four important trade–oﬀ’s in the European Fiscal Frame-
work:
1. Discipline versus Flexibility,
2. Rule versus Discretion,
3. Fiscal–Fiscal versus Central Coordination and
4. Stabilization versus Consolidation.
In the following subsections we evaluate the four trade–oﬀ’s and relate all of
them to the discussion on the Stability and Growth Pact.
2.3.1 Discipline versus Flexibility
Fiscal discipline is seen in the literature as the precondition for a balanced ﬁscal
budget and policy mix, because high levels of debt are likely to induce a restrictive
stance in monetary policy (Buti et al., 1998). In other words, the SGP allows
the ECB to be less restrictive in monetary policy (Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999). In
contrast to the rule–based scheme, it is sometimes argued that ﬁnancial markets
provide a suﬃcient guarantee for ﬁscal discipline on their own. However, far being
from perfect, ﬁnancial markets react with a lag, have a tendency to overshoot the
31
2.3 Conﬂicting Objectives
equilibrium and can cause negative contagion eﬀects as well as spill–overs to other
member countries (Arits and Buti, 2000; Artis and Winkler, 1999).
A politic–economic argument is that partisan control over ﬁscal policy usually
suﬀers from a deﬁcit bias due to incentives to overspend (Alesina and Tabellini,
1987; Nordhaus, 1975). The reason for this is that political agents do not inter-
nalize the whole social cost of providing beneﬁts within their region. Normally,
overspending is partially counteracted by the risk of incurring higher interest
rates, not least because of increased inﬂationary pressure from depreciation in
the exchange rate. The establishment of the monetary union has spread that risk
to all members and thereby increases the relative weight of the incentives to over-
spend. The unintended negative externalities of expansive ﬁscal policy are then
externalized onto the community. Moreover free–riding on the expansive ﬁscal
policy in other euro member countries increases the problem in a monetary union.
The EMU therefore aggravates perverse incentives for ﬁscal looseness and exac-
erbates a politically induced deﬁcit bias (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999). The
inﬂationary result of increased deﬁcits can, inside a monetary union, no longer
be cushioned by exchange rate deprecation (or devaluation) and will therefore
lead to reduced exports. Another justiﬁcation for a disciplining mechanism like
the SGP is provided by the concern over ﬁscal spillovers in the sense of negative
externalities of ﬁscal proﬂigacy on other, ’innocent’, member states within the
Eurozone. This danger is the main argument of the proponents for increased pol-
icy coordination and has been claimed to grow in line with economic integration
(Masso, 1996).
The essence of the arguments supporting the SGP is the need for ﬁscal dis-
cipline in itself. This need is increased by the speciﬁc requirements of monetary
union. The pact is perceived as helpful because price stability itself is argued
to be poorly safeguarded by the institutional independence of monetary policy
(Grilli et al., 1991). A politically induced deﬁcit bias, exacerbated by entry to the
EMU, has to be institutionally contained in order to enable a growth–enhancing
policy mix.
The main criticisms of the rule–based approach to ﬁscal discipline is that the
SGP in its present form is excessively tight and inﬂexible and thereby hampers
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automatic stabilizers (Buti et al., 2003). The Stability Pact as such does not en-
courage discipline and consolidate when it could be achieved at a much lower cost,
i.e. in upswings, but is conﬁned to requiring pro–cyclical measures in times of
weak or falling growth. Furthermore, it completely fails to promote an improve-
ment in the quality of consolidation and in sustainable public ﬁnance. It remains
paradoxical that the SGP exhibits an unjustiﬁed overemphasis on deﬁcits rather
than the more substantial debt problem (Rostagno and Hiebert, 2001). The only
explanation is to be found in a political economy argument: It is easier to control
the deﬁcit by rules than by the debt level. Logically it is more diﬃcult to deﬁne
sustainable public debts (Pasinetti, 2000).1
A last argument for disciplining schemes in a monetary union is based on
a game–theoretic reason and the problem of ﬁscal–monetary interaction (Dixit
and Lambertini, 2001). Dixit and Lambertini (2001) show that ’ﬁscal discretion
destroys monetary commitments’ on the part of the ECB, which justiﬁes the im-
position of budgetary rules when there are conﬂicting targets between monetary
and ﬁscal authorities. However, if both sides agree on the ultimate policy tar-
gets in what the authors call a situation of ’monetary–ﬁscal symbiosis’, then the
preferred outcomes can be achieved.
All mentioned criticisms to the pact do not deny the need for ﬁscal discipline
and its increased importance under the conditions of monetary union. Never-
theless, concerns about the ability of ﬁscal policy to fulﬁll its equally enhanced
responsibility for anti–cyclical stabilization of the demand side give grounds for
considerable doubt as to whether the particular institutional solution that has
been adopted represents a good choice.2
2.3.2 Rule versus Discretion
Departing from the issue of discipline, the question remains how the ﬁscal branch
of economic policy should be procedurally organized? The alternatives are located
1cf our approach to evaluate sustainable public ﬁnance in the European Monetary Union.
2The same is true for the reformed Stability and Growth Pact, since March 20, 2005.
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on a continuum between complete political discretion at one end and a fully de–
politicized scheme of rules and technocratic agencies at the other.
Economic policy suﬀers inevitably from ’time inconsistency’ (Kydland and
Prescott, 1977). Without a credible commitment to an ex ante optimal plan,
policymakers will always ﬁnd it rational to deviate ex post from their announced
course. Moreover the ’Lucas critique’ which denies the applicability of traditional
economic models to policymaking is a clear argument for game–theoretic models
in that research ﬁeld.1 To limit the eﬀects due to deﬁcit spending, government
action should be constrained by rules or even delegated to an independent agency.
This demand has been implemented for monetary policy in the form of a ’conser-
vative central banker’ (Rogoﬀ, 1985), which is independent of time–inconsistent
governments and can follow a predictable rule.
Fully rational expectations would imply that ﬁscal action has no impact on
’Ricardian Equivalence’ (Barro, 1974). The ’Fiscal Theory of Price Level’ (Leeper,
1991; Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2002; Woodford, 2003) states that in reality there
is more likely a ’Non–Ricardian–Equivalence’. That constellation implies a close
connection between ﬁscal and monetary policy. Whereas Barro’s contribution
described ﬁscal policy as ’irrelevant’ in the sense of public debt and taxation
being equivalent in their eﬀects on the economy, Woodford et al. (2003) conﬁrm
the relevance of ﬁscal policy in a so–called ’non–Ricardian’ regime. However,
price stability implies not only commitment to monetary policy rules but also a
clear commitment to an appropriate ﬁscal framework.
The emerging theoretical ”near–consensus” between rules and discretion seems
to point towards ’rules with discretion’ or ’The Principle of Constrained Discre-
tion’. A higher budget deﬁcit or an expansionary monetary policy is thus able
to decrease unemployment. However, in the long–run, structural parameters de-
termine a ’natural level’ of growth and employment. Therefore, in theory, an
adequate system of ﬁscal policy should generally aim for long–term budgetary
consolidation, whilst leaving room for automatic or ad hoc discretionary stabi-
lization in the face of short–term ﬂuctuations.
1Our economic analysis in chapter 4 and 5 is therefore based on game–theoretic models.
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2.3.3 Fiscal–Fiscal versus Central Coordination
Begg et al. (2003) describe it as a means of addressing two simultaneous dilem-
mas. First, providing a purposeful framework for twelve interdependent ﬁscal
policies vis–a`–vis a single monetary policy, implies a problem of collective action.
This is generally shown by Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (Arrow, 1951). The
second problem arises due to the fact that consolidation under the EMU is charac-
terized as a ’prisoners dilemma’ (Allsopp, 2002). Therefore, one country beneﬁts
from another country’s consolidation in the form of positive externalities, primary
through the interest rate channel, and moreover has an incentive towards free–
rider behavior and provides too little consolidation itself. The SGP can therefore
be seen as a device to impose the cooperative solution (Axelrod, 1995) into a con-
solidation game as well as a guarantee of central banks independence vis–a`–vis
potentially irresponsible spending behaviors.
2.3.4 Stabilization versus Consolidation
In normal situations, business cycle ﬂuctuations in the economy are smoothed by
the so–called ’automatic stabilizers’ operating in the public sector in the form of
progressive or higher government expenditure and lower taxes at times of eco-
nomic downturns (Frenkel and Razin, 1987). Recent empirical research suggests
that European economies have experienced extensive stabilization eﬀects through
ﬁscal policy in the 80ies and 90ies (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1995; Bayoumi and
Masson, 1996). The importance of stabilization has even increased with the EMU
because of the common objectives, the Stability and Growth Pact and, by de-
ﬁnition the ’one size ﬁt all’ monetary policy. However, the theoretical ﬁndings
in chapter 4 and the empirical evidence (von Hagen et al., 2002) suggest that
discipline and stabilization are mutually supporting in the longer run.
Summing up: All the discussed trade–oﬀ’s underly also the following relation
between Eﬃciency versus Discipline and Stabilization. A potential trade–oﬀ has
also been identiﬁed between budgetary discipline (stabilization) and eﬃciency.
For instance, the constraint of a balanced budget might present governments
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from lowering the tax burden and hence reducing the distortions induced by a
high level of taxes. However, ﬁscal discipline is the precondition for guaranteeing
permanent reductions in the tax burden (Myles, 1998). Moreover it is clear
that public debt has a negative impact on growth in the long–run. Maintaining
discipline will enhance public growth and thus eﬃciency in the long–run whilst
short–term reactions to business cycles bring the typical trade–oﬀ back on the
agenda.
These trade–oﬀ’s depend not only on two dimensions and the behavior of
ﬁscal authorities, but also on the interplay between monetary authorities and the
other ﬁscal policies. Empirical analyzes reveal that ﬁscal and monetary policies
have tended to be substitutes. However, the interaction between multiple ﬁscal
authorities and a single monetary authority makes the policy ’game’ in EMU
much more complex and unpredictable. These interactions imply higher risks
of policy conﬂicts and corresponding higher gains from successful coordination
(Engwerda et al., 2002).
2.4 Literature Review
Economists have tried to model this interaction mechanism and the consequences
implied by the SGP. An early attempt to model the SGP is provided by Beetsma
and Uhlig (1999). They present in a two–period model of the monetary union
that governments have incentives to issue more debt than a social planner would
choose. They conclude therefore that the incentives to restrain debt accumulation
are diminished in a monetary union and, hence, the excessiveness of debt will be
exacerbated. Thus, the spill over eﬀect arises through increasing public debt in
a country, which leads to a looser common monetary policy and hence, aﬀects
all the union participants. Similarly to Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) is the work
by Chari and Kehoe (1998) and Chari and Kehoe (2003) who explore the need
for debt restrictions in a two–country model of monetary union. They conclude,
that restrictions on public debt are needed, because union members do not fully
internalize the welfare eﬀects of an increase in nominal debt on the common
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union–wide inﬂation rate.1 Dixit and Lambertini (2003) and Beetsma and Jensen
(2003) modeling a monetary union with ﬁscal–monetary interaction.2 The results
of these models are: prices (or inﬂation) are higher if the central bank cannot
fully commit to the aim of price stability and a shock–contingent budgetary target
leads increasing free–riding behavior.
All the papers mentioned so far have in common that the union’s central
bank is not only concerned with low inﬂation, but also with other objectives.
Debrun (2000), in contrast provides a rational for short–run (deﬁcit–based) ﬁscal
constraints, despite the assumption that the ECB is totally committed to its
objective (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 2002). The important point here is that ﬁscal
policies aﬀect aggregated demand and supply and, hence the price level in the
monetary union. Through a lack of commitment in monetary and ﬁscal policy the
public deﬁcit biased up: Firstly, governments try to stimulate aggregate demand
by expansive ﬁscal policy and secondly, they use deﬁcits to move the common
inﬂation rate to the direction they individually prefer.3 This model prediction
is perhaps an empirical rational for the reason why France and Germany with
very low ’national’ inﬂation rates and growth rates breache the SGP. In the
following thesis, we found that the current SGP works not really to secure price
stability. We can show, if more than one country breaches the Pact, a deﬁcit–
spiral (or debt–spiral) to more excessive government spending will be induced,
despite the SGP. Additionally we found that the optimal inﬂation rate by the
ECB could be higher under the current Stability and Growth Pact. Moreover
complex monetary–ﬁscal interaction reduces the disciplining power of monetary
policy.
The theoretical analysis explains on the one hand the need of ﬁscal restrictions
and on the other hand the implementation problems of the current SGP. Beetsma
concludes however, that the theoretical literature cannot pass any clear verdict
on the SGP: ’Therefore, the pros and cons of the SGP need to be assessed using
qualitative arguments.’
1Cf. Giovannetti et al extend the paper of Chari and Kehoe into various directions.
2Cf. However without implementing ﬁscal restrictions such as the Stability Pact.
3Cf. If the real inﬂation rate target is too tight, it boosts aggregate demand further, which
increases inﬂation.
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In a nutshell, the need of a strong ﬁscal framework like the SGP in the Euro-
pean Monetary Union is consensus. The implementation of an eﬃcient coordina-
tion mechanism is very diﬃcult, because it has to link ’National and European’
interests. Therefore there is no ’perfect’ rule. However in the following chapters
we will assess what some key ingredients would be to manage this interaction
eﬃcient.
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Chapter 3
Lessons from historical and
current Monetary Unions
’Over most of history, monetary uniﬁcation has fol-
lowed political integration.’
Robert A. Mundell (1999)
European Monetary Union diﬀers in many matters from the historical exam-
ples. On the one hand EMU has proceeded thus far without any political inte-
gration until today. On the other hand, because the euro is based on paper and
book–keeping currency, it diﬀers from silver and gold standards. But Monetary
integration in such a framework is more diﬃcult than with metallic currencies
(Mundell, 2000). So the open question will be: ’What makes a successful inter-
national currency? Analyzing the history of monetary union is a valuable source
of knowledge about the prospects for the European Monetary Union, even if the
lessons of history are not always straightforward. In this section we focus on the
importance of the ﬁscal policy frameworks in historical monetary unions .1
1For a detailed overview of the development of the world ﬁnance system see Eichengreen
(1996). A very good summary of the history of monetary unions is presented by Theurl (1992).
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3.1 Introduction
A Monetary Union or a uniﬁed currency area is an extreme version of a ﬁxed
exchange rate monetary re´gime (Bordo, 2001). The body of a monetary union
is that all member states or entities adopt the same currency as unit of account,
medium of exchange and store of value.1 The monetary union therefore has one
exchange rate towards the rest of the world (Jarchow and Rhmann, 1991).
In the following section, we distinguish between national monetary unions and
multinational monetary unions and their corresponding ﬁscal frameworks. By a
national monetary union we mean that political and monetary sovereignty go
hand in hand (Theurl, 1992). Roughly speaking, the borders of the nation–state
are the borders of the monetary area. For example, within the British monetary
union comprising England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland or the United
States or the German monetary union of the western and eastern parts in July
1, 1990 (Lehmann, 1995). A national monetary union has as a rule merely one
monetary authority, commonly a central bank.
By a multinational monetary union we mean international monetary coop-
eration between a number of independent countries based on permanently ﬁxed
exchange rates between member countries. Typical historical examples on the
European continent are:
• Latin monetary union (1865–1927) which consisted of: France, Switzerland,
Belgium, Italy and Greece.
• Scandinavian monetary union (1872–1931) which had one common cur-
rency, the Scandinavian krona, and three members: Sweden, Norway and
Denmark.
• Austro-Hungarian Monetary Union (1867–1919) which was based on Aus-
tria and Hungary.
1These properties deﬁne money in standard textbooks, but not at all exclusively. New
monetary economics deﬁne money slightly diﬀerently. See Smithin (2003) and Greenwald and
Stiglitz (2003).
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Adoption of a common currency by member states can be consistent with
alternative sets of institutional arrangements. While we deal in this chapter
primarily with monetary experience of the late 18th and the 19th centuries the
lessons for the European Monetary Union could be not more appropriate. On the
one hand it shows very impressively the danger of an inconsistent ﬁscal framework
and on the other hand it explains very illustratively the symptoms of a break–up.
Apart from that a number of monetary unions have been established in the 20th
century, for example:1
• CFA Franc Zone, formed in 1959 by former French colonies in west and
central Africa.2
• East Caribbean Currency Area is a multinational monetary union consisting
of seven small island nations.3
• Very small unions, as for example Andorra-France, Vatican City-Italy and
Liechtenstein-Switzerland.
Table 3.1: Summary of Historical Monetary Unions
Monetary areas Time of creation
National monetary unions
United States 1789-92
Italy 1861
Germany 1875 and 1991
Multinational monetary unions
Latin monetary union 1865
Scandinavian monetary union 1873-75
Austro-Hungarian monetary union 1867
Current monetary unions
CFA Franc Zone 1959
EMU 1999
Source: Herzog (2004)
1A more complete summary is found in Cohen (1993) and Bordo (2001).
2The members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.
3The members are Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts-Nevis, St
Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines.
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All these monetary unions cooperate also in other matters, for example within
a common market. Moreover all these current unions are still in operation.
In the following sections we describe the establishment of three national
unions, those of US, Italy and Germany, and the three multinational unions:
Latin monetary union, Scandinavian monetary union and Austro–Hungary mon-
etary union. Finally, we try to analyze monetary union and ﬁscal policy expe-
rience for a better understanding in the EMU (Bordo and Jonung, 2003): We
asked the question: What are the key determinants for the creation and also the
dissolution of past and current monetary unions?
3.2 Diﬀerent Monetary Unions
3.2.1 National Monetary Unions
The United States Monetary Union
The US monetary union was created with the signing of the Constitution in 1789.
The constitution gave the Congress the sole power to ’coin money’ and ’ regulate
the value thereof’. Moreover the, Coinage Act of 1792 deﬁned the US dollar in
terms of ﬁxed weights of gold and silver coins, placing the country on a bimetallic
standard (Bordo and Jonung, 2003). Although banking instability characterized
the nineteenth century, the monetary union remained intact with the exception
of the Civil War period 1861–65. Monetary uniﬁcation of the US was thus not
completed until long after its political uniﬁcation. The US did not establish a
central bank with a lender of the last resort function until this century.
The Italian Monetary Union
The main reason for the establishment of a currency union on the Apennine
peninsula in the 1860s was political uniﬁcation of the area now known as Italy. In
1859, more than 90 diﬀerent metallic currencies were legal tender. The existence
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of a huge number of diﬀerent currencies was commonly regarded as a barrier
to trade, as also seen in Germany through the ’Deutscher Bund’ or ’Zollverein’.
During a brief transition period, only four currencies were acceptable and the
others were exchanged for these four. But the monetary uniﬁcation of Italy was
not accompanied by immediate action to establish a single monetary authority.
Several regional banks were issuing notes as well as performing central bank
functions. Also the Italian monetary union was stable in the past periods.
The German Monetary Union
The German monetary — as well as political — uniﬁcation process proceeded
stepwise. The Reichsbank was created in 1875 after the uniﬁcation of coinage
in 1857. Both steps were important processes in the creation of the German
monetary union. In 1834, all intended customs barriers were removed. This
agreement, known as the ’Zollverein’ was integrated in a system with a common
standard. Political uniﬁcation, by the creation of the German Reich, was followed
by establishing a central bank that could function as a lender of last resort.
Moreover, political uniﬁcation was also a prerequisite for a common ﬁscal policy–
as it emerged during the First World War. Again — as seen in the other cases
— monetary uniﬁcation followed political uniﬁcation (Bordo and Jonung, 2003).
The analogous case was seen in the German monetary uniﬁcation in 1990.
3.2.2 Multinational Monetary Unions
The Latin Monetary Union
In the end of 1865, Belgium proposed a joint monetary conference that created
the Latin Monetary Union between Belgium, France, Switzerland and later also
Italy and Greece. Initially, the union achieved its aims and solved the main
problems from the preliminary period.1 However, two problems soon emerged.
The ﬁrst problem was endogenous: inconsistencies about sovereignty rights in the
1A full description of the Latin Monetary Union was presented by Willis (1901 and 1968).
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area of national ﬁscal policy. That enabled Italy to ﬁnance part of her chronic
government deﬁcit with seignorage, the costs of which were shared between all
four counties (Bordo and Jonung, 2000). The second problem and main cause of
the break–up of the Latin Monetary Union are exogenous factors such as World
War One.
The Scandinavian Monetary Union
Prior to the formation of the Scandinavian monetary union in 1873, the three
Scandinavian countries had a long history of similar currencies and exchange of
notes and coins between them (Jonung, 1984).1 Sweden, Denmark and Norway
created a common monetary union in 1873.2 After some problems the Scandina-
vian monetary union altered the system slightly in 1885, to ensure that no country
sought to gain seignorage beneﬁts at the expense of the others, and in 1894 to
cancel all existing restrictions.3 Like in the case of Latin monetary union, the
Scandinavian monetary union’s collapse was induced through such endogenous
factors as political struggles and exogenous factors as World War One. Conse-
quently to both of them, in that period monetary policy was more expansive in
Denmark and Norway than in Sweden (Bergman et al., 1993).
The Austro–Hungarian Monetary Union
Since 1866, and the end of the Habsburg Monarchy’s rule over Central Europe,
Austrians had to ﬁnd a way to grant Hungary increased economic freedom while
at the same time retaining the economic unity of the stumbling Empire (Flan-
dreau, 2003). The result was the so–called ’Compromise of 1867’ a comprehensive
1A complete summary of the history of the Scandinavian Monetary Union is shown in
Bergman et al. (1993)).
2Norway ﬁrst oﬃcially joined the monetary union in 1875, after two years. The reason for
that is historically not entirely clear, but in practice her monetary standard was the same since
1873 (Bordo, 2000).
3The monetary union was not combined with a Scandinavian free trade area (Lonung, 1993).
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agreement which carefully delineated political and economic rights and obliga-
tions. The ’Compromise’ was signed for ten years. It was renewed every ten
years until 1919 through negotiation rounds. The Austro–Hungarian Monetary
Union was based on two distinct political entities (monarchies), and deﬁned the
domains where the two countries were fully sovereign, and those where sovereignty
was shared. Among the latter we ﬁnd the common market and trade policy, the
common currency, a common army, a common diplomacy and foreign represen-
tatives. Among the ﬁrst were the right for each part to have its own parliament,
government, electoral system, laws and budgets. Thus the dual monarchy can be
called a de facto monetary union like the EMU today (Flandreau, 2001).
3.2.3 Current Monetary Unions
The main focus on newly formed Monetary Unions like the EMU has been some
attention on their economic impacts — given EMU’s short life in terms of his-
torical monetary unions — and thus the large matters for speculation. However
European monetary unions are by no means a new phenomenon, as the current
example of the CFA France Zone shows.
The CFA Monetary Union
As the various colonies achieved political independence in the late 1950s and early
1960s, most of these monetary unions were dissolved, the new nation states prefer-
ring complete economic independence, with their own currencies and independent
central bank. In western and central Africa, most of the states newly independent
from France chose to retain close economic links with the colonial power. They
retained the shared currency of French colonial Africa, and continued to work
with the existing central banks.
The African Zone — the Communaute´ (or Cooperation) Financie`re Africaine
(CFA) — currently consists of ﬁfteen countries, all but one of which are situated
in West and Central Africa. The main goals and institutions of the CFA monetary
union are:
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• Complete ﬁnancial integration between member states.
• Guaranteed convertibility.
• Fixed exchange rates.
• Free transfers between the member states and France (no restrictions).
• administrative structure to which member states bind themselves, and which
prevent African states from free riding on French guarantees, and on each
other.
The institutional mechanism entails considerable loss of economic sovereignty
on the part of the African states (Fielding, 2002) and is probably comparable
to the Stability and Growth Pact in the European Fiscal Framework. Fielding
(2002) argues in a very detail analysis as follows:
”The administrative structures of the CFA are designed to ’harmonize’
the monetary policy of member states, so that the French guarantees
are feasible, i.e. institutional restrictions prevent countries free rid-
ing on the system. Without any controls, free riding would be easy.
For example, without any institutional constraints, government could
create large current account deﬁcits each year by increasing borrowing
from private banks to ﬁnance government consumption of imports.”
Similar features are possible in the EMU. Moreover the monetary framework
has some similarity with the EMU (Fielding, 2002). The conclusions and sugges-
tions for future policy are relegated to the next section.
European Monetary Union
On 1 January 19991 the exchange rates of eleven members2 of the European
Union were locked to each other at irrevocably ﬁxed rates. This was a major
1Indeed, the changeover weekend is both easily identiﬁed and correct de jure. However, the
euro area was de facto created in the weekend of 2-3 May 1998, when the decision was made
as to which countries were to participate in the Third Stage of EMU.
2now 12 members plus Greece.
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step towards the establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and
the European Central Bank (ECB). The domestic currencies have been replaced
by one single currency, the EURO. Since then, the creation of the Euro marks
an important event in the history of European integration and in the history of
global monetary systems.
The creation of EMU and the ECB was accompanied by a discussion of the
future of EMU. Independent observers have pointed out a number of shortcom-
ings, ’ﬂaws’ and ’hazard areas’ in the construction and workings of EMU (Bordo
and Jonung, 2003). These include:
• the absence of a central lender of last resort function for EMU,
• the lack of a central authority supervising the ﬁnancial systems of EMU,
• weak democratic control (accountability) of the ECB,
• unclear and inconsistent policy directives for the ECB,
• the absence of central co–ordination of ﬁscal policy within EMU combined
with unduly strict criteria for domestic debt and deﬁcits as set out in the
Maastricht rules and the Stability and Growth Pact in the face of asym-
metric shocks, and
• Euroland is assumed not to be an ’optimal’ currency area.
Do these shortcomings represent major threats to the future of EMU? Later,
we focus mainly on the ‘ﬁfth’ item, especially on the Stability and Growth Pact
and its current drawbacks. But before the pure economic analysis starts — with
various economic models — we answer some questions by examining the historical
record of the illustrated unions above, those that have turned out to be lasting
as well as some unions that have been dissolved. The main advantages of this
analysis as compared to pure economic theory are: First, it recognizes the ’Lucas
critique’ (Lucas, 1976); Second, it is not static and ﬁnally of most importance it
is not ahistorical. This approach is an evolutionary one, since we examine a long
stretch of time and the character of the processes causing the appearance and
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dissolution of monetary co–operation and uniﬁcation. The aim is to extract the
key conditions for the establishment and survival of monetary unions.1
3.3 Lessons from Historical Monetary Unions
There are several reasons why unions are created (Bordo, 2001). First, the most
important reason is the existence of political unity. Second are economic reasons,
including gains from trade, access to wider markets, reduction in transaction
costs in exchanging money and harmonization of policies. All have played an
important role in the creation of monetary unions. Finally, there are also other
non–economic factors encouraging unions such as a common history, a common
language, culture and religion (Alt and Lowry, 1994).
3.3.1 Can we learn from history?
Why are monetary unions dissolved or destroyed? The answer is: ”Far–reaching
political events are the crucial factor.” The crucial point emerge when far–reaching
political events causes. The break–up of existing monetary unions is accompanied
by periods of transformations and such strong exogenous shocks as wars. Bordo
(2001) concludes:
’To sum up, the causes of the fall of monetary unions are mainly to
be found in political developments.’
The paper by Bordo (2001) concludes with some bearing on EMU and distils
out several lessons from the historical record.2 In the following list we summarize
the main historical observations:
1A more detailed description of the relevant institutional monetary and ﬁscal framework
was done in chapter 1 and is extended in chapter 5.
2Several conclusions are independently found from Theurl (1992) in his research about
twelve lessons from history.
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1. The creation of national monetary unions was closely associated with sov-
ereign and independent nation–states. Moreover all national monetary
unions (United States, Italy and Germany) were followed by political uni-
ﬁcations. This feature is a historical constant and a very long–running and
far–reaching relationship.
2. Economic reasons for monetary unions are reductions in transaction costs,
gains from trade and a wider harmonization.
3. The existence of permanent institutions supporting political unity is a good
indication for a stable and strong monetary union.
4. Monetary unions collapse when political disintegration is caused by ex-
tremely strong and unexpected shocks.
5. Monetary uniﬁcation is an evolutionary process and it is impossible to set–
up a detailed plan for the process in advance covering all future circum-
stances.
Feldstein (1997) and Cohen (1993) argue from six case studies of monetary
co–operations ’that political conditions are most instrumental in determining the
sustainability of monetary cooperation among sovereign governments.’ The term
”political conditions” covers the presence of a strong local hegemon or a dense
network of institutional interactions. Cohen (1993) concludes that economic and
organizational factors matter, but interstate politics appears to matter most of
all.
The main causes of the break–up of the three discussed multinational mon-
etary unions was apart from the First World War the decentralized ﬁscal policy
of member countries. Therefore the dissolution of these monetary unions was
determined by both exogenous shocks and such endogenous factors as diﬀerent
preferences in the national ﬁscal policies. But multinational monetary unions
have been easy to divide when each member state maintained a central bank of
its own during the monetary union. Thus the central banks of the nation states
could rapidly re–establish the domestic ’national’ monetary union. The following
table illustrates the dissolution of some monetary unions in the twentieth century:
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Table 3.2: Dissolution of Historical Monetary Unions
Monetary Unions Dissolution Causes of dissolution
National monetary unions
Austria 1919-27 Defeat at war
Russia 1918-20 Creation of several new states
Soviet Union 1992-94 Political unrest; New states
Yugoslavia 1991-94 Civil war; rise of new states
Czechoslovakia 1993 Political divergences; New states
Multinational monetary unions Sock of war and especially
Latin monetary union 1914-27 Divergent monetary & ﬁscal policies
Scandinavian monetary union 1914-24 Divergent monetary & ﬁscal policies
Austro–Hungarian union 1919- Divergent monetary & ﬁscal policies
Source: Herzog (2003), Bordo and Jonung (1997).
One can see that the exogenous factor ’War’ alone was not suﬃcient to explain
the dissolution of monetary unions. Such endogenous factors as high ﬁscal deﬁcits,
high inﬂation and other political determinants were also important causes of the
break–up.
When considering the future of EMU, we ﬁrst should ask whether EMU will
emerge as a national or multinational monetary union. The answer is not obvious.
The EMU could be both. The EMU project is unique in the history of monetary
unions and thus there is no adequate example in monetary experience. Bordo and
Jonung (2003) propose to see the EMU as a ’National Monetary Union’ because
of the major institutional framework of monetary policy (the ECB) and the other
institutions in the EMU (i.e. SGP, BEPG). But this perspective was criticized
by several other authors because there is no existing political union and none to
be seen in the future. But despite the debate over the correct framework some
determinants and shortcomings are clear and more will emerge over time. Indeed,
current criticism by economists concerning the short–comings of the Eurosystem
lays the groundwork for future improvements.
We pick up some of the biggest problems —”The Maastricht criteria and the
Stability and Growth Pact”— that are of most importance in the later chapters
and sections. The Maastricht criteria are tough on paper, but in reality they
have already been stretched incredibly in various ways, for example by allowing
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Belgium, Italy, Greece and others into the EMU in spite of their debt to GDP and
deﬁcit to GDP ratios being ’too’ high.1 Wide cross–country diversity in inﬂation
trends and budgetary positions would also manifest itself with no doubt costly,
acrimonious debates within the future of European Union. In extrem circum-
stances, this could even raise the specter of possible break–up; more generally, it
would generate additional uncertainty about future policy, with probably adverse
knock–on eﬀects, such as those on the risk–premium parameter. Political desider-
ata have already overruled the rules of the Eurosystem. The political economy
of the EMU will primarily be determined by the major powers among the mem-
bers of the monetary union. If there were to be tensions between for example
Germany and France, the risk for the EMU to become unstable would increase
(Bordo and Jonung, 2003). The EMU requires one dominant player or a strong
coalition to function well. To sum up, the political process as the major deter-
minant of the future of the EMU is consistent with the views put forth by many
other researches (see for example Cohen (1993,1998), Corden (1972), Goorhart
(1998) and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996)).
The lessons from the current CFA monetary union provide a good example
of the biggest challenges also in the European context. The regulations that
are designed to constrain the borrowing of individual governments are ineﬀective
because they do not represent binding constraints (Fielding, 2002). This phe-
nomenon is also observable in the EMU (Hughes-Hallett, 2004). Moreover some
empirical studies conﬁrm that larger countries accumulate higher deﬁcits than
smaller countries (von Hagen, 2004). These failings entail on the one hand eco-
nomic costs and on the other hand they create ﬁnancial instability and thus have
the potential to destabilize the monetary union. Fielding (2002) concludes that
for the future institutions — in CFA monetary union — to perform eﬃciently,
they should be based on the characteristics of its member states.
A major lesson from history is that monetary uniﬁcation is an evolutionary
process (Bayoumi and Masson, 1996). This process, should properly be regarded
as a policy learning process where policy makers learn to cope with the short-
comings that emerge. This process will continue as long as the political will to
1Notice that with the exception of Luxemburg no country in the pre-EMU has achieved all
four Maastricht convergence criteria (Wagner, 1998).
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maintain the union is present. Once it disappears, the EMU will break apart.
However, learning from history this might occur only under a complex combina-
tion of extreme circumstances.
3.3.2 Could the Eurozone Break Up?
’No times. The Monetary Union is irreversible.’
Wim Duisenberg (FAZ, 12. November 2004)
Recent political squabbles and the eﬀective abandonment of the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) has led some to question whether the whole ”Euro experi-
ment” could collapse. We look at what could cause the Eurozone to break up,
namely, political inﬁghting, the failure of the SGP and the deep recession in big
countries like Germany and France.1
As seen in all historical monetary unions it is more likely that politics rather
than economics would cause the Eurozone to break up. However, an escalation
of political inﬁghting could lead to a loss of credibility in the Eurozone and cause
the Eurozone to break up either gradually or with a big bang.
If the SGP rules can be broken then simple game theory tells us that if one
person (state) cheats (and gets away with it) everyone will ”cheat” and the SGP
will totally unravel. This could lead to a vicious cycle i.e. more political inﬁghting
and a loss of conﬁdence from the outside world. The consequences are even more
ﬁscal loosening and higher interest rates, and eventually the collapse of the Euro.
Is that a realistic perspective?
From a historical point of view certainly: Yes. But as we have explained above
the EMU is a ’new’ monetary union with no real example in history. The major
factors suggesting that this will not happen in the near future are the following
points:
1The war with Iraq also highlights how political disagreements could lead to strong tensions
within the Eurozone.
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1. Each Eurozone member country gives up its sovereignty rights in monetary
policy and delegate them to the European Central Bank. A quick reversal of
that direction — i.e. reestablishing the old national currency — is, because
of the costs and time of transition very unlikely.
2. The losers in the case of such a development would be those countries that
have beneﬁted the most from joining the Euro, i.e. the small and peripheral
countries.
3. Moreover there is no ’secession’ of excessive breaching states allowed in the
Treaty and the ’no–bail–out–clause’ is not credible.
4. This might be happen only under a complex combination of extreme cir-
cumstances.
All the facts mentioned so far are indicators for no break–up. But there is a
slightly fuzzy danger about future developments within the discussion about the
Stability and Growth Pact. The necessity of the ﬁscal framework is undeniable,
but the gradually decreasing credibility because of breaching states is an unforseen
source of danger. Therefore it is reason enough to focus more on the Stability
and Growth Pact and to analyze its impacts.
3.3.3 Critics to the pure historical approach
’The only lesson of history is that men never learn any-
thing from history.’
Georg W.F. Hegel (1830)
The critics of the historical research reemphasize that the history of so–
called monetary unions is only a limited guide to the prospects of EMU, because
the regimes of today and their institutional frameworks diﬀer in many respects
(Samuel, 2001):1
1But the mechanism today is the same. The historical monetary unions had gold convert-
ibility as a common focal point a commitment mechanism. Today the analog mechanism is
’price-stability’ (Bordo and Jonung, 2001).
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• Gold standard versus paper and ﬁat money standard.
• Convertibility and seignorage versus price stability, economic growth and
employment.
Indeed there are many diﬀerences in both the monetary systems and their
respective targets. But each human being and also the economic literature know
that we can learn from history: Compare for example the ”Learning–by–doing–
theory” in economics. The main objective is to avoid the same mistakes as we
have made the past. To make correct comparisons is impossible, which is clear
from philosophy (Kant, 1971). Hence, it is possible to criticize any historical
approach.
”History is therefore not a great deal of help in deciding whether a
paper-based euro needs a common political authority (Samuel 2001).”
Moreover it is questionable whether the EMU is sustainable without a political
union. From a historical perspective there are three kinds of external shocks to
the individual members in a monetary union which can simply be countered with
political agreement:
• asymmetric shocks,
• banking failures,
• military threats.
It seems a little surprising that the three forces working to break–up a mon-
etary union are the same today as in the past, excepting the last. But the new
’Terro–threat’ makes that point not also so unimportant.
The open question is also the reverse one: Must political union accompany
monetary union? Schwartz (2001) argues that member countries have diﬀerent
preferences with respect to the level of the long–run inﬂation rate and the de-
gree of ﬁnancing budget deﬁcits. Thus it is not obvious why a political union
would resolve this dilemma because a political union does not level this diversity
in economics, politics and culture. Additionally, Walters (2001) concludes that
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the basic reason for putting monetary union ﬁrst is that the architects of the
EU believe that there was considerable electoral support for a monetary union,
whereas there was little taste for a centralized political union among the peoples
of Europe. Therefore, Jacques Delors (Delors, 1989) said that there would be
substantial approval for a monetary union which would, he thought, soon led
inevitably to a United States of Europe. Moreover Connolly (1998) has pointed
out that Luxemburg and Belgium had a monetary union and no political union
for a very long time. That fact conﬁrms that a strong and automatic connection
between monetary and political union like Bordo and Jonung (1997) have shown
is not necessary rather than suﬃcient for an successful monetary union.
Moreover several authors argue that the supranational and national monetary
unions in the nation building process are not adequate predictors for the current
European Monetary Union. Some authors see the Austro-Hungarian example as
the best precedent case and the most ﬁtting ’theoretical equivalent’ for the EMU.
The reason for this is straightforward: unlike many other experiences of mone-
tary uniﬁcation which have relied either on a large decentralization of monetary
and commercial authority or on process of political integration, both Euroland
and Austria–Hungary occupy the uncomfortable middle ground of full monetary
and commercial uniﬁcation, with complete ﬁscal subsidiarity. Flandreau (2001)
suggests in line with the French scholar Vilar (1974) that the history of money
could be a way to improve our analytical understanding of monetary phenomena.
However, it could only be achieved through the use of the conceptual tool which is
called ’theoretical equivalents’. This implies that the Austro–Hungary Monetary
Union is the best ﬁtting theoretical equivalent to EMU. Indeed the institutional
structure is more similar to the modern EMU but there are also an number of
diﬀerences between the two unions:
• The AHMU was a simple two player game where monitoring was easy and
negotiation direct.
• Free rider problems were limited in the AHMU because of the geographic
and economic links.
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• There was a market mechanism1 to discipline ﬁscal policy; ”not a rule”
approach.
But the simplest answer to all arguments is always: We compare not like
with like but we try to learn something about the diﬀerences in structure and
their induced implications. The EMU emerges as a hybrid between a so–called
”multinational monetary union”, i.e. each member states retain a large degree of
sovereignty and a ”national monetary union”, i.e. there is only one single central
bank — the ECB — which runs the currency.
3.4 Conclusion
These lessons from historical monetary unions are very important for the design
of the current EMU and their institutions. A successful EMU needs an adequate
ﬁscal and economic framework as was seen in the historical experience of monetary
unions. This was one of the key ﬁndings in all past historical monetary unions.
Moreover the illustration of all above examples shows that the constitution of
the political system was always the ‘uncertain’ and ‘critical’ factor in history.
To learn from these historical records — like learning by doing — is a very
important and necessary step before one can economically analyze and evaluate
the European ﬁscal framework in more detail.
1The market in the past is really also not comparable with capital markets today.
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Chapter 4
Analyzing the European Stability
and Growth Pact
”Every ﬁscal norm or rule will have some arbitrariness
by deﬁnition but it is considered to be necessary to enforce
ﬁscal discipline in EU Member States.”
Buti et al. (2003)
The most illustrative example in the history of ’European Integration’ is cer-
tainly the supranational ’Monetary union’, since 1999 (Theurl, 1992).1 The eco-
nomic and political costs and beneﬁts of European Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) have been the subject of lively academic and public debates (Dixit, 2002).
A wonderful by–product for the economic profession has been the emergence of a
new research topic. The EMU involves many interactions between the common
monetary policy and the domestic ﬁscal policies of the member governments.
The conﬂicts caused by these interactions, especially the current problems with
the ’Stability and Growth Pact’ (SGP), as well as the institutional consequences
(’Modes of economic governance’) will be analyzed in economic terms in our
papers. Freedom of national ﬁscal policies undermines the ECB’s monetary com-
mitment (article 104 ECT). This may justify ﬁscal constraints like the ’Stability
and Growth Pact’ but in a modiﬁed version compared to the current SGP.
1cf. historical monetary unions existed in Europe also in the 18th century. For example
’Latin coin union’, German-Austria-Union and Scandinavian-Union.
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The ﬁscal framework of EMU has developed gradually. In 1992, the Treaty
of Maastricht set the ﬁscal criteria for joining Monetary Union. After seting
up the ﬁscal framework a lively debate emerged in Europe. Why ﬁscal rules
in EMU?1 There were many reasons presented, like moral hazard, free–riding,
interest rate spill–overs, no credible bail–out provision and so on (Brunila et al.,
2001). The conclusion of the debate was that ﬁscal policy in a monetary union
can foil the primary target ’price–stability’, set by the European Central Bank
(ECB). Additionally German politicians and society have had some fears about a
weak ’EURO’. Therefore the former German Finance Minister Theo Waigel put
forward a proposal in November 1995 to complement the provisions of the Treaty
(Buti et al., 2000)2. So a further step in the ﬁscal framework of EMU was the
’Stability and Growth Pact’ (1466/97 and 1467/97, Stability and Growth Pact
(1997))3, adapted by the European Council in Amsterdam, in June 1997 (Brunila
et al., 2001).
After the implementation of the SGP in 1997 and contemporaneous with
the introduction of the Monetary Union in 1999, several criticisms (Buti et al.,
1997) of the ﬁscal rules emerged (Brunila, 2001).4 In the EU’s system of ﬁscal
surveillance, ﬁnance ministers are both the miscreants and the judges.5
Hence, the need for reforming the SGP became more and more obvious in
the course of 2002. In February 2002, the erosion of the Stability Pact started,
because ECOFIN was unable to vote for a simple early warning so–called ’blue–
letter’ for Germany. Currently the largest countries — Germany6, France, and
Italy — are in breach of the Stability Pact. They exceeded the 3% budget deﬁcit
threshold of GDP in 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005. Moreover, they are likely to
do so again in 2006. Hence, we can conclude for Europe that everybody knows
something went wrong with the current SGP because ECOFIN is unlikely and
1cf. Junius, et al. (2002): Handbuch der EZB.
2cf. He announced a ’Stability Pact for Europe’.
3Since July 28, 2005, the old Stability and Growth Pact was supplemented by the reformed
Pact in 2005 (EC–Regulation 1055/05 and 1056/05).
4cf. Why 3% to GDP deﬁcit and not more?, Beetsma and Uhlig (1999).
5cf. Although countries that are in breach of the pact do not vote on their own sanctions,
they can hope for a certain amount of sympathy from theirs peers.
6cf. German deﬁcit is 3.9% to GDP and French is 4.1%, in year 2003; Eurostat (2004).
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unable to vote in favor of imposing sanctions (Barysch, 2003). Furthermore, the
president of the EU–Commission Romano Prodi has said in the newspaper Le
Monde (2002): ”I know very well that the Stability Pact is stupid, like all rules
that are rigid”.
So far the current ﬁscal institutional framework is based on four elements in
Europe:
1. two criteria inherited from the Maastricht Treaty: the 3% of GDP deﬁcit
threshold and
2. respectively the 60% of GDP government debt threshold
3. an institutional framework to implement ﬁscal surveillance: the Stability
and Growth Pact
4. a co–ordination process: the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines.
The theoretical literature about European Monetary Union (EMU) is based
on the work by Rogoﬀ (1985), who has shown that an optimally designed central
bank involves a trade–oﬀ between ﬂexibility and credibility. Extending this type
of analysis to monetary union, Laskar (1989) investigates how the optimal degree
of conservatism of the central bank depends on the relative importance of common
and idiosyncratic shocks.
In contrast to monetary policy, ﬁscal policy remains a national responsibility
within the EMU. The analytical literature on European monetary union has paid
relatively little attention to the importance of ﬁscal policies and their interactions
with the common monetary policy (Lane, 2003).1 Several works have considered
only the incomplete interaction cancels of monetary and ﬁscal policies in a mon-
etary union. For example Sibert (1992), Levine and Brociner (1994), Dixit and
Lambertini (2001), Dixit and Lambertini (2003) and Beetsma and Bovenberg
1cf. In a closed economy setting with national monetary policymaking, the interaction
between monetary and ﬁscal policy has been analyzed by Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Debelle
(1993) and Debelle and Fisher (1994).
59
(2002), which consider monetary–ﬁscal interaction in a monetary union where
the purpose of ﬁscal policy is the supply of public goods. All these papers have in
common that the take not into account the ’Stability- and Growth Pact’. They
suggest that a monetary union with decentralized ﬁscal decisions and discre-
tionary monetary policy produces an inﬂationary bias and excessive spending on
public goods resulting in excessive debt accumulation. Fiscal coordination or ﬁs-
cal leadership may discipline ﬁscal and monetary policy. In particular, the Barro
and Gordon (1983a,b) model of nominal wage contracting employed by Rogoﬀ
(1985) investigates the trade–oﬀ between credibility and ﬂexibility is extended
to a monetary union with both constellations: decentralized ﬁscal policymaking
and coordinated ﬁscal policymaking. Within such a framework with endogenous
ﬁscal policy, adverse output shocks are not stabilized merely through the tra-
ditional channel of inﬂation surprise (as in Barro and Gordon, 1983) but also
through lower taxes ﬁnanced by additional seignorage revenues and lower pub-
lic spending. In this way, stabilization policy involves not only monetary policy
but also ﬁscal policy; compare Dixit and Lambertini (2003) and Beetsma and
Jensen (2003). The reduced role of monetary policy stabilization implies that it
attaches a higher priority to price stability. Whereas monetary uniﬁcation thus
reduces both expected inﬂation rates and the variance of inﬂation, it harms over-
all welfare by reducing average output and public spending and increasing the
variability of these variables. In fact, countries would like to enter a monetary
union if this union involves an international transfer stabilizing asymmetric and
idiosyncratic shocks (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999). In the tradition of Dixit
(2001a,b), Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2002), Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) and
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999), we explore the role of monetary–ﬁscal policy in-
teraction from a public ﬁnance perspective. Our papers draw on that literature
to investigate: What are the national incentives of ﬁscal policy in the current
’Stability and Growth Pact’?
The remainder of the chapter is based on four published papers and is orga-
nized as follows. In section (4.1), we present a model extended with a SGP to
analyze ﬁscal policy incentives in the EMU. Section (4.2), builds a new deﬁnition
approach to sustainable ﬁscal policy in the EMU under the Stability and Growth
Pact. Using that tool, we extend a model framework to analyze the eﬀects of
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relaxing the long–run targets in the SGP in section (4.3). Finally, in section
(4.4), we present a new model framework to analyze the institutional interaction
in the European Economic and Monetary Union. In chapter 5, we present again
a new model that focuses on a detailed analysis of consolidation incentives and
the behavior of the participating EMU countries.
4.1 Fiscal–Monetary–Interaction Model with a
SGP
The monetary union is formed by n countries.1 The European Central Bank
(ECB) is responsible for the whole monetary policy. The ﬁscal policy is de–
centralized. In the monetary union exists i (i = 1, ..., n) governments. For sim-
pliﬁcation, we assume that all i economies are identical. Each country produces
a single perfect substitutable good. The inﬂation rate π is uniform across the
monetary union. Labor is assumed to be internationally immobile. Trade union
objective is to set the log real wage rate r∗t > 0. Nominal–wage contracts are
signed before policies are selected.2 So the trade unions are Stackelberg–leaders’.
Expectations are rational pe = E[p].
The normalized output equation for ’y’ is (Derivation in appendix A.1):
yˆi,t = z ∗ [πt − πet − r∗t − τi,t + ln(η)] + µt, (4.1)
where ’π’ represents inﬂation, ’πe’ expected inﬂation, ’µ’ is a stochastic shock
and ’z’ is an abbreviation for elasticities. Two distortions reduce output below
its ﬁrst best level. First, the output tax τi,t which drives a wedge between social
and private output. Second, the power of the trade union allows them to drive
the real wage ’r’ above its social optimum. We transform the outcome through
1The section is based on the following published papers: 7th INFER Workshop
on Economic Policy, Conference-Proceeding and 9th Spring Meeting for Young
Economists (SMYE); http://www.smye2004.org/session.php?session=47.
2This sequence is necessary to guarantee the so–called shock channels.
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subtraction of the following term z(−r∗t + ln[η]) (which is constant) from the
above equation.
yi,t := yˆi,t − [−r∗t + ln(η)]z = z ∗ [πt − πet − τi,t] + µt (4.2)
The ﬁrst best output level is attained in absence of tax distortions (τi,t = 0)
and if expectations are fulﬁlled (π = πe). Thus it results:
yˆ∗i,t =
η
1− η ln(η); y
∗
i,t = zr
∗
t . (4.3)
This implies that the real wage target must be greater than zero r∗t > 0 and acts
as an implicit tax on output (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999).
4.1.1 Model assumptions
To calculate the optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy, we minimize diﬀerent loss
functions. The loss function of country i’s society is in general (Dixit, 2001a;
Engwerda et al., 2002)1:
Lisˆ =
1
2
2∑
t=1
βt−1s
[
απ,s(πt − π∗t )2 + (yi,t − y¯i,t)2 + αx,s(xi,t − x¯t)2
]
, (4.4)
with 0 < βS ≤ 1 as the discount–factor and απ,s, αx,s > 0 as weights. The
welfare loss increases in: (1) deviation of inﬂation, (2) deviation of output and
(3) deviation of government spending, from the target levels. To simplify the
further calculations, we assume that π∗ = 0. In Europe, this is nearly correct
because the target inﬂation is near 2%2. Moreover the inﬂation measures are
normally biased up.
1cf. Woodford (2003). Microfoundations of this loss function are approximations of
quadratic welfare functions (Benigno, 2003)
2cf. ECB Press Release (8 May 2003): The ECB’s monetary strategy.
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The loss function of a ﬁscal authority is in general:
LFi =
1
2
2∑
t=1
βt−1F
[
απ,s(πt − π∗t )2 + (yi,t − y¯i,t)2 + αx,s(xi,t − x¯t)2
]
, (4.5)
with 0 < βF ≤ 1. The diﬀerence between these two functions is only the
discount–factor coeﬃcient β.
The monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank (European
Central Bank), which exercises direct and perfect control over the inﬂation rate.
One could also assume that the ECB could prefer stabilizing policy outcomes
(article 2 ECT) if the inﬂation target is achieved. The ECB loss function is
assigned by means of contractual agreement with the principal (e.g. legislature).
That is:
LECB =
1
2
2∑
t=1
βt−1s
[
απ,M(πt − π∗t )2 + (yi,t − y¯i,t)2
]
(4.6)
where πt∗ is the inﬂation target imposed in period t. Without loss of gener-
ality, we assume in the whole paper that the inﬂation target is zero. Moreover,
the relative weight the ECB attaches to inﬂation is απ,M and may deviate from
society’s corresponding weight, απ (=απ,S). The intuition behind that function
is that the ”Common Central Bank” considers only its primary target price–
stability but if this is satisﬁed it also looks at the output objectives (article 105
ECT).1
The ﬁscal authority (government) is confronted with the (intertemporal) bud-
get constraint:2
xi,t + (1 + ρ)di,t−1 + φL(0,1)(bi,t − D¯) = τi,t + dt +
φR(0,1)
n− 1
∑
j=1,j =i
(bj,t − D¯), (4.7)
where di,t−1 denotes the stock of public debt carried over from the previous
period, while di,t represents the outstanding debt at the end of the current period
1cf. Beetsma and Bovenberg, 2003.
2cf. Beetsma and Uhlig (1999).
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t. The real rate of interest is ρ. This is assumed to be exogenous because the
countries in the monetary union are relatively small to the rest of the world. The
variable τ stand for distortional tax. D¯ is the deﬁcit threshold of the SGP and
parameter φ is a characteristic or index function.1 The variable bi,t represents the
actual deﬁcit amount. The deﬁcit is deﬁned as bi,t = di,t − di,t−1. If a country
j breaches the deﬁcit criteria then φR = 1 (also interpreted as the probability
to breach the Stability Pact); in the other case no breach of the SGP: φR =
0. Moreover, we assume that countries feature the same initial stock of public
debt di,t=0 = d0 (i=1,...,n). Without loss of generality, it is set equal to zero
(d0 = 0). All debt is paid oﬀ at the end of the last period (di,t = 0, i = 1, ..., n).
The assumption indicates ”No–Ponzi–Game” and is similar to the well–known
transversality condition in dynamical optimization.2
For some convenience we rewrite the budget constraint above as,
Kt + (1 + ρ)di,t−1 − di,t + φL[0,1]([di,t − di,t−1]− D¯) =
(τi,t +
y¯t
Z
) + (x¯t − xi,t) +
φR[0,1]
n− 1
∑
j=1,j =i
([dj,t−1 − dj,t−2]− D¯) (4.8)
with, K :=
[
x¯t+
y¯t
z
]
. Notice that the government budget constraint abstracts
from seigniorage revenues. These revenues are very small in industrial economies
in comparison to the total government revenues.3 Substituting (2)4 in (7) and
eliminating τt, yields (9):
1is equivalent to a delta function Strang (2003)
2cf. appendix B and Chiang (1992) and Dixit (1990).
3cf. Beetsma and Jensen, 2003.
4For simplicity we always use only the last digit of the 2 digit numeration of mathematical
formulas.
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Kt + (1 + ρ)di,t−1 − di,t + φL[0,1]([di,t − di,t−1]− D¯) +
µt
z
=
(y¯t − yt)1
z
+ (x¯t − xi,t) + (πt − πet ) +
φR[0,1]
n− 1
∑
j=1,j =i
([dj,t−1 − dj,t−2]− D¯) (4.9)
The right hand side (RHS) of the budget constraint equation (7) represents
the sources of ﬁnance: (1) implicit tax revenues, (2) shortfall of governmental
spending and (3) revenues of sanction fees, if country j breaches the SGP. The left
hand side (LHS) shows the sources of expenditures: (1) government expenditures
for services, (2) debt payment and (3) sanction payment, if country i breaches
the SGP.
We assume that the Common Central Bank (CCB) can not fully commit to a
pre–announced inﬂation target. Hence, the CCB acts under discretion and takes
the inﬂation expectations as given when it sets its policy instrument. This is
probably the most realistic description of how monetary policy is conducted in
practice (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 2003). The timing within each period is as
following:
1. Shocks materialize
2. Wage setters sign nominal wage contracts
3. Shocks materialize again
4. After the announced rule monetary policy selects the inﬂation rate; the
government simultaneously selects the tax rate and public debt
5. Hence, output is determined
6. Public spending x is residually determined from the budget constraint
7. Sanction fee does matter or not.
This implies that monetary and ﬁscal authorities are playing a Nash game
together.
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4.1.2 Economic Analysis
In this section, we discuss the model in more detail. It is a kind of Barro and
Gordon–model but extended in a similar way to Dixit and Lambertini (2003)
as well as Beetsma and Bovenberg (2003) to analyze monetary–ﬁscal interaction.
First, we implement a two period time structure with a common stochastic shock.
Second, we implement the SGP in this framework. Finally, we extend the two–
period framework to inﬁnite time. In the following subsections we analyze the
implications of the existing SGP and the consequences for debt policy. The whole
calculation of this model is in the Appendix A.11.
The ﬁrst–period ﬁscal authority equates the marginal beneﬁt from issuing
more debt to the marginal cost. The result is:
αx,s(x¯1−x1) = λFU [(1+ρ)+φL]
(
K¯2+(1+ρ)di,1+φ
L(di,1−D¯)− φ
R
n− 1
∑
(dj,1−D¯)
)
(4.10)
Now we can solve this condition to ﬁrst–period debt d1:
K¯1−(φL−φR)−λ∗[1+ρ+φL]
[
K¯2−φLD¯− φ
R
n− 1
∑
(dj,1−D¯)
]
= [1+λ∗(1+ρ+φL)2]∗d1
(4.11)
with, λ∗ := λF
(
P
S
)
.2
This result is similar to Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) without a SGP. In
our model we have ∂d1/∂λ
∗ < 0, that implies a decrease in ﬁrst–period debt, by
an increase of marginal cost of debt accumulation λ∗. Another interesting ﬁnding
is, if the monetary union becomes larger (i.e. n grows), that implies λ∗ decreases
and so the ﬁrst–period debt level increases (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999). In-
tuitively, from the perspective of each individual member of the EMU, the ECB
generates diﬀerent public goods. So in a larger union, each ﬁscal authority faces
less incentives to contribute to this public good. Hence public debt and thus
inﬂation are higher in a monetary union, in comparison to a unique nation state.
1Moreover the following results and proofs are relegated also to the Appendix (A.1).
2P := απ,Sαπ,M +
1
z2 +
1
αx,s
and S := 1απ,M +
1
z2 .
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Result (i). In absence of a Stability Pact φL = φR = 0, the following results:
(a)
∂di,1
∂λ
< 0 (4.12)
(b)
∂di,1
∂ρ
< 0. (4.13)
Proposition 4.1. In absence of a Stability Pact φL = φR = 0 marginal cost of
debt λ∗ is a substitutional instrument for disciplining debt accumulation.
Proof 4.1. See result (i) part (a).1 
In fact, debt costs can be distributed around the participating countries in a
monetary union. That might be one reason to implement a Stability and Growth
Pact into the EMU. The main objective of the Stability Pact is to reduce that
pervers incentives. In a more general framework (with a SGP) the proposition
above is only correct with an additional assumption. One must assume that the
deterministic component of expenditures K¯2 is bigger than the sanction fees in
country i and sanction revenues from other breaching countries j. In the European
ﬁscal framework that assumption is normally satisﬁed. One question for further
research would be whether the European ﬁscal framework is more restrictive
(stronger) for smaller than for bigger countries. Apart from these results, the
next section focuses on a more detailed analysis of the Stability Pact.
4.1.3 Comparative static analysis of the SGP
The problem with the existing SGP is really more sophisticated. First, the sanc-
tion mechanism is not credible and the enforcement procedure in the ECOFIN
1Cf. Appendix A.1
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council is questionable. The current empirical problems with the breaching coun-
tries Germany, France, Italy, Greece and Portugal induce a reform discussion
about the ’Stability and Growth Pact’ in Europe. Reform proposals and criti-
cisms of the Stability Pact are discussed later. Already the main criticisms of the
Pact: missing long–term incentives, no economic theory for the thresholds, the
ﬁscal aggravation of breaching countries and the key failure, the partisan decision
mechanism in the Ecoﬁn council, show us how urgent a detailed analysis of the
current SGP is. Exactly both problems would be considered within our reform
proposal in chapter 6 and 7. To analyze these incentives in more detail, we en-
dogenize the SGP in the optimization process (Appendix A.1). The following
proposition is achievable:
Proposition 4.2. If both countries i and j breaches the SGP (φL = φR > 0) then
country i’s debt stock is aﬀected as follows:
(a) A race to the top of debt accumulation is induced.
(b) The eﬀect (a) is increasing if country j’s breaching probability φR increases.
(c) Relaxing the deﬁcit threshold D¯ increases the debt in country i, if the breach-
ing probability in country i is higher than that in country j (φL > φR), and
vice versa decreases the debt if the breaching probability in the other country
is higher (φR > φL).
Proof 4.2. (a) From (8), we can compute,
∂di,1
∂dj,1
=
λ∗[1 + ρ + φL]φR
1 + λ∗[1 + ρ + φL]2
> 0. (4.14)
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(b) Now computing this term to φR yields:(
∂di,1
∂dj,1
)
∂φR
=
λ∗[1 + ρ + φL]
1 + λ∗[1 + ρ + φL]2
> 0. (4.15)
(c) Derivating the ﬁrst–order condition to D¯ results in:
∂di,1
∂D¯
= −λ
∗[1 + ρ + φL](φR − φL)
1 + λ∗[1 + ρ + φL]2
⎛
⎜⎝ >
≤
⎞
⎟⎠ 0, if
⎛
⎜⎝ φL > φR
φR > φL
⎞
⎟⎠
(4.16)
Case (a) demonstrates the typical free rider situation. The excessive debt
policy in country j implies an increase in the debt level for the breaching country
i because the cost of debt policy is distributed on all members. It is interesting
that the debt target D¯ vanishes. This explains the fact that the current SGP
cannot solve the problem of internalizing external eﬀects in the EMU.
Part (b) shows very clearly, that if both countries breach the Stability Pact
there is a kind of ’competition’ about the highest debt levels. Empirically that
ﬁnding covers the current situation between the two breaching countries Germany
and France very well.
Finally part (c) implies that relaxing the 3% deﬁcit threshold of GDP in
Maastricht and/or in the SGP, increases the debt stock in country i, di,1, if the
‘excessive deﬁcit procedure’ or ‘breaching–probability’ in the other countries is
relatively small. In this situation the debt/deﬁcit target D¯ is important. A
higher debt/deﬁcit target reduces the optimal debt/deﬁcit policy in country i, if
the breaching probability is smaller than that of country j. Why? The result is
counterintuitive. An interesting ﬁnding is that the objectives of the SGP are out
of reach because of unsatisfactory incentives, the short–run time horizon1, as well
as the non-credible enforcement mechanism. Finally, we assume that the debt
level is identical in all countries (di = dj). That simplifying assumption yields
the next surprising proposition.
1cf. Wyplosz, Charles (FT, 2003): Stabilita¨tspakt verscha¨rft Konjunkturkrisen.
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Proposition 4.3. The incentives in the SGP are:
(a) An increase of the probability to breach the deﬁcit ceiling (φL), decreases the
debt stock di,1.
(b) An increase of country j’s probability (φR), increases the debt stock di,1.
(c) Relaxing the deﬁcit threshold D¯, increases the debt in country i, if the breach-
ing probability in country i is higher than in country j (φL > φR) and vice
versa decreases the debt if the breaching probability in the other country is
higher (φR > φL).
Proof 4.3. The whole proof is relegated to the Appendix.
The intuition of part (a) and (b) describes the fact that the ’excessive deﬁcit
procedure’ in the SGP disciplines only as long as no other country breaches the
Pact. Additionally the same case occurs, if country j’s probability to breach
the Pact in future is higher than that of country i. The interpretation of the
ﬁndings in part (c) is similar to proposition 2. A combination of Proposition 2
and Proposition 3 implies immediately the following Proposition.
Proposition 4.4. If one country breaches the SGP there is an incentive for other
endangered countries to breach also the Stability Pact.
Proof 4.4. Following directly from Proposition 2 and Proposition 3.
That paradoxical ﬁnding eliminates the implied disciplining eﬀect of the cur-
rent Stability and Growth Pact. The main reason for that observation is the
sanction–fee compensation mechanism in the SGP. A similar result was found
by Ohr and Schmidt (2002) in an institutional economic analysis of the SGP. A
summary of our results is shown in Figure 4.1. The next subsection extends and
closes the technical analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact.
The remaining question is unaﬀected: Why do more larger countries have
problems with the SGP in comparison to the smaller countries? The analysis
above helps also to ﬁnd a ﬁrst approximation to that question (Herzog, 2004).
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Deﬁcit/Debt cascade to the top
Figure 4.1: Summary of the model results
Proposition 4.5. If the breaching probability of an other identical (in debt stock)
country is higher than the country in breach, then that country may follow to
breach the Stability Pact. But if the breaching probability for a group of countries
is low, then there is no incentive to follow and breach the Stability Pact.
Proof 4.5. Because the Proposition is derived under the assumption of identical
countries (meaning the same debt stock), an incentive to breach the Pact if the
breaching probability φR in the other country is higher, or respectively not to
breach the Pact, if respectively lower, exists immediately.
So from that Proposition it is clear that in Europe the larger countries are
more likely to breach the SGP, because there exists at least one country which
was in breach (France, Germany or Italy). Furthermore, there exists stronger
free–rider incentives in bigger countries as shown later in chapter 5. Thus the
other big countries such as Italy, Great Britain and Netherlands follow to breach
the Pact in 2004 as we will see empirically (Hughes Hallett and Lewis, 2005).
For the smaller countries there is no country — for a long-term — in breach
and furthermore the free–rider incentives are lower (Heise, 2002). Notice the
’excessive deﬁcit procedure’ (EDP) against Portugal was adjusted after only 1–
year in breach, in spring 2004. That conﬁrms empirically the Proposition and the
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situation which is observed in reality around the larger countries like Germany
and France in 2002, 2003, 2004 and probably 2005. Moreover it seems to be
a really robust result from historical record and the situation observed in the
African monetary union over the last 30 years.
4.1.4 Analyzing the outcomes
In the inﬁnite–period model, we calculate the ﬁnal outcomes with an exogenous
Stability Pact. Thus, we can analyze the responses of the Stability Pact to the
outcomes.
Proposition 4.6. Assume country i breaches the SGP:
(a) Inﬂation increases, πt.
(b) Output yt and public spending xt decreases.
(c) Debt dt increases.
Proof 4.6. Part (a) follows immediately from derivation to 1SGP : ∂πt/∂1
SGP >
0. Notice that breaching the SGP implies 1SGP > 0. Similarly part (b): the
derivation to 1SGP . Hence: ∂(y¯ − yt)/∂1SGP > 0 and ∂(y¯ − yt)/∂1SGP > 0.
Hence that implies smaller yt and xt for given (ﬁxed) targets y¯t and x¯t. Part (c):
after the derivation, it results: ∂dt/∂1
SGP > 0. 
This proposition emphasizes that the key target — to maintain price–stability
in Europe — fails in that model framework even with a SGP. An interesting
extension of that model might be to endogenize the breaching probability in the
Stability and Growth Pact.
4.1.5 Model Conclusion
We would like to conclude with some implications of our results for the design of
institutions and mechanisms in the EMU1 and suggestions for further research.
1cf also EEC.
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Participation in the EMU depends on ﬁscal policy ﬂexibility, structure of
the national budget, the ”Stability and Growth Pact” and the old (Maastricht)
convergence criteria. The evaluation of all these factors leads to a positive or
negative decision for catching–up countries. But the SGP leads to a situation in
which the new countries refuse to participate in the EMU, because only countries
with a sound household structure e.g. low deﬁcit levels are able to fulﬁll the
SGP. But empirical ﬁndings show that new EU–member countries possess lower
debt amounts sooner but with very high deﬁcit levels. This discrepancy would be
even stronger in the process of catching–up to average European levels (Balassa–
Samuelson–Eﬀect).
The enlargement of the European monetary union is a very important topic
today because nobody knows how a monetary union will work with more than
12 participating countries.1 And how can the European economic and monetary
union be controlled more eﬃciently in the future? To ﬁnd some other institutions
and mechanisms than the SGP in the ’European Economic and Monetary Union’
is necessary for the further success of the EMU and the ’Euro’.2 The new research
agenda of ’ﬁscal–monetary interaction’ seems very promising for future research
(Lane, 2003 and Buti, 2003). Moreover the results and the developments of public
debt in reality (France, Germany, Italy, Greece, Portugal...) show us, how urgent
further research on this topic is. A further extension in that framework might be
a full endogenous modelling of the breaching probability.
The deﬁnition of ﬁscal architecture of EMU is still in progress. Many aspects
and problems will be clariﬁed merely as time goes by. Identifying key issues and
relevant trade–oﬀs is essential for designing appropriate policy responses at the
EMU and at the national level. Since February 2002, with the failure of early
warnings against Germany and France and the failure to impose sanctions in
November 2003, many people called the European ﬁscal framework, especially
the SGP, dead. Therefore it is time to look for an appropriate ﬁscal framework
which cures the main problems and drawbacks, particularly the current failures
within the ’STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT’.
1M. Friedman proposes that the European monetary union breaks-down in 10 or 15 years.
2The importance of good ﬁscal policy coordination in monetary unions is also obviously
shown in historical monetary unions in Europe — Scandinavian and Latin coin unions — and
current monetary unions in Africa.
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4.2 Deﬁning Fiscal Policy Sustainability within
the SGP
The most illustrative example of interaction conﬂicts in the EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY is seen in the history of European monetary integration.1 In the back-
ground of environmental research a new term becomes more and more important:
’SUSTAINABILITY’ (Neher, 1990). Sustainable ﬁscal policy is also one of the
mainstays in Europe. In nearly all policy areas that term is used, for instance
in the common provisions ”... to achieve balanced and sustainable development”
(article 2 ECT) or in ﬁscal policy ”... sustainable growth” and ”...sustainable
ﬁscal policy” (Stability and Growth Pact, 1997). Hence, sustainability has been
the subject of lively public and academic debates in Europe (Bohn, 1995 and
Pasinetti, 2000). A wonderful by–product for the economic profession has been
the emergence of a new research topic (Dixit and Lambertini, 2001; Wacker,
1998).
In the tradition of resource economics (Kennedy, 1986; Stocky and Lucas,
1993) and recent papers in related ﬁelds from Wilcox (1989), Bohn (1995, 1998),
et al. (2001) and Alfaro and Kanczuk (2003), we try to deﬁne what is meant by
’sustainable’ ﬁscal policy (debt and deﬁcit policy) in the European framework.
The second part of our paper is in reference to the growing literature about ﬁscal–
monetary interaction e.g. Dixit (2001a), Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2002, 2003)
and Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999, 2002), to exploring the role of sustainable
monetary–ﬁscal policy interaction from a public ﬁnance perspective. Our paper
draws on that literature to investigate the impact, of the sustainable ﬁscal policies
in the EMU and the consequences, especially for the current reform discussion
about the SGP (Beetsma and Jensen, 2003; Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999). The
main objective is to ﬁnd an answer to the following question: Which constellation
1The section is based on the following published papers: EcoMod04 Conference-Proceeding
(and online: http://www.ecomod.net/conferences/ecomod2004/ecomod2004 papers/91.pdf)
and 16th CEIS-Conference at Villa Montragone (Interna-
tional Economic Association), Conference-Proceedings (and online:
http://www.ceistorvergata.it/conferenzeconvegni/mondragone/XVI papers/Paper-
Herzog%20%20Bodo.pdf).
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implies a strong sustainable policy framework in Europe, as in ﬁscal policy versus
a weak framework as in employment- and social policy?
We think the supranational monetary policy on the one hand and the decen-
tralized ﬁscal policy on the other hand and its connection link the Stability and
Growth Pact is an interesting research topic in the future of ’European policy
modelling’. To make the existing literature in this ﬁeld more realistic it is neces-
sary to take into account the objective of a sustainable ﬁscal policy framework.
We try to explain more precisely what is meant by sustainable public ﬁnance and
how sustainability relates to the optimality of ﬁscal policy in a broader perspec-
tive. The innovation in that paper is to answer the question: How can we solve
the interaction conﬂicts between sustainable ’European’- and ’National’ interests
eﬀective?
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. The following subsec-
tions explain and motivate the expression ’sustainability’ and its function in ﬁscal
policy. In section 4.3, we present a model close to the paper by Beetsma and Uh-
lig (1999) and Beetsma and Jensen (2003) and analyze the implications of ﬁscal
policy sustainability. We show several new insights and suggestions for the de-
sign of ﬁscal rules in the EMU. The knowledge that policy–makers need a simple
screening device to evaluate sustainable policy in the European framework will
be analyzed in a new stylized model approach. Finally, the last subsection con-
cludes the main body of the paper. All technicalities and proofs are relegated to
an Appendix.
4.2.1 Motivation of Sustainable Modelling
In the European Community Treaty provisions the expression ’sustainable’ ap-
pears 6 times. One ﬁrst ﬁnds ’sustainable’ ideas in article 2 ECT, which an-
nounces the main targets of the European union:
’The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market
and an economic and monetary union and by implementing common policies or
activities referred to in articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community a
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harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high
level of employment and of social protection, equality between men and women,
sustainable and non–inﬂationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and
convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement
of the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality
of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.’
Furthermore article 4 ECT and article 6 ECT mention ’sustainability’ as a
key element in Europe. In article 4(3):
’These activities of the Member States and the Community shall entail com-
pliance with the following guiding principles: stable prices, sound public ﬁnances
and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments’.
Moreover article 6 emphasize: ’Environmental protection requirements must
be integrated into the deﬁnition and implementation of the Community policies
and activities referred to in article 3, in particular with a view to promoting
sustainable development.’ These references are a brief showcase of the importance
of sustainability in Europe. However, in the European Treaty under Title VII
’Economic and Monetary policy’ there are again several legal rules with a clear
reference to sustainability. For instance article 121 ECT contains the well–known
convergence criteria, which are sustained in the SGP: ’A high degree of sustainable
convergence by reference to the fulﬁlment by each Member State of the following
criteria’:
• the sustainability of the government ﬁnancial position; this will be apparent
from the country having achieved a government budgetary position without
a deﬁcit that is excessive as determined in accordance with article 104(6)
ECT.
These treaty provisions show us the primary focus of sustainability in ﬁscal
policy in Europe. Additionally, we analyzed regulations, protocols and all related
documents to ﬁscal and economic policy from the European Commission and
found that the expression ‘sustainable’ or ‘sustainability’ appears more than 30
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times. This is in our view an indicator that the term sustainability became a
very important guideline in ﬁscal policy but also in other related policy ﬁelds.
Since the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact in 1997, there have
been many discussions about the ﬁscal framework in Europe. In spring 2002, the
criticims of the Stability Pact were reinforced after the failure to send a ’blue
letter’ to Germany. In the aftermath, ECOFIN was unable to strengthen the ’ex-
cessive deﬁcit procedure’ against Germany or to impose sanctions against sinner
states in November 2003. Although many people would like a stronger Stability
Pact, with a more independent council (Wyplosz, 2002), since then there are oth-
ers who prefer only some modest modiﬁcation of the current Stability Pact. The
main objective of the latter approach is to achieve more ﬂexibility in ﬁscal policy
(De Grauwe, 2003). To understand the current reform discussions about the SGP
better it is necessary to consider the discussion about ’sustainable’ ﬁscal policy in
more detail. The reason for that is a crucial preference for sustainable policy in
the treaty provisions as seen in the economic and ﬁscal framework and in the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact. ‘Europe will achieve a sustainable growth path and the
national debt should decrease sustainably.’ All around Europe that expression
is used. But the economic meaning in the diﬀerent ﬁelds is often not declared
and seems nearly vague.1 In a recent book Fatas et al. (2003) conclude:’(...)
EMU should implement appropriate institutions at the national level that enable
them to fulﬁl their obligation for maintaining sustainable public ﬁnance. There
is, however, no explanation of what this obligation means in practice’ and also
the EU-Commission said on 11 November 2002: ’All countries must agree that
sustainability is a core objective.’(...) however (...) a clear deﬁnition of how sus-
tainability should be measured is not included’ in the European ﬁscal framework.
This clearly pre–embryonic stage of discussion about European ’sustainability’ in
the ﬁscal framework is now ready to be focused on in more detail.
1cf. the struggles in the EU-Commission and also in academic areas about the deﬁnition of
sustainability.
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4.2.2 Deﬁnition Approaches
The art of designing a ﬁscal framework for EMU is in ﬁnding an appropriate
translation of the long–run concern for sustainability to the short–run behaviour
of the government and an eﬀective enforcement mechanism. A ﬁrst attempt to
deﬁne the concept of ’sustainability’ in the European framework starts in 1998.
Pasinetti (2000), deﬁnes sustainable policy as: a deﬁcit/GDP ratio that entails
a decreasing (or at worst a constant) debt/GDP ratio, which means a decreas-
ing (or at most a constant) tax burden, on account of the debt, on tax-payers.
Conversely, he deﬁnes as non–sustainable those deﬁcit/GDP ratios that entail
an increasing debt/GDP ratio, which means that — if corrected — they would
require an additional tax burden on the citizen. This deﬁnition has been criti-
cized by Harck (2000). Harck asked the question: ’Is the deﬁnition by Pasinetti
acceptable in the sense of being a useful screening device?’ The main conclusion
from Harck’s criticism was that a non–increasing debt ratio is neither a necessary
nor a suﬃcient condition for sustainability in any reasonable sense of the word. It
does not clearly make sense to deﬁne sustainability in isolation from the question
of the existence and the level of a ﬁnite terminal debt ratio. Therefore, Pasinetti
distinguishes two possible ways to deﬁne ’sustainability’. The deﬁnition diﬀeren-
tiates according to whether the initial debt position of the country concerned is
above or below the externally given optimum level. This implies:
(a) In those countries where D
Y
> 60%, the strong inequality holds
S
Y
> −gD
Y
where D represents debt, S is deﬁcit and Y is the abbreviation for GDP. This
deﬁnition would indeed be a necessary and suﬃcient condition to put the
country concerned on a persistent converging path towards a point below
the externally ﬁxed threshold of debt/GDP ratio to 60%.
(b) In those countries where D
Y
≤ 60%, the added triangular area (see 4.2, right)
would allow some temporary increase in debt/GDP ratio, so that the fol-
lowing condition holds temporarily
S
Y
≥ −g60%.
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Figure 4.2: Two diﬀerent deﬁnitions of sustainability
The purpose of the simple deﬁnition of sustainability was indeed to provide
a quick and simple screening device for policy–makers. But this is not without
danger, as we will show in our model and deﬁnition approach in the next subsec-
tion. The main problem with Pasintetti’s deﬁnition approach is also mentioned
by De Grauwe (2002). A sustainable ﬁscal policy like that deﬁned here and in
the SGP implies a zero debt position in the long–run. Pasinetti admits to this
constellation as a fascinating scenario, by far more interesting than any arbitrary
levels of debt and deﬁcit ceilings. Basically, there is no economic theory for debt
and deﬁcit thresholds but there are really good arguments for a certain amount
of debt (De Grauwe, 2003, p.217).
In a press release of the European Commission (EU-Commission, 2004), we
found a wider view of the ’sustainability’ deﬁnition: ’...the Commission has pro-
posed that the most heavily indebted countries should be monitored more closely,
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coupled perhaps with more ﬂexible application of the Stability and Growth Pact
in the case of countries achieving substantial progress in the areas of deﬁcit and
public debt.’ This view relaxes the sustainable idea, because more shock and case
to case contingent reactions implies more free–riding and undermines crucially the
credibility of the commitment to the Stability and Growth Pact (Beetsam and
Jensen, 2003).
Buiter and Grafe (2003) deﬁne sustainability of a government ﬁscal pro-
gramme as the absence of default risk. They mention also that ’one can weaken
this to the requirement that default risk be below some threshold level’ (Besan-
cenot, 2004). The idea of the ﬁscal constraints like the SGP and the Maastricht
Treaty is to have externally imposed constraints aimed at preventing each indi-
vidual member country from following an unsustainable, explosive path of public
debt and deﬁcit. In this view Buiter and Grafe show that ’excessive’ debt is
a more broadly based concept than ’unsustainable’ debt. The reason for this
is: ’Debt and deﬁcit can be excessive, that is, impose greater costs than bene-
ﬁts, without creating a serious risk of sovereign debt default (Butier and Grafe,
2003).’ However, debt sustainability is a more long–run perspective and so it is a
necessary condition for debt not to be excessive in that view. But the deﬁnition
here is very vague and impossible to easily apply for policy–makers. How can
default risk measured in states?
In the next subsection, we try to systematize the deﬁnition debate. Sustain-
able policy was born in resource economics and environmental economics. Hence,
we borrow from the analysis in those ﬁelds and deﬁne ’sustainability’ in the tra-
dition of that literature. To understand this in more detail, we construct now a
simple intertemporal ’Debt consolidation model’. In that model we will explain
our view of the term ’Sustainable ﬁscal policy or debt policy’. Section 4.2 uses
that new deﬁnition of sustainability and implements it in a more complex model
framework. We show what the impacts of changes in the sustainability–target–set
are based on, especially on the Stability and Growth Pact.
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4.2.3 Sustainable model approach
Government deﬁcits have become a focus of professional interest and political
debate all around the world (Bohn, 1995; Wilcox, 1989). Particularly since the
implementation of the SGP in the European monetary union and the signiﬁcant
rise of budget deﬁcits in Germany, France and Portugal in 2003 and in UK and
Italy in 2004 concerns, are increasing about the long–run sustainability of ﬁs-
cal policy in Europe. A ﬁrst attempt to analyze ’Sustainability of Government
Budget Deﬁcits’ is made by Wilcox (1989). Against the approach by Diamond
(1965), in which it was sustainable to borrow money, and pay the interest by
borrowing more, Wilcox searched for an other way. In those economies which
are labelled ’dynamically ineﬃcient’ in the literature, an increase in current debt
has no implications for future surpluses. So governments in dynamically eﬃcient
economies face a present–value constraint, because the literature states that the
current market value of the debt equals the discounted sum of expected future
surpluses. The empirical results from Wilcox and related papers such as Hamil-
ton and Flavin (1986) show on the basis of U.S. data an ambivalent result about
the sustainability of ﬁscal policy. They found that the U.S. ﬁscal policy is not
sustainable. However, Bohn (1995) criticized the older approaches and estab-
lished an explicit ’stochastic general equilibrium model’. He studied ﬁrst the
theoretical foundations of sustainability and through that found new ways for
an empirical test of sustainability. A quantitative analysis on the basis of the
theoretical foundation conﬁrms the ﬁnding that U.S. ﬁscal policy is sustainable
(Bohn, 1998). The central result of Bohn (1991) was that the government has
to satisfy an intertemporal budget constraint and an associated transversality
condition regardless of the level of the safe interest rate. All policies that satisfy
both conditions would be called sustainable. Close to this literature, we will ﬁrst
present a ’deﬁnition model’, which examines the conjuncture of sustainable pol-
icy and consolidation eﬀort to deﬁne ’Sustainability’ more appropriately in the
European framework under the SGP.
In the following, we assume that the debt level is similar to a (natural) stock
variable1 which is treated as sustainable (cf. logistic growth law). The intuition
1Cf. in environmental economics for example ﬁshes.
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behind this assumption is clear: Excessive debt is dangerous because of the default
risk but too low debt also implies disadvantages. A strong consolidation in the
debt stock implies giving–up necessary infrastructure investments. That implies
higher long–run costs in the future. Additionally a low debt stock is analogous
with a too low ﬁsh stock. On the one hand the result is malnutrition, on the
other chronic underﬁnancing. A similar analogy is found if the debt stock is
too high.1 This interpretation is certainly unfamiliar but it is also very tricky
to ﬁnd innovative insights and new results for the design of a sustainable policy
framework. Furthermore, empirical ﬁndings by Bohn (1998) are in line with
our model approach. The question is: How much does consolidation depend on
sustainable resource management in ﬁscal policy? No existing model can answer
this important question. In our model approach we try to approximate to that
question a bit closer. In the following, we indicate the debt stock with the variable
’d(t)’ and the ’harvest-rate’ (= consolidation variable) ’u(t)’. The debt stock is
interpreted (as explained above) as a utility variable from real debt ’b(t)’. The
aim is to ﬁnd the optimal consolidation path and so the equilibrium levels for
debt and their corresponding consolidation eﬀort.
Now we are ready to deﬁne the problem formally:
max
u
∫ ∞
0
ln[u(t)]e−δtdt (4.17)
s.t. d˙ = r ∗ d
(
1− d
k
)
−u r > 0, k > 0 (4.18)
dt=0 = d0 (4.19)
The parameter ’r’ can be interpreted as debt growth, ’k’ represents the whole
ﬁnancial budget revenues (on GDP) and ’δ’ is a discount rate. Additionally,
we assume that r > δ > 0 which is normal in these problems. The functional
form of the budget constraint (4.18 and 4.19) is typical in resource economics.2
Moreover we transfer the ’Maximum Sustainable Yield’ (MSY) concept here for
1The utility of the debt stock decreases after a maximum because the costs of excessive
debts are higher than their beneﬁts.
2F (d) = rd
(
1− dk
)
.
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debt d∗ < dMSY = k/2. To solve this problem we use a ’Hamilton function’. From
optimal control theory — the ﬁrst–order necessary condition — is known as the
maximum principle or pontryagin principle. Denoted by H, the Hamiltonian is
deﬁned as
H˜ = ln[u] + λ(t)
[
rd
(
1− d
k
)
−u
]
(4.20)
Form the problem (4.17–4.19) and the Hamiltonian deﬁned1 in (4.20), results
the maximum principle conditions as:
∂H˜
∂u
=
1
u
− λ = 0 (4.21)
λ˙− δλ = −∂H˜
∂d
= −λr
[
1− 2d
k
]
(4.22)
d˙ =
∂H˜
∂λ
= rd
(
1− d
k
)
− u. (4.23)
After several transformations it results the following trivial ordinary diﬀeren-
tial equation system (ODES):
d˙ = rd
(
1− d
k
)
− u (4.24)
u˙ = −u
(
δ − r
[
1− 2d
k
])
. (4.25)
The solution of this diﬀerential equation system results in the optimal debt
path d∗ and the optimal consolidation path u∗. The results are:
d∗ =
k(r − δ)
2r
(4.26)
u∗ =
k
2
(r2 − δ2). (4.27)
1H˜ = Hert.
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Figure 4.3: Sustainable–Deﬁnition Diagram
Because of the transversality condition (TC) limt→∞ λ(t) → 0, we can prove
that the path is stable with a unique equilibrium.1 The most important results
and concluding deﬁnitions for sustainable ﬁscal policies are relegated to the next
subsection.
4.2.4 Model results and their implications
A ﬁrst not unexpected ﬁnding, is that the analysis above provides a warning
about the popular ﬁscal ’indicators’ like deﬁcit to GDP or debt to GDP ratios in
the Stability and Growth Pact. In fact they provide very little information about
sustainability. This fact is also mentioned in the current reform discussion about
the SGP by De Grauwe (2003).
The results from this simple model are
Results (i):
(a) The optimal debt level is positive and smaller than the ’maximum sustainable
yield’ utility debt 0 < d∗ < dMSY .
(b) The optimal consolidation rate is positive u∗ > 0.
(c) There is one stable path to convergence in the equilibrium point (d∗, u∗).
1H˜ = Hert ⇒ H = e−rtln(u) + λ[rd(1 − dk )− u]→ 0, because of the TC.
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The implications from these results are: A sustainable debt policy or con-
solidation policy corresponds even with a positive equilibrium debt ratio. In
comparison to the existing targets in the SGP, that result shows us: a zero debt
level is not an ’inner’ equilibrium. Only a rim debt level d = 0 could be possible
but only with an ineﬃcient high consolidation level u >> 0, which is certainly
not achievable.
So these results imply that a ’sustainable’ ﬁscal policy (particularly debt pol-
icy) is consistent with the following three propositions.
Proposition 4.7. Sustainable ﬁscal policy or debt policy is a stable conjuncture
among optimal consolidation and the corresponding debt level.
Additionally a sustainable debt policy is smaller than the maximum sustain-
able yield amount but greater than zero. This generates the following proposition,
Proposition 4.8. Sustainable debt policy isn’t excessive (d∗ < dMSY ).
The deﬁnition here seems diﬀerent to Buiter and Grafe (2003) but the general
idea is the same, because the sustainable equilibrium debt level in this approach
is equivalent to ’the absence of default risk’. Moreover 4.3 shows that sustainable
debt policy is also attainable with higher (’excessive’) debt. This implies ﬁnally
the last proposition,
Proposition 4.9. A higher debt level (d > d∗) is sustainable if the consolidation
level is also higher (u > u∗) and both variables converge onto the stable path into
equilibrium (SBCP).
All proofs are immediately clear from the model solution and assumptions.
This result might be helpful for a clearer understanding of sustainable deﬁcit
levels. But the diﬃculty in both cases lies in a closer operationalization of the
’maximum sustainable yield’ level. This approach does not provides optimal
debt or deﬁcit thresholds like that in the SGP. But it shows us the direction of
convergence for long–run target values in ﬁscal policy. All debt or deﬁcit levels
that are on the ’Sustainable–Balance–Consolidation–Path’ (SBCP) are labelled
as sustainable ﬁscal policies under the European framework and the SGP. A brief
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summary of this preliminary subsection is the following deﬁnition of ﬁscal policy
sustainability in the European Monetary Union under the Stability and Growth
Pact as:
Deﬁnition 4.2.1. Sustainable policy is each combination of the managed re-
source and their corresponding consolidation eﬀort (control–variable), with a po-
sition on the ’Sustainable–Balance–Consolidation–Path (SBCP). The properties
of ﬁscal policy sustainability are summarized in the comprised Propositions.
That new deﬁnition includes the deﬁnition of Bohn (1998), which deﬁnes sus-
tainable as a point on the Balance–Growth–Path (BGP) and it is in line with
the transversality condition. Moreover it is also very similar to the deﬁnition in
the European framework by Pasinetti (2000) as well as Buiter and Grafe (2003).
However, it is in our opinion a neat description and moreover better tractable for
an analytical analysis in the following polit–economic model. The next section
uses the new sustainability concept and integrates it in a game–theoretic inter-
action model which analyses in more detail the sustainability of the European
framework especially within the well–known Stability and Growth Pact.
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4.3 Analyzing Sustainability within the SGP
Closest in spirit of the following model is Beetsma and Jensen (2003) and Beetsma
and Uhlig (1999), which analysis contingent deﬁcit sanctions and moral hazard
with a stability pact. Other related work are Chari and Kehoe (1998) and Gio-
vannetti et al. (1998), who explore the need for debt restrictions in multi–country
models of a monetary union. Moreover Besancenot et al. (2004) analyzes the de-
fault on sustainable public debt. They found in the model that the maximum
debt level that investors are willing to hold may be much lower than the com-
monly used sustainable level.1 Hence, what are the implications of that ﬁndings
for the European ﬁscal framework?
4.3.1 Extended Model Framework
The model consists of two periods, 1 and 2, and n>1 countries that participate in
a monetary union. Monetary policy is conducted at the supranational level, while
ﬁscal policy remains dezentral in the national sovereignty responsibility. Coun-
tries are assumed to be identical both in their economic and political structure.
Moreover each country has two political parties, F and G, of which one of them
forms the government in period 1. At the beginning of period 2, the incumbent
government is assumed to be re–elected with probability 0≤p<1. Without any
loss of generality, we assume that party F is in power in period 1 in each country.2
Close to Alesina and Tabellini (1987) we assume that the two parties diﬀer in
terms of their preferences for the composition of public spending. Both parties
F and G attaches only to the provision of their own public good called f and
1The section is based on the following published pa-
pers: EcoMod04 Conference-Proceeding (and online:
http://www.ecomod.net/conferences/ecomod2004/ecomod2004 papers/91.pdf)
and 16th CEIS-Conference at Villa Montragone (International
Economic Association), Conference-Proceedings (and online:
http://www.ceistorvergata.it/conferenzeconvegni/mondragone/XVI papers/Paper-
Herzog%20%20Bodo.pdf) and 9th SPIE Annual Meeting in Conference-Proceeding
(and online: http://iscte.pt/SPIE/lista completa eng.htm).
2Cf. Beetsma and Jensen (2003) mention that the result would be unchanged if in some
countries party F and in other countries party G is in power, as long as the re-election probability
of the incumbent government remains the same across countries.
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g. The incumbent party will not spend anything on the other party’s preferred
good. Now the expected utility of parties F and G in country i are given by,
respectively,
UF i = E[u(fi1) + pu(f2i)− π
2
2φ
], (4.28)
UGi = E[pu(g2i)− π
2
2φ
], (4.29)
where fti ≥ 0 and gti ≥ 0, respectively, are spending on public goods F and
G in period t. Function u is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0
and u(0) = 0. E[.] is the expectation operator conditional on the information
available at the start of the game. Both parties are care about inﬂation π. The
inﬂation rate is determined in the last second period. Parameter φ > 0 is the
inverse of the degree of inﬂation aversion. Similar to Beetsma and Jensen (2003),
we abstract from discounting because this does not aﬀect our results.
The budget constraints of the government in country i, ∀i, in periods 1 and 2
are,
f1i + g1i = 1 + i + b1i − ψ(d1i − d¯1i) + ψ
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j =i
(d1j − d¯ij), (4.30)
f2i + g2i = 1− (1 + πe − π)b1i − ψ(d2i − d¯2i) + ψ
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j
(d2j − d¯2j). (4.31)
The governments endowment is exogenous and equal ’1’ in each period. First–
period variables are hit by i, a shock with E[] = 0 and bounded support [L, 
U ],
L < 0 < 
U , and variance σ2 with i iid. ∀i. Debt at the end of period t is
denoted by bit. We assume that countries start with zero initial debt and that
all debt is paid oﬀ at the end of the second period (i.e. b0i = b2i = 0, ∀i).
Beetsma and Jensen (1999) relaxed the zero–initial debt assumption in their
model and show that the main results are unaﬀected. The debt in period one,
is in nominal government debt and sold on the world capital market (cf. Calvo
and Guidotti, 1993). Close to Beetsma and Jensen (2003), we assume that the
ex–ante real interest rate is zero, which is exogenously determined on the world
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capital market. But this does not aﬀect our results. The variable πe is the
rational inﬂation expectation. Additionally the risk–neutral investors are willing
to hold government bonds and the ex post real interest rate is πe − π. The
government deﬁcit is deﬁned as dit := bit − bi,t−1. If the current deﬁcit level dit is
higher than the allowed threshold of d¯it, imply a ”Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure”
whenever ψ > 0. In that situation (period t) a breaching government i pay the
ﬁne ψ(dti− d¯ti), but in the revers constellation it becomes a reward. In line with
Beetsma and Jensen (2003), we assume ﬁrst of all in contrast of the actual SGP,
that the period 1 deﬁcit level depends on the resource of shock. But later we
extend this assumption in a more realistic way,
d¯1i = d¯− δi and d¯2i = d¯, (4.32)
where δ is what the authors term the ’degree of state contingency’. If δ >
0, and a bad shock occur imply a raise in the reference deﬁcit level like the
’exceptional options’ in the SGP if the shock is suﬃciently large.1 The last terms
in the equations (4.30) and (4.31) are the rebates to country i of the ﬁnes paid
by the union members; close to the mechanism in the current SGP. Apart from
the current reform discussion about the SGP that model implicit assumes total
credible sanctions.
The Common Central Bank (CCB) sets monetary policy for the whole mon-
etary union with primary aim ’price stability’. Equivalent to the assumptions
above and the formal Treaty provisions (article 105 ECT), we assume that the
CCB is not completely independent. This assumption is controversial but many
papers show that free–riding, moral hazard and bail–out problems are tougher in
a monetary union and inﬂuence so the independence of the CCB. The CCB at-
taches a weight 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 to the inﬂation objective of maximizing −π2/(2φ) and
a weight (1− λ) to the objective of maximizing the average amount of resources
1Hence, δ can be interpreted as the degree of ﬂexibility in the SGP. The current reform
debate pushes the δ to a higher level and generates therefore a huge buﬀer for all economic
situations.
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available to the governments in period 2. The function is
UCCB = λ
(
−π
2
2φ
)
+(1−λ) 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
1−(1+πe−π)b1i−ψ(d2i−d¯2i)+ ψ
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j
(d2j−d¯2j)
]
(4.33)
After some transformations and calculations the function can be minimized
to (cf. Appendix A.2)1
UCCB = −π
2
2α
+ 1− (1 + πe − π)b˜1, α := (1− λ)φ
λ
≥ 0. (4.34)
Before we presenting our model extensions to analyze ’sustainability in debt
policy’ we need some basic results from the model (Beetsma and Jensen, 2003)
presented above.
The optimal inﬂation rate is calculated from maximizing (4.34) over π. This
yields:
π = αb˜1. (4.35)
The entire solution of the basic model can be summarized in a result as:
Result (i). Let i = ˜, ∀i. One has:
(a) Suppose that p < 1. First , if ψ = 0,˜ = 0 and p −→ 1, then b˜1 = 0. Second,
a fall in p implies a higher b˜1. Finally, if α > 0, ∂b˜1/∂n > 0 and ∂b˜1/∂α < 0.
(b) ∂b˜1/∂ψ < 0, unless α = 0, in which case ∂b˜1/∂ψ = 0
(c) ∂b˜1/∂ < 0. Moreover, if u is quadratic and α > 0, ∂b˜1/∂˜ decreases with n
and increases with ψ.
The result above implies in easy words: (a) If the re–election probability p
decrease then the optimal debt level in period 1, is higher. Behind that result is
a kind of debt–bias for the incumbent party. Moreover an increasing number of
monetary union member countries imply an increase of the optimal debt level,
because of more free–riding incentives. Finally, higher weight to the inﬂation
objective imply a decrease in the debt level. (b) The sanction mechanism ψ
1Cf. Beetsma and Uhlig (1999).
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discipline the debt variable. (c) The debt increase in response to shocks if the
monetary union is larger because each government internalizes the costs only to
a lesser extent.
Finally, we will mention here one important proposition which characterized
an optimal pact. In our later work we refer to that Proposition:
Proposition 4.10. The ﬁrst–period governments all prefer the pact characterized
by (ψ, δ) = (n−1
n
; 1).
The intuition behind this proposition is that an optimal pact solve two roles
simultaneously. First, it fully internalize the consequences of individual debt
policies for the common inﬂation rate. Second, the reference deﬁcit level to the
shocks, is fully eﬀective to eliminate country speciﬁc movements in public spend-
ing. Now we are ready to discuss our model extension and analyze sustainable
debt policy in a European framework within the SGP.
4.3.2 Modelling ’Sustainable debt consolidation’
The new research focus is to analyze similar to the model in section 4.2 the
problem of ’sustainable’ policy but in a model which describes a monetary union.
From EU-Treaty provisions and the Stability and Growth Pact there is a clear
focus on ’sustainable’ debt consolidation.
We will take the notation from section 4.3 and now extend the basic model.
Variable ei is the debt stock consolidation eﬀort of country i. The motion of the
debt stock ’s(ei)’ depends on the consolidation eﬀort ’ei’. Thus the government
i’s expected utility is now given by:
UF i = E[−si(ei) + u(f1i) + pu(f2i)− π2/(2φ)], ∀i, (4.36)
where si(ei) = (1/2)(ei − k2 )2 represents the costs of ’sustainable’ consolida-
tion within the European ﬁscal framework, especially of the ’Stability and Growth
Pact’. The function above is crucial because it deﬁnes the ’maximum sustain-
able yield’ value by ’k/2’. Moreover the costs for the member states increase if
consolidation is too high because of giving up long–run structural reforms and
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distribute the costs of such projects above generations. However, too low con-
solidation implies also higher costs because from section 4.2 we have shown that
this corresponds with an ’excessive deﬁcit’. Apart from other functional forms
the interpretation of the following budget constraint is very similar to equation
(4.30):
f1i + g1i = 1 + i + ei + b1i − ψ(d1i − d¯1i) + ψ
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j =i
(d1j − d¯ij). (4.37)
where now,
d¯it = d¯− δ(i + ei), and d¯2i = d¯. (4.38)
Besides of the deﬁnitions above we need additionally one assumption which
induce the trade–oﬀ among sustainability consolidation between deﬁcit and debt
levels. In the following we deﬁne the deﬁcit as (notice, di1 > 0):
dit := bit − bi,t−1 +
(
k
2
− ei
)
.1 (4.39)
The last term consists of the MSY optimum of consolidation minus the actual
consolidation variable. A too low consolidation i.e. — below the MSY target —
implies an increase in short–run deﬁcit and long–run debt. However, consolida-
tion in the MSY–Optimum ei = k/2 have no impact on debt and deﬁcit levels.
But a very high consolidation amount above the MSY–Value, reduce on the one
hand the current deﬁcit but on the other hand imply more costs through the
sustainability function s(ei) in the expected utility function Ui. Two important
questions arise now: First, what is the optimal consolidation eﬀort and so the
debt level? Second, what happens with the social utility value if the MSY value
’k’ changes (interpreted as a change of the debt threshold in the SGP)? Hence,
both questions are now analyzed in the extended model framework.
Using (4.37) and (4.31), the ﬁrst– and second–period spending on good F; can
be written as (appendix A.2):
1Notice that I assume also that d2 = −bi1.
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f1i = 1 + ˜ + ei + 2e˜ + b˜ +
(
n
n− 1ψ − 1
)
[(b˜− bi,1) + (e˜− ei)]+
+
(
n
n− 1ψδ − 1
)
[(˜− i) + (e˜− ei)] (4.40)
f2i = 1− b˜1 −
(
1− n
n− 1ψ
)
[(b˜1 − bi,1)]. (4.41)
The simple model extension and the incorporation of a sustainability function
have an tremendous impact on the model results. This is seen in the above
two time-constraints. They are completely diﬀerent from the analogue part by
Beetsma and Jensen (2003).
4.3.3 Model Solution
The optimal behavior of the government of country i, in terms of the choice
of eﬀort and debt issuance, are characterized by the following necessary and
suﬃcient ﬁrst–order conditions:
∂UF
∂ei
= 0⇐⇒ s′(ei) = E[u′(f1i)[1 + ψ(1− δ)]
⇐⇒ s′(ei) = [1 + ψ(1− δ)]E[u′(f1i)] ∀i (4.42)
∂UF
∂bi
= 0⇐⇒ 0 = E[u′(f1i)[1− ψ] + pE[u′(f2i)][−(1− ψ)]− E[α
2
φ
b˜1]
⇐⇒ E[u′(f1i)[1− ψ] = pE[u′(f2i)](1− ψ) + E[α
2
φ
b˜1], ∀i (4.43)
While the second condition (4.43) corresponds to that in the basic model, the
ﬁrst condition (4.42) hints the new eﬀect. It represents the optimal consolidation
eﬀort. Hence, it equates the government marginal costs of consolidation through
eﬀort with the expected marginal gain from period one and two (in terms of a
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lower debt level close to the equilibrium MSY value). The stronger the response
of the reference debt level (δ ↑), the weaker is the ’excessive deﬁcit procedure’
(ψ ↓)1, and thus the smaller is the expected marginal gain. These reactions
are important new ﬁndings for the ’sustainable debt policy’ within the Stability
and Growth Pact’.2 An interesting ﬁnding is that through consolidation the
marginal gain of the RHS (4.42) increases by ψ in comparison to a situation
without consolidation. An increase in strength of the ’excessive deﬁcit procedure’
thus increase the marginal gains from consolidation. That result illustrates that
for sustainable debt policy, a tougher Stability Pact can improve the marginal
gains, ceteris paribus.
For an explicit and closed–form model solution we assume a linear–quadratic
speciﬁcation of the function u (Cf. Beetsma and Jensen, 2003):
u(fti) = −(ξ − 1)
2
(fi1)
2 + ξfti, ξ > 1 and 0 ≤ fit < ξ
ξ − 1 . (4.44)
This is very convenient for explaining the intuition behind the new results.
To see how to solve the (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium in this case look in the
Appendix A.2. With the functional speciﬁcation above the consolidation eﬀort
and public debt levels can be expressed as:
b1i = B − Bi (4.45)
ei = D −Di. (4.46)
where D,B, D > 0. The explicit expressions for B,D,B and D are contained
in the Appendix A.2. We limit the attention to cases in which E[b˜1] = B > 0.
As seen before, there is an active role for a stability pact. A growing size of
the union (’n’ increases) implies an increase in the average expected debt level.
Result (iii). Let ψ > 0. Then,
1 and the re-election probability (p ↓) in a more general framework see appendix B.
2This result show that the re-election probability is very important. A reform proposal
which deﬁne a debt level per law for all diﬀerent Government is from that perspective desirable
(De Grauwe, 2003) but it is not really implementable because a new government implement
their own consolidation level.
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(a) ∂D
∂δ
< 0 and ∂B
∂δ
< 0.
(b) ∂D
∂k
> 0 and ∂B
∂k
< 0.
Part (a) implies that an increase in the reference deﬁcit level of country i
induce a smaller sanction fee if a bad shock occur, and thus decreases debt and
consolidation eﬀort. Therefore, the incentive to exert more consolidation eﬀort
is weakened. Contrary: an increase in debt imply symmetrical an increase in the
consolidation eﬀort (also seen in our model in section 4.2) to achieve sustainable
public ﬁnance.1
The results in part (b) focus more on ’sustainable’ policy implications. An
increase of the MSY value k (interpreted as an increase of the excessive debt
threshold) implies a higher ’D’ and therefore a higher consolidation eﬀort. The
intuition behind this result is that a lower threshold in the long–run does not
change the initial deﬁned debt equilibrium. Therefore to achieve that equilibrium
debt level, despite the lack of clear and credible deﬁcit ceilings; a need for a higher
consolidation eﬀort. Apart from the reactions to the consolidation eﬀort the debt
level declines. Because: On the one hand lower deﬁcit ceilings implies lower
excessive debt in the future and on the other hand higher consolidation eﬀort
which accelerate the decrease in B and thus the debt value.
4.3.4 Are relaxed deﬁcit thresholds compatible with ’Sus-
tainability’?
Proposition 4.11. In the situation of sustainable consolidation; i.e the equilib-
rium level, is equivalent to the ’maximum sustainable yield’ value; parties welfare
function is increasing with relaxing the debt and deﬁcit threshold; ∂VF i(ψ, δ)/∂k >
0.
Proof 4.7. See Appendix A.2. 
Hence, this proposition states there are several gains from a ’sustainable con-
solidation’ policy in equilibrium. However, if the debt/deﬁcit stock is below the
1These results are also in line with Beetsma and Jensen (2003).
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’MSY’ threshold there are no clear beneﬁts from relaxing the ’excessive deﬁcit
procedure’ in the SGP. On the one hand we can argue that might depend on
the re–election probability and the debt amount in period one. In fact, a low
re–election probability and a low debt level imply rather a negative inﬂuence to
the parties utility. A big surprise in our model is that the gains from relaxing the
sustainable thresholds in the SGP arise only if countries consolidate today more
than necessary. However it is easy to show (empirically) that since the start of
EMU nearly all participating countries decline their consolidation eﬀort in ﬁscal
policy tremendously in comparison to the pre-EMU amount (Fatas et al., 2003).
Therefore it is possible to assume that all countries have more disadvantages and
costs if they relaxes the ’sustainable–thresholds’ in the SGP.
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4.4 Institutional Interaction with Diﬀerential Equa-
tions
The huge reform discussion about the Stability and Growth Pact which emerged
with the failure of the early warning in February 2002 and the failure to impose
sanctions against Germany and France in November 2003 is reason enough to an-
alyze the current Stability Pact and the ﬁscal–monetary interaction framework in
more detail. Finding out the relevant trade–oﬀs in the European ﬁscal–monetary
interaction framework is a new research ﬁeld in the short term.1
It is therefore not surprising that there are relatively few models and theo-
retical arguments for the Stability and Growth Pact, which was established in
the subspace of ﬁscal–monetary interaction, since monetary union in 1999 (Dixit,
2001a). One of the most prominent results of the qualitative analysis of ﬁscal rules
in the pre–1990s is that: free–riding, moral hazard and asymmetric information
are challenges in a monetary union, because of the new interactions. However,
nobody knows a good and eﬃcient rule to manage ﬁscal–monetary interaction,
and there is no economic theory which explains the current 3% to GDP deﬁcit
threshold and the 60% debt threshold (De Grauwe, 2003a). Rather, it seems
non–trivial to analyze the European ﬁscal framework and especially the Stability
and Growth Pact, because it links on the one hand monetary and ﬁscal theory as
well as incentive theory with institutional economic analysis on the other (Brunila
et al., 2001). The two theory blocks are hardly linked: Institutional economic
analysis aims to overcome the major drawbacks of pure economic theory.
This paper focuses on the existing pre–embryonic model framework and tries
to extend it to a more appropriate form for policy conclusions. Therefore we begin
with a new model framework that is based on an interdisciplinary approach using
Economics and Mathematics.
When dealing with ﬁscal–monetary interaction in a monetary union it is a
common practice (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999; Beetsma and Jensen, 2003;
1The section is based on the following published Working papers: ’New Eco-
nomic Windows‘ on 2004 Conference-Proceedings and ’New Frontiers of European
Union’ Conference-Proceedings 2005.
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Dixit and Lambertini, 2003) to study models which are based on Barro and
Gordon (1983b), Kydland and Prescott (1977), and thus on simple game theory.
The weakness in all these models is the non-dynamic structure between the more
complex institutional framework of ﬁscal–monetary interaction and the Stability
and Growth Pact. The construction of these models is based on the idea of
modelling the Stability and Growth Pact as a ﬁxed ﬁne ’ψ’ for each additional
unit of debt that is issued (Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999). To use this modelling form
is simple because at the moment there exists no other real option to make the
Stability Pact also traceable in analytical models.
To extend the horizon of the existing models in that environment and to
make the results more relevant for policy conclusions at least for the current
reform discussion about the Stability and Growth Pact, we created a new model
approach based on dynamic diﬀerential equations (Hairer and Wanner, 2002).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.4.1 explains the
main modelling idea. In section 4.4.2, we present a elementary–interaction model
between ﬁscal policy and the Stability and Growth Pact. Section 4.4.3 extends
the framework to a full interaction model between Fiscal–Monetary Policy and
the Stability and Growth Pact. After solving and analyzing the stability of the
model we interpret the model results in subsection 4.4.4. Finally we summarize
the model conclusions and present some policy relevant modiﬁcations for the
current Stability and Growth Pact. Section 4.5 concludes the main body of all
papers presented in chapter 4 as well as the conclusions from our earlier theoretical
analysis.
4.4.1 Model Framework
The model framework consists of three interacting institutions (Beetsma and
Uhlig, 1999). The ﬁrst is the centralized monetary policy (European Central
Bank, ECB). The primary objective of monetary policy is to maintain price–
stability (article 105 ECT). The monetary policy mainly interacts with ﬁscal
policies through the determination of price–levels (FTPL) and interest rates. The
second important institutional framework is the decentralized ﬁscal policy. The
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main diﬀerence between monetary and ﬁscal policy is that the nation retains a
large degree of responsibility over its own ﬁscal policy. This implies three diﬀerent
interactions:
(i) Fiscal policy interacts with monetary policy. Budget decisions about deﬁcit
and debt have an impact on price–stability and thus on monetary policy (cf
FTPL).
(ii) A nations ﬁscal policy interacts with the other ﬁscal policies in the monetary
union because of the competition around the public good ’price–stability’
provided by monetary policy. Thus one ﬁscal policy can undertake free–
rider behavior against the other participating member states within the
monetary union. This free–riding incentive actually increases in the frame-
work of EMU (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999). To eliminate or discipline
this free–rider behavior in the European Monetary Union the so–called ’Sta-
bility and Growth Pact’ was implemented.
(iii) The Stability Pact is the third institution in the EMU. On the one hand
the SGP disciplines ﬁscal policy and free–rider behavior. On the other
hand it helps monetary policy to maintain the primary objective ’price–
stability’. Hence, the objective of the SGP is twofold and it thus represents
an intermediary institution.
The main task in the following paper is to analyze the interactions or in-
terrelations in the European Monetary Union between these three institutional
agents. We choose a dynamic concept that uses diﬀerential equations. The exist-
ing economic literature analyzes ﬁscal–monetary interaction (Dixit and Lamber-
tini 2003, Beetsma and Bovenberg 1999) in a game theoretic framework. The ﬁrst
approach to analyzing the Stability and Growth Pact (Beetsam and Uhlig 1999)
again uses a game theoretic framework but without the real ﬁscal–monetary in-
teraction structure. Moreover the economic approache focuses more on monetary
and real variables and their developments in the monetary union (Aarle et al.,
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Figure 4.4: Institutionell Interaction in EMU
2001). But nobody tries to analyze the institutional interaction in the European
Monetary Union simultaneously using a dynamic framework.1
To illustrate the model framework graphically look to Figure 4.4. Fiscal policy
can inﬂuence the SGP and the monetary policy through lax deﬁcit and debt pol-
icy. The incentives to do this are: national interest, increase of re–election prob-
ability, national output stabilization, reaction to asymmetric and idiosyncratic
shocks and the new free–riding behavior. ζ represents the diﬀerent incentive
channels.
The next section tries to model the interaction relationships between all three
institutions with diﬀerential equations. The stringent modelling of that complex
framework helps us to learn something new about the interactions, impacts and
causalities of the ’European Monetary Union’.
4.4.2 Basic Model
The following section describes the basic interaction model between European
ﬁscal policy and the Stability and Growth Pact. The primary target is to under-
1cf a non-technical or analytical institutional analysis (R. Ohr und A. Schmidt, 2003).
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stand the evolution of breaching countries ′x(t)′. Modelling the dynamic results
in (x(t) ≥ 0) (Schmeiser, 2000):
x′ = (g − p ∗ s)x, t > 0, x(0) = x0 (4.47)
where ’g’ is the beneﬁt from free–rider behavior of ﬁscal policy in the European
monetary union (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999)1 and ’s’ represents disciplining
sanctions from the ’Stability and Growth Pact’. The parameter ’p’ is the prob-
ability of imposing sanctions. The intuition behind the ﬁrst–order diﬀerential
equation is:
• the increasing free–rider behavior ’g > 0’ in a monetary union increases
with the number of countries that violate the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP), because of the expected beneﬁts.
• the sanction procedure ’s > 0’ of the Stability and Growth Pact tries to
reduce or discipline the free–rider behavior of national ﬁscal policies and
thus reduce the number of breaching countries. But this mechanism works
eﬃciently only if the probability of imposing sanctions ’p > 0’, is suﬃciently
large.
The solution of this model is x(t) = x0e
(g−p∗s)t. This implies an increasing
number of breaching countries in the SGP, if free–riding incentives ’g’ are larger
than the disciplining sanctions ’s’. In the current ﬁscal–SGP interaction system
the probability of imposing sanctions is very small.2 This implies ’g > p∗ s’; thus
the number of breaching countries might be increasing.3 But this model approach
is simpliﬁed in the sanction mechanism and its impact on national ﬁscal policy.
A more realistic sanction mechanism looks like:
s = s(x) = s0 + a ∗ x, s0, a ≥ 0, (4.48)
1cf Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) show in the paper that free-riding behavior even increase
in a monetary union.
2cf the failures of imposing early warnings against Germany, France (2002) and for example
Italy (2004) and no sanctions against sinner states as Germany and France (2003) conﬁrm that.
3This describes the current situation in the EMU empirically. The new breaching countries
are Netherlands, United Kingdom, Greece and some of the new EAC.
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where s0 represent the basic sanction amount and a the marginal sanction rate
or the idiosyncratic inﬂuence of the national ﬁscal policy. Substituting equation
(4.48) in to equation (4.47) yields:
dx
dt
= x′ = (ζF − p ∗ a ∗ x)x, with t > 0, x(0) = x0, (4.49)
and ζF := g − p ∗ s0. The diﬀerential equation above is a so–called logistic–
diﬀerential equation (or ’Verhulst–Model’). The logistic modelling framework
also shows the sustainability of the number of breaching countries ’x(t)’. The
solution of that diﬀerential equation through integration is:
t =
∫ t
0
= dτ =
∫ x(t)
x(0)
dx
(ζ − pa ∗ x)x =
∫ x(t)
x0
1
ζ
(
1
x
+
pa
ζ − pa ∗ x
)
=
=
1
ζ
(
ln
[
x(t)
x0
]
+ pa ∗ ln
[
ζ − pa ∗ x0
ζ − pa ∗ x(t)
])
.
(4.50)
Solving the last term to x(t) results in:
x(t) =
ζ ∗ x0
pa ∗ x0 + (ζ − pa ∗ x0)e−ζt . (4.51)
For t→∞:
x(t) −→
{
ζ/(p ∗ a) : ζ > 0,
0 : ζ < 0.
(4.52)
If the sanction mechanism is fully credible i.e. the implementation probability
’p’ and sanction ’s’ are high, then the number of breaching countries converges to
zero. But if free-riding behavior ’g’ dominates the disciplining mechanism ’(p∗s0)’
then ζ > 0 and thus the number of breaching countries convergs to ’ζ/(p ∗ a)’,
a positive ﬁgure. The ﬁnal number of violating countries increases with higher
free–riding incentives but decreases if the sanctions are more credible and the
economic impact of ﬁscal policy ’a’ in the MU is relatively high.1 The intuition
behind the last term is that higher inﬂuence of ﬁscal policy ’a’ in MU normally
implies a stronger sanction procedure (higher sanction amount or a punishment
1vice versa for a high policy impact of ﬁscal policy member states.
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through the monetary policy) because of the increasing inﬂation danger. This
might be a strong disciplining eﬀect for member countries to reduce the ﬁscal
policy below the 3% deﬁcit and 60% debt thresholds. This ﬁnding suggests a
sanction–threshold that depends on the national GDP rate. The term ζ/(pa)
could be interpreted as the natural intake capacity of breaching countries in a
Monetary Union.
The next section extends the simple model with the monetary interaction
level. Monetary policy interacts both with ﬁscal policy and the Stability and
Growth Pact. Now we take into account monetary policy and analyze the full
interaction framework.1
4.4.3 Full–Interaction–Model
Similar to the model description in section 4.4.2, we now extend the model with
the monetary authority. Analyzing the complete–complex system explains the
current European ﬁscal–monetary interaction framework and the connection with
the Stability and Growth Pact in a more realistic way than all the other existing
economic models.
To model the evolution of monetary policy ’y(t)’, we follow a similar approach
with diﬀerential equations:
y′ = (ζM − d−1 ∗ y)y, t > 0, y(0) = y0 (4.53)
where ’y’ is monetary policy (for instance interest rates) and ’d ≥ 0’ reﬂects the
independence of monetary policy (or a weight; i.e. it is possible to follow other
objectives such as output stabilization as well). In the following section, we deﬁne
c := d−1. The intuition behind equation (4.53) is:
• if free–riding behavior is dominant in the MU ζM > 0 (inﬂation target)
then monetary policy might punish ﬁscal policy additionally with higher
interest rates.
1cf because independent European monetary policy can also discipline ﬁscal policy, for
instance with higher interest rates.
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• on the other hand if the monetary policy is fully independent (d → ∞)
then the primary objective ’price stability’ (ζM) has the whole weight. A
more dependent Common Central Bank (CCB) (d→ 0) implies that output
targets are more important. This has an explicit negative impact on interest
rates (i.e. a decline).
In a more realistic interaction framework, free–rider incentives ’ζ ’ depend also
on the current number of ﬁscal policy breaching countries (Herzog, 2004b)1:
ζ = ζM(x) = −ζM1 + ζM2 x, with ζ1, ζ2 ≥ 0 (4.54)
where ζ1 represents disciplining incentives (for the number of non–breaching
countries) and ζ2 describes the ’Cascade to the top’ eﬀect which was ﬁrst explained
by Herzog (2004a). Moreover the ﬁscal policy free–rider incentive ζF also depends
on monetary policy:
ζF (y) = ζF3 − ζF4 y, with ζ3, ζ4 ≥ 0 (4.55)
where ζ3 represents the increasing free–rider behavior in the Monetary Union
(Beetsma and Bovenberg 1999) and ζ4 describes the ’Disciplining–Monetary–
Policy’ eﬀect (interest rate eﬀect).
Substituting equation (4.54) into equation (4.53) and also equation (4.55) into
equation (4.49) yields the following system of diﬀerential equations. This system
is very similar to the so-called ’Lotka–Volterra equations’:2
x′ =(ζF3 − ζF4 ∗ y − pa ∗ x)x t > 0 x(0) = x0
y′ =(−ζM1 + ζM2 ∗ x− c ∗ y)y t > 0 y(0) = y0
(4.56)
To understand how the solution of the system evolves, we ﬁrst simplify the
system and assume a = c = 0.
x′ =(ζF3 − ζF4 ∗ y)x t > 0 x(0) = x0
y′ =(−ζM1 + ζM2 ∗ x)y t > 0 y(0) = y0
(4.57)
1cf Fiscal Theory of Price Level, Woodford (2003).
2Goes back to Alfred James Lotka (1880–1949) and Vito Volterra (1860–1949).
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This system of diﬀerential equations has two possible solutions (x1, y1)
′ and
(x2, y2)
′:
(
x1
y1
)
=
(
0
0
)
and
(
x2
y2
)
=
(
ζM1 /ζ
M
2
ζF3 /ζ
F
4
)
To show the (asymptotic) stability or instability of the two solutions, we deﬁne
the function F (x, y) and calculate the eigenvalues of the system:
F (x, y) =
(
(ζF3 − ζF4 ∗ y)x
(−ζM1 + ζM2 ∗ x)y
)
x, y ≥ 0, (4.58)
and so the derivatives in the associated points are:
F ′(0, 0) =
(
ζF3 0
0 −ζM1
)
, ∧ F ′
(
ζM1
ζM2
,
ζF3
ζF4
)
=
⎛
⎝ 0 −ζF4 ∗ ζ
M
1
ζM2
ζM2 ∗ ζ
F
3
ζF4
0
⎞
⎠ ,
Now we calculate the eigenvalues of F ′(0, 0):
det|F ′(0, 0)− λI| = −(ζF3 − λ)(ζM1 − λ) = 0, (4.59)
which implies λ1 = ζ
F
3 and λ2 = ζ
M
1 . Because of the assumption that all ζi > 0
∀i, the two eigenvalues are positive. Hence, there is an unstable equilibrium point
P1(0, 0).
1
To determine the eigenvalue for F ′
(
ζM1
ζM2
,
ζF3
ζF4
)
, we have to solve the following
equation:
det
∣∣∣∣F ′
(
ζM1
ζM2
,
ζF3
ζF4
)
− λI
∣∣∣∣ = λ2 + ζM2 ∗ ζ
F
3
ζF4
∗ ζF4 ∗
ζM1
ζM2
= λ2 + ζF3 ∗ ζM1 = 0, (4.60)
the system is also unstable if Re λ1 < 0 and Re λ2 > 0 (Strang, 1988, 2003).
Therefore the system is unstable around the second point P2(ζ
M
1 /ζ
M
2 ; ζ
F
3 /ζ
F
4 ).
1The instability can also be seen from: det|F ′(0, 0)| < 0.
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However, it follows directly from (4.60) that the eigenvalues are: Im λ1,2. The
possibility of complex eigenvalues implies no real solution. To describe the so-
lution behavior of the system near the point (ζM1 /ζ
M
2 ; ζ
F
3 /ζ
F
4 ), we rewrite the
diﬀerential equation system (4.57) in the following shape:
dx
dy
=
dx
dt
dy
dt
=
x′
y′
=
(ζF3 − ζF4 ∗ y)x
(−ζM1 + ζM2 ∗ x)y
, (4.61)
and after integration we can rewrite the equation above as,
−ln[xζ1 ] + ζ2 ∗ x =
∫ −ζ1 + ζ2 ∗ x
x
dx =
∫
ζ3 − ζ4 ∗ y
y
dy = ln[yζ3]− ζ4 ∗ y − α,
(4.62)
where α is an integration constant. Thus all the solutions (x(t), y(t))′
satisfy the implicit solution:
ln[x(t)ζ1 ] + ln[y(t)ζ3]− ζ2 ∗ x− ζ4 ∗ y = α ∀t ≥ 0. (4.63)
The integration constant α can be calculated from the initial condition (x0, y0):
α = ln[xζ10 ] + ln[y
ζ3
0 ]− ζ2 ∗ x0 − ζ4 ∗ y0. (4.64)
We suggest that the solution set (x(t), y(t)) satisﬁes a closed–form solution in
the environment (, δ) around the point (x2, y2):
x(t) =
ζ1
ζ2
+  ∗ sin[ωt], ∧ y(t) = ζ3
ζ4
+ δ cos[ωt], (4.65)
with  > 0, δ  1 and ω > 0. When t = 0 after trivial aggregation we get the
result:
α = ζ1 ln
[
ζ1
ζ2
]
+ ζ3 ln
[
ζ3
ζ4
]
− ζ1 − ζ3 + |O(δ)| (δ −→ 0). (4.66)
The next step is now the approximation of the general solution (x(t), y(t))
(with second-order Taylor series) in the environment of x2 = ζ1/ζ2 and y2 = ζ3/ζ4:
ζ1 ∗ ln[x(t)] + ζ3 ∗ ln[y(t)]− ζ2 ∗ x(t)− ζ4 ∗ y(t) (4.67)
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is equivalent to:
= ζ1 ln
[
ζ1
ζ2
]
+ ζ2 sinωt + ζ3 ln
[
ζ3
ζ4
]
+ ζ4δ cosωt +
ζ22
2ζ1
2 sin2 ωt+
+
ζ24
2ζ3
δ2 cos2 ωt− ζ1 − ζ2 sinωt− ζ3 − ζ4δωt + O(3 + δ3), (4.68)
=ζ1 ln
[
ζ1
ζ2
]
+ ζ3 ln
[
ζ3
ζ4
]
− ζ1 − ζ3 + ζ
2
2
2ζ1
2 sin2 ωt +
ζ24
2ζ3
δ2 cos2 ωt + O(3 + δ3),
=α + O(2),
if we choose
ζ22
2ζ1
2 =
ζ24
2ζ3
δ2.
Thus we can conclude that our speciﬁed solution (4.65) solve the general
system (x(t), y(t)) until a error term of order O(2). Moreover we can see that
the Trajectories {(x(t), y(t)) : t ≥ 0} are approximative ellipse around the point
(x2, y2).
The intuition in the short term: The simpliﬁed system–dynamics imply that
the number of breaching countries increases so long as the monetary policy sees
no danger for price–stability in the future. After the reaction of the monetary
policy (increase in interest rates) the number of breaching countries decreases.
But the most interesting case is the general model (4.56) with a = c = 0.
Now we calculate the general solution and prove the stability of the associated
diﬀerential equation system. Starting from the bottom, we are now ready to solve
and analyze the interaction relationships between all the interacting institutions:
Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy and the Stability and Growth Pact.
The general model is described through the function F (x, y):
F (x, y) =
(
(ζF3 − ζF4 ∗ y − pa ∗ x)x
(−ζM1 + ζM2 ∗ x− c ∗ y)y
)
x, y ≥ 0, (4.69)
There are the following four solutions for the general model:
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(
x1
y1
)
=
(
0
0
)
∧
(
x2
y2
)
=
(
0
−ζ1/c
)
∧
(
x3
y3
)
=
(
ζ3/(pa)
0
)
and (x4, y4)
′ is the solution of the linear equation system:
(
pa ζ4
ζ2 −c
)(
x4
y4
)
=
(
ζ3
ζ4
)
using Cramer’s-rule results in:
(
x4
y4
)
=
1
pac + ζ2 ∗ ζ4
(
ζ3 ∗ c + ζ4 ∗ ζ1
ζ3 ∗ ζ2 − pa ∗ ζ1
)
with A := ζ3 ∗ c + ζ4 ∗ ζ1 and B := ζ3 ∗ ζ2 − pa ∗ ζ1.
The second solution (x2, y2) is a non possible stationary point because we
have assumed x, y ≥ 0. To ﬁnd out the stability of the other three solutions, we
deviate the function F (x, y):
F ′(x, y) =
(
ζ3 − ζ4 − 2ax −ζ4x
ζ2y −ζ1 + ζ2x− 2cy
)
. (4.70)
Similar to the model in subsection 4.3 the point (x1, y1)
′ = (0, 0)′ is a non
stationary solution because of Reλ > 0.1 The point (x3, y3) is unstable, if ζ1/ζ2 <
ζ3/a, and asymptotic stable, if ζ1/ζ2 > ζ3/a. The point (x4, y4) is positive i.e.
x, y ≥ 0 for ζ1/ζ2 < ζ3/a. The eigenvalues from F ′(x4, y4) are:
λ1,2 = −1
2
(aA + cB)±
√
1
4
(aA + cB)2 − (ζ2ζ2 + ac)AB,
with A,B > 0. Because of Reλ1,2 < 0 the point (x4, y4) is asymptotic stable,
i.e. (x(t), y(t)) −→ (x4, y4) for t −→ ∞. This implies that the number of
breaching countries converges after a necessary time to:
x4 =
ζ3c + ζ4ζ1
pac + ζ4ζ3
. (4.71)
1cf Heuser (1986a,b) because of Lipschitz-stetig (steady) or Bronstein et al. (1997).
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The following equation system summarizes the general model results:
ζ1
ζ2
>
ζ3
pa
: x(t)→ ζ3
pa
and y(t)→ 0 for t→∞;
ζ1
ζ2
<
ζ3
pa
: x(t)→ ζ3c + ζ4ζ1
pac + ζ4ζ3
and y(t)→ ζ3ζ2 − paζ1
pac + ζ3ζ4
for t→∞.
(4.72)
The interpretation of the results is relegated to the next subsection.
4.4.4 Interpretation of the Model Results
Now we discuss the mathematical analysis above and show some numerical sim-
ulations. Moreover the numerical simulations proofs the robustness and stability
of our theoretical results, even in a more complex model framework.1
The ﬁrst part of our general results is very similar to the ﬁndings in the basic
model in subsection 4.3. However, the implications from the assumed constella-
tion ζ1/ζ2 > ζ3/(pa) are not so realistic because of the monetary policy variable
convergence to zero; y(t) → 0. Despite this problem we can show that even in
that case the number of breaching countries converges against a ﬁxed ratio. This
is a really surprising ﬁnding because it illustrates that monetary policy alone is
not suﬃcient to discipline breaching countries in a monetary union.
Moreover, assume that the free–rider incentives in a MU are small (ζ3 → 0)
and the number of disciplined member countries within the SGP are big (ζ1 →
∞). Now, the ratio above exceeds the ratio of ﬁscal policy ’ζ3/(pa)’. This illus-
trates our ﬁrst proposition:
Proposition 4.12. The number of breaching member states depends on the real
beneﬁt from free–riding (ζF3 ) and the probability (credibility) of sanctions ’p’ as
well as the inﬂuence on ﬁscal policy of the aggregate variables ’a’.
Proof 4.8. The proof follows directly from the ﬁrst part of the model.
1cf ﬁgure 2 and 3 in the graphical appendix.
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Remark 4.4.1. Hence, we can see that either a high sanction probability or a
high inﬂuence of monetary variables (on the big countries) reduces the number
of breaching countries. On the other hand the free–riding incentives induce the
problem of lax ﬁscal policy behavior in this framework. It is clear that the
implementation of sanctions within the Stability and Growth Pact depends on
the probability and credibility of the enforcement mechanism. On the one hand,
the current sanction procedure within the SGP is poor because the sanction
probability is too low and the credibility of the enforcement procedure is too
weak. On the other hand the partisan inﬂuence within the ECOFIN–council and
the pretty vague ﬁscal–institutional framework in the EMU are reasons for the
past failures in the SGP. That situation implies an increasing number of breaching
countries despite the fact that the sustainable member countries dominate the
EMU by deﬁnition.
The second part of our results is more interesting, because of the following
more realistic assumptions:
(a) The impact of an individual country on monetary policy is relative small
(a → 0) and the sanction probability ’p’ within the SGP is rather low.
Moreover the public good ’price–stability’ induce a strong incentive of free–
riding (ζF3 → ∞), as shown by Beetsma and Bovenberg (2002). Thus
the following ratio converges to inﬁnity (ζF3 /(pa) → ∞). Otherwise the
intended disciplining ratio ζM1 /ζ
M
2 is lower because of the weak ﬁscal con-
solidation eﬀect in the MU, ’ζ1’, and the so–called new ’Cascade–to–Top’
eﬀect within the interaction framework, ’ζ2’.
(b) Moreover, in the observed case a stabil and strict positive outcome exists for
both solution variables (x(t), y(t)).
First, we discuss the determinants of ’x(t)’:
Is monetary policy suﬃcient to constrain the number of breaching ﬁscal poli-
cies in the EMU? To answer that question, we ﬁnd new trade–oﬀ’s in the monetary–
ﬁscal interaction framework. The determinants of the breaching countries depend
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on the monetary independence variable ’c’ and on the ﬁscal policy impact vari-
able ’p ∗ a’ to monetary policy. This illustrates a trade–oﬀ between central bank
independence and the credibility of the SGP. Unfortunately this trade-oﬀ is not
discussed at all in the reform discussion of the Stability and Growth Pact.
Proposition 4.13. Monetary policy independence ’c’ and ﬁscal policy impact on
monetary policy ’p*a’ can inﬂuence the number of breaching countries. Moreover
monetary policy ’ζ4’ reduces the number of breaching countries but the consol-
idation incentives (good guys) from the SGP increase the number of breaching
countries ’ζ1’.
Proof 4.9. Derivation of x(t) is: ∂x(t)
∂c
=
ζ4(ζ23−paζ1)
(pac+ζ3ζ4)2
> 0, because of the assump-
tion ζ3 → ∞ and a → 0. Increasing monetary independence (c ↓) implies a
reduction in the number of breaching countries. The impact of ζ2 is independent
from the number of breaching countries. This is immediately clear from equation
(4.19). But a higher impact of ﬁscal policy ’a’ reduce the number of breaching
countries in the interaction framework through a more restrictive monetary policy
(ζ4). The disciplining eﬀect through monetary policy is:
∂x(t)
∂ζ4
=
c(
→0︷︸︸︷
p ∗ a ζ1 −
→∞︷︸︸︷
ζ23 )
(pac + ζ3ζ4)2
< 0
.
On the other hand, the ﬁscal policy framework, especially the Stability and
Growth Pact ’ζ1’ generates an increasing number of undisciplined countries in
the EMU. See also equation (4.20) 
Remark 4.4.2. A very interesting and new insight is the impact of ζ1. This variable
describes the impact of the good guys (non–breaching countries) or the incentives
of ’sound’ and ’sustainable’ ﬁscal policy. If the number of good guys increases in
MU ’ζ1 ↑’, a simultaneous increase of the breaching countries ’x(t) ↑’ is immedi-
ately implied, because of the increasing free–rider incentives and the inﬂuence of
the declining sanctions. The main problem with this paradoxical ﬁnding is again
the redistribution of sanction revenues to the other member countries.
Second, we discuss the determinants of ’y(t)’:
Assume an initial constellation of parameters, where monetary policy can
increase the interest rates. The following proposition shows that monetary policy
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is very constrained in the European Monetary Union when it comes to punishing
the breaching countries ’x(t)’:
Proposition 4.14. An increasing ﬁscal policy impact ζ2 increases monetary pol-
icy y(t) but restricted to: (i) Monetary impact on reducing the free–rider incen-
tives ’ζ4’ and (ii) the number of good guys i.e. the ﬁscal rules like the SGP ’ζ1’.
Proof 4.10. The derivation is: ∂y(t)
∂ζ2
= ζ3
(pac+ζ3ζ4)
> 0 
Remark 4.4.3. The innovative model result in proposition 4.14 is pretty surprising.
It shows that a strong monetary policy, with an independent central bank, is
not suﬃcient to limit the number of breaching countries. Or in other words,
monetary policy alone is unable to discipline ﬁscal policy free–rider behavior in
the European Monetary Union. Hence, if the number of disciplined member
states (good guys) decreases or the ﬁscal framework reveals several weaknesses
in disciplining the free–riding behavior, then a strict monetary policy CB —
committed to ’price-stability’— will fail. The reason for this is the limitations and
constraints in the ﬁscal–monetary institutional interaction framework within the
European monetary union. Again this ﬁnding shows how important a sound and
eﬃcient ﬁscal framework such as the Stability and Growth Pact is. A strong and
independent ’Common Central Bank’ is not enough to solve the ’new’ incentives
to more free–riding behavior in the European Monetary Union.
This paradoxical situation where a fully independent monetary policy is un-
able to discipline lax ﬁscal policy conﬁrms the necessity of a strong and eﬃcient
ﬁscal–coordination framework in the European Monetary Union. Some modiﬁ-
cation proposals to the current SGP are in the next section.
Last but not least we brieﬂy discuss the results for a theoretically complete
independent monetary policy. The result (4.72) changes to:
ζ1
ζ2
<
ζ3
pa
: x(t)→ ζ1
ζ3
and y(t)→ ζ3ζ2 − paζ1
ζ3ζ4
for t→∞.
(4.73)
Remark 4.4.4. The last case illustrates that the number of breaching countries
depends only on the impact of ﬁscal policy free–riding incentives ζ3 and the
number of good guys (i.e. ﬁscal policy rule; SGP) ζ1. Hence, if the number of
disciplined countries (good guys) is larger and/or if the ﬁscal rule is suﬃciently
strong then the number of breaching countries might be increasing. Moreover
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in the fully independent case the monetary policy is more contractive but also
more restricted. So a weak ﬁscal framework ’ζ1’ and a low disciplining impact of
monetary policy on ﬁscal policy ’ζ4’ are both big limits for monetary policy in
reducing the free–riding incentives in the EMU. This is a really surprising result
and shows the clear disadvantage of a fully independent monetary policy within
a monetary union framework with a weak Stability and Growth Pact. Basically
this ﬁnding suggests a clear beneﬁt from more ﬁscal policy coordination because
of the strong limits of monetary policy independence in the EMU.
4.5 Concluding the Model Results
We are now ready to give the main result of this chapter, which is quite technical,
but applicable to several situations discussed later. To be on the right track, if
there is too much rigidity policymakers will be unable to plug gaps and asym-
metric shocks in temporary hard times. Too much laxity, and the integrity of
monetary policy may be violated by incompatible objectives or by the budgetary
machinations of myopic policy, vote–hunting or even debt–racing. How to draw
and tread the thin line between these two is a challenge for any jurisdiction,
national or supranational, in future.
The main ﬁndings in section 4.1 illustrate that the breach of the SGP depends
on the country’s own expectations of breach but also very much from the expec-
tations of the other countries in a monetary union. Due to that mechanism, a
”deﬁcit- or debt cascade to the top’ is induced if at least two countries breach the
SGP. This ﬁnding is in line with several other theoretical and empirical observa-
tions in the literature. At the same time, we can also show that the Stability and
Growth Pact disciplines the EMU member states merely as long as no or only
one country breaches the rules of the SGP. Therefore the SGP is necessary but
not suﬃcient to discipline ﬁscal policy. To protect ’European price-stability’ we
need further mechanisms or a modiﬁcation of the current SGP.
A rethinking of the ﬁscal–monetary framework for the EMU is necessary and
urgent. Revising the Stability and Growth Pact will not be easy, because we have
a heterogenous target set of a ’magic Polyeder’. The analysis of ’sustainability’ in
the European ﬁscal framework again shows that this term seems very important.
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Unfortunately there is no clear deﬁnition of ’sustainability’ either from the aca-
demic side or from the EU-Commission. Hence, our approach is certainly only
a ﬁrst step to an implementation theory that explains necessary and suﬃcient
ingredients and deﬁnitions for a sustainable policy framework. Further research
in this ﬁeld is necessary for the success of the EMU and the ’Euro’.1 This seems
an important topic for future research. Additionally the results and the devel-
opment of public debt in reality in France, Germany, Portugal, Italy and so on
show us how urgent further research on this topic is.
The deﬁnition of a sound ﬁscal architecture of EMU is still in progress. Many
aspects and problems will be clariﬁed merely as time goes by. However, as shown
in section 4.3, identifying key issues and the relevant trade–oﬀs is essential for
designing appropriate policy responses at the EMU and at the national level.
We have shown in the model that often the sustainability objectives in the SGP
induce welfare losses. But after February 2002, with the story of the early warning
against Germany and after November 2003, with the decision against imposing
stronger sanctions, everybody knows a reform of the Stability and Growth Pact
is only a matter of time. Now it is time to look for an appropriate ’sustainable’
ﬁscal framework which cure the main problems and drawbacks particularly the
current rules of the ’STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT’.
Our novel approach of modelling ﬁscal–monetary interaction with the current
Stability and Growth Pact through diﬀerential equations shows new and some-
times surprising results. The ﬁrst new ﬁnding is that the system is stable with a
positive number of breaching countries. The second and really astonishing result
is that monetary policy is despite its independence restricted in punishing the
breaching countries through higher interest rates. Moreover we ﬁnd some new
interaction channels, for instance the positive–relation between the disciplined
member states (strong ﬁscal rules) and the number of breaching countries. All
the ﬁndings invalidate the existing studies of the Stability and Growth Pact.
For this reason we can show that the ECB is not able to discipline (eliminate)
the free–riding behavior of the bad guys. This ﬁnding disproves nearly all those
1The importance of good ﬁscal policy coordination in monetary unions is also obviously
shown in historical monetary unions in Europe -Scandinavian and Latin coin unions- and current
monetary unions in Africa.
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studies which propose that inﬂuence channel. Several policy conclusions from
this model show again how necessary and important an eﬃcient ﬁscal framework
like the Stability and Growth Pact is in the European Monetary Union. Further-
more, we present some ideas for the design of a new Stability and Growth Pact
(cf. chapter 6 and 7).
If the theory expounded in these papers were valid empirically, there would
be major implications for the manner in which ﬁscal and monetary policies are
related in a monetary union and how necessary an eﬃcient ﬁscal framework might
be.
In this section we have introduced some economical models that lead to a
fairly general treatment of the European Monetary Union as well as the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact. An important role is played by the phenomenon of
”free–riding” and the ”ﬁscal–monetary interaction” associated within a ”Mone-
tary Union”. The existence of these continuous externalities and spill–overs can
be characterized by a purely economic property of the underlying space, which
is deﬁned in the well–known ‘Coase–Theorem’. In the next section we introduce
both concepts and establish the connection between them and analyze: Why do
bigger countries have more problems with the ”Stability and Growth Pact”.
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Chapter 5
Why do bigger countries have
more problems with the SGP?
5.1 Introduction
The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe has a common central bank
that decides about monetary policy, but each member country’s government re-
taining simultaneously a large degree of ﬁscal autonomy. Since 1 January 1999,
one of the most illustrating example in European Monetary Union integration are
their growing interactions between sovereign countries ﬁscal policy and the Euro-
pean central bank monetary policy. Moreover to ensure European price–stability
(article 105 ECT) in EMU the Maastricht Treaty was supplemented with the Eu-
ropean Stability and Growth Pact in Amsterdam 1997. The implementation of
the Stability and Growth Pact (1466/97 and 1467/97) introduce additionally new
conﬂicts and gets to one of the mainstays in the European ﬁscal framework. But
since the Ecoﬁn–Council fails to send early warnings — so called Blue-letter’s —
to Germany and France and fails to impose sanctions against sinner states, in No-
vember 2003, the ’Stability and Growth Pact’ (SGP) is subject of lively academic
and public debates. Diﬀerent suggestions and proposals to modify the current
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’Stability and Growth Pact’ are in discussion (Bayoumi and Masson, 1996; Buti
et al., 2003). But one of the most surprising and interesting question about the
Stability and Growth Pact emergences in the last two years. Why have obviously
bigger countries more problems with the budget consolidation and thus with the
Stability and Growth Pact (Rodrik, 1998)? or why breaching countries are more
larger countries as Germany, France and likely in year 2004 also Italy?1
In this paper, we examine the ﬁscal consolidation behavior within the Euro-
pean Monetary Union and ﬁnd some new results and suggestions regarding the
design of the European ﬁscal framework especially the Stability and Growth Pact.
Moreover we try to analyze the trade–oﬀs among the rigidity and demanded ﬂex-
ibility in the current reform discussion about the Stability and Growth Pact. We
consider a model where ﬁscal policy reputation, homogeneity and output variance
aﬀects the consolidation speed, and explain so the problem of huge diﬀerences
in budget consolidation in Europe. Countries with high past ﬁscal reputation as
for instance Germany consolidate their budget slower because of a lower risk–
prima on interest rates, higher free–riding incentives in a monetary union and
the well–known signaling eﬀect by asymmetric information (Bohn, 1998). De-
lays in consolidation are particularly ineﬃcient if the longer countries waits the
more costly is the policy adjustment. The reason is that longer periods of in-
stability implies higher ineﬃciencies and sanction fees from the SGP. This paper
studies the economic determinants of delays in the consolidation of ﬁscal policy
adjustment programs.
We present a simple model that describes some determinants of delayed con-
solidation due to a strategic–interaction game in a monetary union. Concerning
the determinants of the budget consolidation speed, we ﬁnd that the value of out-
put volatility and the homogeneity within ﬁscal programs are the most relevant
to explain the distinguish budget consolidation between the larger and smaller
countries (cf Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Alesina and Spolaore (1997)). Be-
sides we explain one unsolved ’stylized fact’ in empirical macroeconomics (Fatas
1The section is based on the following published paper: Quarterly Journal of
Economic Research 3/2004 and EcoMod04 Conference Proceeding (and online:
http://www.ecomod.net/conferences/ecomod2004/ecomod2004 papers.htm).
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and Mihov, 2001; Gali, 1994): Why all the empirical evidence points to the pres-
ence of a negative relationship between output variability and the government
size?
Moreover it is well known that in models of monetary policy alone, pre-
commitment leads to better outcomes, and avoid the inﬂation bias (Kydland
and Prescott, 1977). Unfortunately that simple relation is not fully true for
ﬁscal-monetary interaction in a monetary union (Dixit and Lambertini, 2003).
In the European ﬁscal framework particularly in the reform discussion about the
Stability and Growth Pact is rather the bias to more discretion than commitment
(De Grauwe, 2003a). This development has a strong impact to the future con-
solidation behavior in the European Monetary Union. Therefore it is of highly
interest to understand ﬁscal policy consolidation behavior in a game–theoretic
interaction framework.
The model results suggest that, when there is a diﬀerence in budget consol-
idation speed in a monetary union, the limits set by the Stability and Growth
Pact, may be useful on the one hand to reduce the free–rider incentives and on
the other hand to close the gap between the bigger and smaller countries. Never-
theless the current Stability and Growth Pact does not solve the second objective
in the last three years. Moreover von Hagen et al. (2001) conclude in a ﬁrst
empirical assessment about ﬁscal policy consolidation in the European Monetary
Union (EMU): ’The ﬁscal framework of Stage III of EMU will work more eﬀec-
tively in the small European states than in the larger states.’ Thus there are
some systematic incentives to play weak oﬀ against tough. To understand this
phenomenon is an important issue for a future reform of the Stability and Growth
Pact. In sum, the evidence indicates that the SGP need a more transparent and
a more credible enforcement mechanism.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a
short literature review and discuss several aspects of the current reform literature
about the Stability and Growth Pact. Section 3, starts with the construction of
the model and proceed with the discussion of the results. Policy conclusions for
the current reform discussion about the Stability and Growth Pact are taken up
in section 4. The last section 5 provides discussion and concluding remarks.
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5.2 Literature Review
Our approach is related to the literature on dynamic games between a monetary
and ﬁscal authority, initiated by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983b). The paper covering two analyzes of delayed stabilization. (A)
Tabellini (1986) consider a war of attrition that is played between the ﬁscal
and monetary authorities: an unsustainable combination of monetary and ﬁscal
policies in place until one side concedes. (B) Alesina and Drazen (1991) build a
war of attrition model, however they shift the focus to a game between interest
groups. They show why are stabilizations delayed.
My paper diﬀers from Tabellini (1986,1987) and Alesina and Drazen (1991)
in several ways. First, we concentrate on the consolidation of deﬁcits and debts,
and therefore abstract from pure politic–economic determinants. Second, we try
to analyze a strategic situation in a Monetary Union that ﬁts the situation in
the European Monetary Union with the current Stability and Growth Pact, since
1999. Finally, and most important, the model attempt to explain not only the
fact why consolidation speed is delayed and diﬀerent in the European Monetary
Union, we show also why consolidation is diﬀerent between larger and smaller
countries in the EMU.
The results illustrates that larger countries consolidate slower than smaller
countries because of greater diﬀerences in the public sector and output variations.
Indeed, the model focus on a few details to explain the current empirical case in
the EMU but together with the paper by Alesina and Drazen (1991) it is a
reasonable explanation for the current phenomenon of breaching countries and
refers to the discussion around the Stability and Growth Pact (von Hagen et. al,
2001).
There is also a huge literature about the economic impacts and reasons for
the European Stability and Growth Pact and the new ﬁscal–monetary interaction
relationships. An early attempt to model the SGP is provided by Beetsma and
Uhlig (1999). They present in a two–period model of monetary union that gov-
ernments have incentives to issue more debt than a social planner would choose.
They conclude therefore that the incentives to restrain debt accumulation are
diminished in a monetary union and, hence, the excessiveness of debt will be
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exacerbated. Thus, the spill over eﬀect arise through increasing public debt in
a country, which leads to a looser common monetary policy and hence, aﬀect
all the union participants. Similarly to Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) is the work by
Chari and Kehoe (1998, 2003) who explore the need for debt restrictions in a two–
country model of monetary union. They conclude, that restrictions on public debt
are needed, because union members do not fully internalize the welfare eﬀects of
an increase in nominal debt on the common union–wide inﬂation rate.1 Actu-
ally Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003) and Beetsma and Jensen (2003) model
a monetary union with ﬁscal–monetary interaction. The main results of these
models in concern to the Stability and Growth Pact are: (A) Fiscal discretion
eliminates the gains of monetary commitment. But monetary discretion does not
completely eliminate the gains of ﬁscal commitment within rules. (B) Shock–
contingent budgetary targets (or sanctions) leads too an increasing free–riding
behavior and thus eliminates the disciplining character.
All the papers mentioned so far have in common that the union’s central
bank is not only concerned with low inﬂation, but also with other objectives.
Debrun (2000), in contrast provides a rational for short–run (deﬁcit–based) ﬁscal
constraints, despite of the assumption that the ECB is totally committed to its
objective (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 2002). The important point here is that ﬁscal
policies aﬀect aggregated demand and supply and, hence the price level in the
monetary union. Through a lack of commitment in monetary and ﬁscal policy the
public deﬁcit biased up: First, governments try to stimulate aggregate demand
by expansive ﬁscal policy and second, they use deﬁcits to move the common
inﬂation rate into the direction they individually prefer.2 This model prediction
is perhaps an empirical rational for the reason why France and Germany with
very low ’national’ inﬂation rates and growth rates breach the SGP. Also Herzog
(2004a) found that the current SGP works not really to secure price stability. He
shows, if more than one country breaches the Pact, a deﬁcit-spiral (debt-spiral)
1Cf. Giovannetti, Marimon and Teles extend the paper of Chari and Kehoe into various
directions.
2Cf. If the actual inﬂation target is to be too tight, they boost aggregate demand further,
which increase inﬂation.
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to more excessive government spending will be induced. Moreover Herzog (2004)
shows that monetary policy in the EMU in combination with the current Stability
and Growth Pact is more limited to punish undisciplined ﬁscal policy. That imply
under speciﬁc circumstances a higher optimal inﬂation rate than intended by the
ECB. The theoretical analysis in that topic explain on the one hand the need
of ﬁscal restrictions and on the other hand the implementation problems of the
current SGP. Despite Beetsma (2001) conclude, that the theoretical literature
cannot pass any clear verdict on the SGP: ’Therefore, the pros and cons of the
SGP need to be assessed using qualitative arguments.’ We show here a further
argument for the necessity of an eﬃcient and strict Stability and Growth Pact in
the European Monetary Union.1
5.3 Consolidation Model: Big vs. Small
The positive issue of how policymakers choose sustainable debt policy and con-
solidate the budget remains unexplored in the current literature. We provide
on basis to the simple stylized model below a formalization of signaling eﬀects.
Thus we build up a reputation game between two governments which diﬀer in
their ability to sustainable debt consolidation (spending cuts) and in their size.
In that model we examine separating equilibria and pooling equilibria.
The governments objective is to reach a sustainable debt level x∗ that stabilize
the debt–to–GDP ratio. We use the following loss function similar to Drazen and
Masson (1994)2
L = pΛ +
1
2
(T )2 (5.1)
where p denotes the probability that the sustainable stabilization fails, and Λ is
the ﬁxed cost of failure. The costs of failure Λ include possible sanction fees ΓS
from the current Stability and Growth Pact.3 The government chooses ﬁrst taxes
1Strengthening the SGP corresponds with the proposal by the EU-Commission.
2Cf. Dornbusch, 1991.
3Sanctions fees are between 0.2%-0.5% of GDP. I abstract from complex details and assume
ﬁxed fees because it does not change the model results.
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T to achieve their consolidation target value. The cost of taxation is standard,
while the cost of a failed consolidation reﬂects either the reputational and political
costs of missing the announced budget target or the higher inﬂation and sanction
fees within the SGP which may result if the stabilization fails.
The sequence of events is as follows. At the beginning of period 0 the govern-
ment issue debt and decides about the relative amounts of one- and two–period
consolidation. At the end of period 1 the government chooses taxes to meet the
announced budget target. However, whether or not the target will be met re-
main uncertain, since it depends of a shock, Z, which hits the budget after taxes
have been set. The success of consolidation depends on the realization of Z. The
probability that the consolidation fails is
p = prob[Z > T −G−X], (5.2)
where G denotes government spending and X the consolidation eﬀort which de-
pends on the revenue and output in each period. The distribution of the shock Z
is triangular with mean zero, E1Z = 0, and a support ranging between -a and a.
With this assumption we capture the fact that shocks of larger size are less likely
to occur. Equation (2) shows on the RHS the distribution of Z, since we focus on
a government which expects to succeed, in the sense of that it chooses a level of
taxes T, for which the expected budget is larger than the announced target; i.e.
T-G-X>0. The consolidation eﬀort is equal to
X = (1− ψ)Y + (ψ)[E0[Y ] + pE0[ΓS]] (5.3)
where ψ is the share of consolidation in period two, Y is the output and E0Y
respectively the expected output (similar to budget growth revenue) and p is also
the probability to breach the deﬁcit threshold within the Stability and Growth
Pact ΓS (sanction fees). Additionally we assume that output Y depends on ﬁscal
policy stabilization. There are diﬀerent governments in reference to size and ﬁscal
policy in the monetary union. The government can be two types — tough or weak
— depend on the level of spending in period 1. A tough government has a level
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of spending, GL, lower than the level of spending, GH , of a weak government.
Moreover the governments are distinguishing in size. This result in
Y = Y
(
Gi
sj
)
+ µ i = H,L j = B, S (5.4)
where Y (G) ≥ 0, sj is a scaling parameter reﬂecting the fact that the diﬀerent
members of the monetary union are of diﬀerent size; sB for big countries and sS
for small countries with sB ≥ sS. Moreover µ is an independent shock, distrib-
uted on the compact support [µl;µh], with mean E0µ = 0 and variance E0µ
2 = σ2
that reﬂects some uncertainty. There is empirical evidence that smaller countries
are more open to trade and a positive relationship between trade openness and
government size exist (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998). We argue in line with Ro-
drik (1998) that small–open countries are more subject to external shocks, and
therefore have positive incentives in a monetary union to consolidate faster.1 The
current Stability and Growth Pact boost that consolidation incentives more in
smaller countries because of the high degree of openness and the higher amount
of government transfers in these economies (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998).
Substitution X + G− T into the value of p, and replacing p in equation (1),
we obtain the loss that the government expects after observing X, but before
knowing the realization of Z:
L =
Λ
2a2
[a + G + X − T ]2 + 1
2
(T )2. (5.5)
Then, the optimal value of taxes is equal to T ∗ = ζ [a + G + X] where ζ =
Λ/(a2 + Λ). All technicalities are relegated to Appendix (A.4). Substituting T ∗
into equation (5), and taking expectations conditional on the information at time
0, yields the value of the expected loss after some transformations as
E0L
∗ = E0
(
ζ
2
)
[a+G+X]2 = E0
(
ζ
2
)
[a+G+((1−ψ)Y +(ψ)[E0[Y ]+pE0[ΓS]])]2
(5.6)
1Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) ﬁnd some evidence of a direct relationship between openness
and government size of government transfers.
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The loss function (6) is minimized choosing ψ = 1, or respectively setting
x∗ = −a−G. The last solution imply that sustainable debt policy is x∗ < 0 and
depends from government spending and shocks ’a’. Higher government spending
imply also relativ higher sustainable budgetary targets. The explicit solution
for ψ = 1 imply that the government insulates the budget from budget shocks
and thus eliminate all the uncertainty regarding the cost of consolidation. This
policy is optimal because it rules out that the stabilization may fail as a result
of a negative shock to the budget. Intuitively, a government which expects to
succeed will not take the whole consolidation eﬀort in period 1 because there are
also budget risks in the meantime. Thus the government decide to consolidate
optimally in period 2.
Consider now a class of separating equilibrium where believes have the follow-
ing form: for consolidation levels shorter than ψS, the other governments expect
to be tough. If the consolidation take ﬁrst place in period 2, the government
is identiﬁed as weak (W) because their consolidation eﬀort X is lower and thus
slower than in the case of a tough (T) government. This imply the following two
conditions:
The weak government compare
E0L
W (W,ψ = 1) ≤ E0LW (T, ψ ≤ ψS), (5.7)
that inequality holds for
ψ ≤ ψS = σ
2 + λα−√λ2α2 + σ2λ(2α− λ)
σ2 + α2
, (5.8)
where α := a + GH + Y
(
GH
sj
)
and λ := Y
(
GH
sj
)
− Y
(
GL
sj
)
and it is the
solution of the square equation of the expected loss of the weak government
under full information. The intuition for this result is as follows. A short and thus
fast consolidation carries no beneﬁt for a weak government, expect for allowing to
distinguish itself as tough. Since by mimicking a tough government, consolidation
payments are saved merely for two-period consolidation. Such gain disappears
if the weak consolidate faster. In contrast the consolidation risk increase in the
short–term, because of shocks which can arise after the consolidation imply that
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the weak reveals itself by choosing 0 < ψS < 1. It is also worth to mention
that the consolidation speed increase with the variance of output shocks σ2, and
decreases with the diﬀerence, λ, between the eﬀorts of ﬁscal policy stabilization.
A separating equilibrium of the tough government thus exists if and only if
the though government is willing to slow the consolidation down to ψS. This
happens if,
E0L
T (T, ψS) ≤ E0LT (W,ψS < ψ¯ ≤ 1), (5.9)
and the incentive compatibility constraint is satisﬁed if
(1− ψS)2σ2 ≤ (1− ψ¯)2σ2 + ψ¯2λ2 + 2ψ¯λβ, (5.10)
where β := a + GL + Y
(
GL
sj
)
. The necessary condition for equation (10)
depends also crucially of σ2 and λ. If the shock σ2 is too large then the tough
government would prefer not to reveal its type. When such a separating equi-
librium does not exist, pooling equilibrium may exist, where both governments
choose the same consolidation speed and amount.
In a pooling equilibrium both governments choose the same consolidation, i.e.
the forward output rate, is equal to
E0Y
P
1 = E0[qY
T
1 + (1− q)Y W1 ] = [Y
(
GL
sj
)
+ (1− q)λ] (5.11)
where q, is the probability that the government is tough, depends on the
believes of the other governments in the monetary union. Moreover the prob-
ability that the government is tough q, depends on the economic and political
impact in the EMU. Since the tough government chooses ψP , the consolidation
speed which minimizes its expected loss, a pooling equilibrium exists if and only
if ψP satisﬁed the incentive compatibility constraint of the weak government,
E0L
W (Pool, ψS) ≤ E0LW (W,ψ = 1). This requires
ψP =
σ2 − (1− q)λβ
σ2 + (1− q)2λ2 ≥ ψ
W :=
σ2 + λαq −√λ2q2α2 + σ2λq(2α− λq)
σ2 + λ2q2
. (5.12)
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Condition (12) shows that for a pooling equilibrium to exist the initial rep-
utation, q, must be suﬃciently high. Intuitively, a better reputation in ﬁscal
policy imply a lower risk to breach the SGP, lower interest rate risk premium
and thus making the tough government willing to choose instead of a high speed
consolidation a slower speed to consolidate the budget ψP .
Summing up the following results: First, if a pooling equilibrium exists, the
corresponding consolidation amount and speed ψP is slower than the separating
equilibrium speed ψS, which induces a weak government to reveal itself, because
ψW > ψS. Second the consolidation speed increase with the variance of output
shocks in period 1, σ2, and decrease with the diﬀerence, λ, between the ﬁscal
stabilization eﬀorts by the two governments. Thus the reputation game shows
that if the variance σ2 is relative low to λ the diﬀerences in ﬁscal stabilization
(automatic stabilizers), a separating equilibrium is more likely. Instead, in a
pooling equilibrium, is debt consolidation slower (longer) than in a separating
equilibrium. In both constellations is the consolidation speed ψ faster with higher
variances σ2 and smaller λ. Now we summarize the results in the following
propositions.
LEMMA 1: λ ≥ 0.
The proof of Lemma 1 follows straight forward form the model assumptions.
We now want to ﬁnd the adequate equilibrium condition in which the European
Monetary Union is probably situated.
PROPOSITION 1: A monetary union with dezentral ﬁscal policy imply
high diﬀerences in ﬁscal stabilization λ and because of the convergence criteria a
lower European variance σ2 than within single states.1 Thus a monetary union
with a dezentral ﬁscal framework imply more likely a separating equilibrium.
The intuition of this result suggest that consolidation speed is diﬀerent be-
tween the diﬀerent governments in the monetary union. Moreover heterogeneity
1cf. empirical ﬁndings conﬁrm that constellation in the EMU. See De Grauwe (2003), von
Hagen, Hallett and Strauch (2001), Fata´s and Mihov (2001) and Gali (1994) and also David
Fielding (2002).
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alone is not suﬃcient, however, to delay consolidation. There must also be un-
certainty about the variance of output. Comparing the ﬁndings in the war of
attrition model by Alesina and Drazen (1991) they show that stabilization is
delayed. However the model here explains the delay and diﬀerences in consol-
idation around members in a monetary union. The following proposition can
explain the consolidation behavior of the bigger countries like France, Germany
and Italy. Moreover from Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 is clear that the pooling
equilibrium in the group of larger countries is more likely because of the higher
probability q, that imply slower budget consolidation.
PROPOSITION 2: If λ > 0, ﬁscal consolidation diﬀers; for λ = 0 no
diﬀerence occur.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: The ﬁrst part follows directly form
Lemma 1. That imply a relationship between government spending and their
government size:
GH
GL
≥ sB
sS
>
sB
sB
=
sS
sS
>
sS
sB
.
The inequalities proofs the case that a higher discrepancy between government
spending and size imply slower consolidation. The second part is immediately
clear from equation (10).
Proposition 2 states that countries government expenditure and thus partially
debt is more than proportional to their size. Moreover it is obvious that small
(weak) governments have an higher burden than the larger countries (de Haan
et al., 2003). Fielding (2002) argues that marginal costs are inversely propor-
tional to their size. So smaller countries tend to a have higher marginal costs of
debt. Therefore government debt consolidation is proportionally more in smaller
countries. This stylized ﬁnding is generally true of the West African Monetary
Union, with Coˆte d’Ivoire and Se´ne´gal. The empirical result by Fielding (2002)
shows that both states representing the larger country case and Burkina Faso,
Niger and Togo the small country case. Several other empirical studies show also
that phenomenon in the (Pre-)European Monetary Union (von Hagen et al., 2001;
von Hagen and Harden, 1994; Perotti et al., 1998). A more intuitive argument
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for that empirical evidence are the following facts: The EU’s average debt ratio
was 60 per cent in 1992, it climbed to 73 per cent in 1996. Not surprising, this
increase was entirely driven by the debt expansion in ﬁve ’larger’ states: Germany
(44% to 61%), France (40% to 56%), Spain (48% to 70%), Italy (109% to 124%)
and the UK (42% to 55%). In contrast, the debt ratio of the other more smaller
countries were stabilized or fell after 1992.
The empirical evidence in line with the theoretical model and particularly with
Proposition 2 conﬁrms the model framework and its relevance for the European
Monetary Union, where we observe such behavior in the last 2 years.
PROPOSITION 3: Important determinants of consolidation speed are ﬁscal
policy rules (homogeneity) λ and output variance σ2.
This Proposition explains that in the European monetary union exists many
diﬀerent consolidation amounts and speeds. The consolidation eﬀort (speed)
depends on output shocks and the diﬀerences in governments spending. There
are several empirical evidence that countries or regions with large governments
display less volatile economies, as shown in Gali (1994) and Fatas and Mihov
(2001). This empirical ’stylized fact’ imply in our model a slower consolidation
speed for larger countries. Exactly what we can observer the last three years
in EMU (von Hagen et al., 2004): ’Since output volatility is generally higher in
small and fast growing economies, this empirical ﬁnding can also be read as an
indication that small countries are more able to engage in ﬁscal consolidation, or
that governments there are more willing to do so (see Figure 1).’
Moreover the stylized fact why government size can have an eﬀect on the
volatility of output ﬂuctuations was up to now unexplored in economic theory.
Due to the fact in the standard RBC model is no clear connection between both
variables (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998). This unexplored phenomenon can par-
tially explained in our model. Larger countries hope to have higher economic
and political inﬂuence, which aﬀect countries reputation in negotiations. That
relationship imply a slower consolidation and thus in connection with proposi-
tion 3 a decline in output volatility. The correlation between size of government
and volatility has also been reﬁned by several other recent studies in the Euro-
pean context. For example, Martinez-Mongay (2002) and Martinez-Mongay and
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Sekkat (2003) have looked at which measure of government size captures this
correlation better (e.g. personal versus indirect taxes). The empirical evidence
and the economic theory here imply a higher consolidation speed in the smaller
countries as illustrated in 5.1.
The same is approximative true for the other dimension homogeneity in ﬁscal
policy rules (Fatas et al., 2003; von Hagen and Harden, 1994).
PROPOSITION 4: The consolidation speed diﬀers between countries in
ﬁscal policy homogeneity λ as follows:
(a) Weak/Tough government is big imply λW,B / λT,B
(b) Weak/Tough government is small imply λW,S / λT,S
(c) Weak or Tough government are both small or big imply λ.
Thus it is: λW,S > λ > λW,B and/or λT,B > λ > λT,S.
The proof of Proposition 4 follows directly from Lemma 1 in connection with
Proposition 2. The intuition is: If the weak government is also small (λW,S) then
ﬁscal policy is totally diﬀerent (heterogenous). That constellation imply a slow
consolidation for the tough and large government because of free–riding of the
weak. In the other case, if the weak government is big (λW,B), ﬁscal policy is
more homogenous. Thus imply that the tough and small government speed–up
their consolidation because of real beneﬁts through spill–over from the weak and
big country (Heise, 2001). Summing up, the parameter ﬁscal policy homogeneity
imply faster consolidation for a tough and small government and for the unlikely
situation of a weak and big government (i.e. more open).1 It is well–known
that for smaller countries gains from free–riding and spill–over eﬀects are more
important than the own expansive ﬁscal policy. This imply costs in favor of the
larger countries. The intrinsic motivation of smaller countries imply thus a faster
consolidation in the EMU particularly because of the current decision weights
in the current Stability and Growth Pact. This ﬁnding is also consistent with
1cf. A tough and small is for example Luxemburg and Austria and weak and big is Belgium,
Finland, Ireland.
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the theoretical argument by Buti and van den Noord (2004): ’Most importantly,
the political ownership of the ﬁscal rules seems to be shifting towards smaller
countries with sound public ﬁnances which, although numerous, have a relatively
small weight in the euro area. It is fair to recognize that this shift has weakened
the enforceability of the rules, especially vis a` vis larger countries.’ Moreover von
Hagen et al. (2001) shows that most of the smaller countries follows a contract
approach, that worked more eﬀectively in ﬁscal consolidations. Countries as
Germany that was indicated as tough in the preliminary phase of the EMU,
consolidate slower if the diﬀerent amounts in ﬁscal stabilization is more varying
in the other European countries (free–riding) and aﬀect thus through spill–over
the national decision. This fact is still empirically right in Europe (von Hagen et
al. 2003). Another past event that conﬁrms what we found was the violation of
the Ireland government against the BEPG’s in February 2001 (Hallerberg, 2001).
The puzzling question why some of the EMU member countries do not con-
solidate immediately, once it becomes apparent that current policies are unsus-
tainable could partial explained with the model above. Large deﬁcits implying an
explosive path of government debt and it is apparent that such deﬁcits will have
to be eliminated sooner or later because of the SGP excessive deﬁcit procedure.
The spirit of our analysis is similar to recent attempts to explain other stylized
facts of ﬁscal policy. Starting from that results we discuss in the following section
now some policy conclusions for the reform discussion about the Stability and
Growth Pact.
5.4 Policy Conclusions
Delayed consolidation in the EMU under the Stability and Growth Pact can be
explained in a model of strategic–interaction between ’weak’ and ’tough’ member
states in the European Monetary Union. Now we conclude the paper by discussing
some generalizations and by touching on some issues that the model did not
address but which are important in explaining consolidation speed.
First of all, my argument is much more general as initially considered. Thus
the results are very similar to the model of Alesina and Drazen (1991) but the re-
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sults show that within a Monetary Union the determinants for consolidation and
stabilization are more complex and general than in a pure national framework.
Moreover the model shows that credibility the missing parameter by Alesina and
Drazen (1991) plays a very important role in the case of ﬁscal policy stabilization
in a Monetary Union. Second, the model ﬁts the empirical observations in the
AFC Monetary Union and in the European Monetary Union and is consistent
with several other theoretical ﬁndings in that literature. A third generalization
in that model is the explicit modelling of: sanction fees within the Stability and
Growth Pact, the diﬀerent size and behavior of governments and the interaction
of ﬁscal policy consolidation in a monetary union. Finally, we note some issues
that we did not discuss in the current paper. The major missing part is a closer
endogenously politic-economic description of the model. For instant important
political events such as elections, veto power and decision about distribution pol-
icy. Moreover we do not focus on the fact that smaller countries typically pay
more attention to international and European organizations than larger countries
do, and the do more so, the more the receive transfers from these organizations
(Katzenstein, 1991). These determinants are not modelled explicit but all playing
a very important part for a better understanding: why bigger countries consoli-
date slower?
Our model suggest that successful consolidation within the restriction of the
Stability and Growth Pact needs a eﬃcient and credible enforcement mechanism.
A main message is that necessary harmonization or co–ordination in ﬁscal policy
as well as some discretionary policy is needed to close the gap between the larger
and smaller countries to consolidate public ﬁnance.
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Chapter 6
Revising the European Fiscal
Framework
(...) ”Of course, the stability pact restricts the room
for manoeuvre enjoyed by national ﬁscal policymakers. But
this is the price that must be paid for a common currency.
Historically, stability between currencies has been possible
only when countries have been prepared to relinquish some
national sovereignty.”
Horst Siebert, Financial Times, 6 August 2002
In this chapter we analyze the reform discussion about the European ﬁscal
framework, especially the Stability and Growth Pact (Buiter, 2003). The stability
pact is widely regarded as major innovation. Artis (2002) says: ’...the pact must
rank as one of the remarkable pieces of policy coordination in world history. Its
construction makes it in some respects comparable to the founding of the Bretton
Woods system.’ But in the same time the pact has been on the subject of a heated
controversy and extensively criticized by academic and opinion makers. This
debate has accelerated in 2002 under the inﬂuence of public ﬁnance developments
in a number of euro countries and break-out fully after the ECOFIN meeting in
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November, 2003. A number of countries which are in conﬂict with the 3% deﬁcit
threshold called its eﬀectiveness and wisdom into question. While proposals to
revamp the SGP appear by hundreds each day, no systematic analysis has been
carried out so far of the ‘quality’, ‘ingredients’ and ‘impacts’ of the existing EU
ﬁscal rules.1 We review the criteria which have been identiﬁed in the literature
as important in the success of ﬁscal rules and assess their relevance in the EMU.
The theory developed in this chapter has an interesting application to the current
reform discussion and alternative proposals which are examined in a subspace of
the next chapter.
6.1 Designing ﬁscal rules?
Before assessing the recent proposals to address the alleged shortcomings of the
SGP, it is necessary to put the controversy on the SGP in the context of a wider
debate on ﬁscal rules (Kopits and Symansky, 1998). In the recent years, the
role of ﬁscal institutions and procedures in shaping budgetary outcomes has been
increasingly recognized. In this context, institutional reforms in the ﬁscal domain
have been discussed and introduced in several countries. These reforms come in
two main categories: (A) procedural rules conducive to responsible ﬁscal behavior
and (B) numerical rules, such as permanent constraints on the budget balance,
borrowing debt of central and/or local government. The national experience
is a mixed blessing in containing political biases in ﬁscal policy–making and in
achieving sustaining budgetary discipline (von Hagen and Harden, 1994). In
the early 1990 the EMU decides in a clear consensus about the introduction of
common numerical rules and a multilateral surveillance mechanism (Stark, 2001).
Compared to institutional or procedural reforms, numerical rules are simpler
to evaluate, easier to grasp by public opinion and policy–makers, and faster to
implement. Institutional reforms would have represented a feasible alternative
only if more decisive steps towards political uniﬁcation has been taken.
EMU ﬁscal rules reﬂect the interaction between the multinational nature of
EMU and the lack of a political authority of federal rank (Balassone and Franco,
1The only exception is the Paper by Buti et al. 2003.
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2001). The highly decentralized setting of ﬁscal policy in EMU gave prominence
to moral hazard issues (Buti et al., 2003). Summing up, the approach taken by
the EU is stricter than the solutions adapted in some federal economies. This
strictness reﬂect the heterogeneity of the EMU and the need for building up an
sustainable and stability–oriented ﬁscal policy framework.
6.1.1 What is an optimal ﬁscal rule?
The concept of restricting ﬁscal policy behavior through rules is not new. Many
US states impose restrictions on government deﬁcits and debts, and there is a
growing number of countries where diﬀerent forms of numerical constraints are
discussed or implemented (von Hagen et al., 2003). What are the principle under
which such rules should be designed? At this stage we want to be broad in
our analysis, rather than focusing narrowly on the problems that the SGP has
generated. We limit ourselves for now, however, to the analysis of numerical rules
constraining the discretion of policy–makers.
When thinking about the principles upon which optimal rules might be based,
it is useful to separate two dimensions: eﬃciency and enforceability. Eﬃcient rules
are those that meet the given objectives while minimizing any costs or side–eﬀects
that they might impose on the economy. Enforceable rules are those that can be
eﬀectively imposed on the relevant policy–makers. Rules are about constraining
discretion. Constraining discretion can be justiﬁed on several grounds, but it
comes at the cost of reducing the ﬂexibility of ﬁscal policy and its ability to react
to economic shocks.1 To make sure that a rule can achieve its goals at minimum
cost, we want it to follow certain principles.
1. Consistency with its sated goal
While this may seem obvious, it requires a clear understanding of the reasons
why ﬁscal policy should be constrained. In Chapter 1, we have pointed to several
motivations why this might be the case. Is it to ensure sustainability of public
ﬁnance, or is the goal to seek restricting politically motivated changes in ﬁscal
1Cf. chapter 1.
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policy? If so, a limit to the debt burden as a ratio to GDP would be appropriate.
Or is the goal to restrict politically motivated changes in ﬁscal policy? In that
case, limits to the size of the deﬁcit might be required. Or is it a matter of ensuring
an optimal combination of ﬁscal and monetary policies both within the national
economies and across Europe? In that case, limits to the size of the deﬁcit and
spending might be used to prevent spill-overs and interference with monetary
policy. Optimal policy rules must therefore diﬀer according to the ultimate goal.
What is clear is that the rule must set limits that become binding on those sense
to be sub–optimal. Thus, we need a clear deﬁnition of what constitutes a sub-
optimal use of discretion and the rule must be adequate to address that speciﬁc
problem.
2. Credibility
Regardless of the exact type of inferior discretion a rule aims at, it must be
credible and well understood by economic agents to be eﬀective. Credibility
requires consistency with the general goals of ﬁscal policy, i.e. it must be clear
that violating the rule can never be in the best interest of ﬁscal policy-makers.
Credibility also requires transparency in the formulation and implementation of
the policy rule. Deviations from the rule must be observable and veriﬁable.
3. Adaptability to changing circumstances
In order to limit the costs of constraining discretion, a rule should never leave
as much ﬂexibility as possible for ﬁscal policy to adapt to changing economic
circumstances. In the context of rules for deﬁcits and debts, this concerns in
particular the ability of budgetary policies to play their desired role of macroeco-
nomic stabilization. While there is no disagreement on this principle, the natural
trade-oﬀ that exists between constraints and ﬂexibility leads to a debate on how
to balance both principles.
4. Clarity and transparency
Within the set of rules that achieve the desired objectives, a simple rule is always
preferable to a more complex one. Indeed, this requirement is probably implicit
in some of the previous ones, as rules need to be well deﬁned and simple to be
understood, to be implemented correctly and to be credible.
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Now one must also think about the process and the principles on which im-
plementation and enforcement of ﬁscal rules will be based of. The rule itself, its
process for implementation, the penalties in case of violations, have to be deﬁned
and made suﬃcient precise, so that the enforcement process is done eﬀectively
and at the minimum of possible cost.
Monitoring compliance with the rule should be ex post. That is, it cannot
only be about presenting budget plans that are in accordance to a rule but it
must include an assessment of how well these proposals were delivered. Budget
plans are subject to many assumptions about future economic conditions, some
of which are uncertain and will turn out to be wrong. Unless the review process
is ex post, enforcement will be weak, as governments will ﬁnd arguments based
on changing economic conditions to justify deviations from the plan.
Moreover, monitoring compliance should be the task of an independent and
impartial body which is transparent, can imposed suﬃciently severe penalties
on policy–makers defecting from the rule and cannot be overruled by any other
institution. There should be no expectation that diﬀerent standards might be set
for diﬀerent people, or that warnings and sanctions could be blocked after having
been issued. Finally, and related to the previous point, a rule should not be easily
amendable. That is to say, the spirit of the rule and compliance cannot simply be
achieved by frequent changes to the principles and mechanisms underlying them.
The wish to improve eﬃciency and enforceability can be found behind most
of the recent reform proposals for the SGP. However, it is important, to note that
many of the principles listed as requirements for optimal rules are interlinked
and cannot easily be separated. For example, transparency cannot be achieved
unless the enforcement process is credible and consistent. The same is true for
simplicity. A rule based on a numerical limit for budget deﬁcits satisﬁes the
requirement of simplicity; but if there is added ﬂexibility in its interpretation
when it comes to enforcement, its simplicity is meaningless. Thus, one cannot
separate the enforcement process from the rule itself.
Finally, although there is not much disagreement about most of the principles
above, there are signiﬁcant trade-oﬀs between them, which are often neglected in
the current debate. These trade-oﬀs require compromises along some dimensions.
Current reform proposals diﬀer in the emphasis given to the diﬀerent criteria and
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their willingness to sacriﬁce some of the criteria in order to obtain better outcomes
in others. An example is the tension between simplicity and adaptability to
changing economic circumstances. Those who advocate a more ﬂexible rule for
the current framework implicitly argue for rules that are less simple and more
diﬃcult to deﬁne or implement. We come back to these points later in the chapter.
6.1.2 Kopits–Symanski’s criteria
Are the ﬁscal rules of EMU ”good” and ”eﬃcient” rules? Kopits and Symansky
(1998) identify a number of desirable features which the quality of ﬁscal rules
should be assessed (Kopits, 2001). According to these criteria, an ideal ﬁscal rule
should be well–deﬁned, transparent, simple, ﬂexible, adequate relative to the ﬁnal
goal, enforceable, consistent and underpinned by public ﬁnance reforms.
The following Table 6.1 illustrates the Kopits–Symansky criteria but extend
with our new criteria, we have found in our theoretical analysis in chapter 4 and
5. In column two we provide a checklist for the current ”quality” of EU ﬁscal
rules.
Table 6.1: Quality of Fiscal Rules
No. Ideal ﬁscal rule EU ﬁscal rule
1 Well-deﬁned ++
2 Transparent ++
3 Simple +++
4 Flexible ++
5 Adequate ﬁnal goal ++
6 Enforcement +
7 Consistent ++
8 Underpinned by structural reforms +
Legende: +++ very good, ++ good, + fair
Source: Modiﬁed from Buti and Giudice (2002)
It is immediately clear from that objectives there are several conﬂicts and
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trade-oﬀ’s between all of them.
A well–deﬁned ﬁscal rule, in terms of the indicator to be constrained, institu-
tional coverage and escape clauses, is paramount for eﬀective enforcement. The
Treaty criteria is well–deﬁned as to the policy variables subject to constraints.
The SGP speciﬁes the escape clauses and the penalties to be applied in case of
persistent excessive deﬁcits. However, elements of ambiguity remain. First, it
is not speciﬁed how close to the ceiling the deﬁcit should remain without being
deemed excessive. Second, the SGP medium term target of ”close to balance
or in surplus” remains vague. This proofs the signiﬁcant ignorance in all the
member states. Finally, the SGP is silent on how to apply the ’Excessive Deﬁcit
Procedure’ in the case of violation of the public debt criteria of the Treaty which
requires the debt ratio to be on a declining trend as long as it is above the 60%
of GDP reference value.
Transparency has several dimensions as shown in chapter 1. It includes ac-
counting conventions, forecasting exercises and reporting practices. The Treaty
and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) use ESA–95 accounting. The EU–
Commissions forecasts are the reference point for assessing the risk of an exces-
sive deﬁcit or for detecting a ”signiﬁcant divergence” from the set of budgetary
targets. However, the respective roles of Commission and national forecasts in
the assessment of Stability and Convergence Programmes remain undeﬁned. Bud-
getary reporting take place in March and September of each year. Data, however,
are frequently revised at subsequent dates and moral hazard problems may occur
especially when countries are close to the deﬁcit ceiling.
The EU ﬁscal rules are simple. The Maastricht criteria, particularly the 3%
deﬁcit and 60% debt thresholds, enjoy high transparency. Unfortunately, some
simplicity has been lost by the more complex mechanisms and procedures in the
SGP. However, compared to other ﬁscal rules — for example in federal states as
Germany — those underpinning the EMU remain simple.
As to ﬂexibility, diﬀerent elements play diﬀerently. On the one hand, the SGP
includes a tight speciﬁcation of the escape clause, thereby reducing the discretion
of the Council and ﬂexibility of the rules. On the other hand, by putting more
emphasis on medium–term targets and highlighting of cyclical ﬂuctuations, it
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increases ﬂexibility compared with a simple deﬁcit ceiling expressed in actual
terms.
Adequacy of the rules has to be assessed in relation to their ﬁnal goal. The
main goal of ﬁscal rules is ensuring sustainable public ﬁnance. The deﬁcit limit
guarantees ﬁscal discipline on a yearly basis, but there is no consideration of long
term sustainability, i.e. of the future deﬁcit path inherent in current policies which
may imply large contingent liabilities. Moreover, the current rules may not be
adequate for peripheral countries which have large public investment needs (Buti
et al., 2003). This may a further concern in the context of EU’s enlargement.
Finally, from the short–run view, the current rules do not address the pro–cyclical
bias in good times.
The implementation of the SGP with sanctions and timetables in Amster-
dam are set of rules to improve enforceability. Unfortunately the empirical cases
disprove that intended advantage. However, doubts can be expressed on the plau-
sibility of the imposition of sanctions on sovereign countries. This is heightened
by the fact that the Council is in charge of the ﬁnal decision on the implementa-
tion of sanctions and hence a risk of a partisan applications of the rules exists. It
remains to be seen whether peer pressure involves reputational costs is suﬃcient
to discipline national authorities. De Grauwe (2003) proposes a reform of the
SGP, which is only based on peer–pressure as a disciplining device.
A good ﬁscal rule has to be internally consistent with other policies. The
SGP implies that countries attain broadly balanced budgets in cyclically–adjusted
terms and then let automatic stabilizers play freely. From a procedural stand-
point, the overall framework of the Pact is set to ensure consistency of policies
by moving towards a better integration of ﬁscal surveillance and economic policy
coordination under the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (article 99). However,
a strong stress on annual targets may create a tension between ﬁscal policies
and structural policies. For instance, the existing rules may deter reforms and
structural investment needs for not violating temporary against the deﬁcit target.
From the analysis above we have seen that the structure of a good coordination
mechanism depends strongly from the environment. Additionally in ﬁscal policy
there are also some normative claims: (1) the ﬁnancial sustainability of the state,
(2) the eﬃcient ﬁnancing of public spending and (3) macroeconomic stability,
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that is, the elimination of unnecessary and undesirable ﬂuctuations in economic
activities (Buiter, 2003). Now it is a formidable task to design a rule, or a set of
rules, that makes sense for the whole Euro area.
In the list below we summarize criteria for good coordination rules between a
’supranational–national’ gravity ﬁeld:
• Good rules are simple and easily veriﬁable.
• Good rules should ensure the solvency of the government.
• Good rules should not encourage pro-cyclical behavior.
• Good rules makes sense also in the long-run.
• Good rules allow distinguishing in economic structures.
• Good rules make sense at the national level and for the EMU as a whole.
• Good rules are credible.
• Good rules are enforced impartially and consistently.
• Good rules include eﬃcient incentives to the targets.
• Good rules discipline the actors by positive incentives (sanctions).
The ingredients seen in the list above are a multi–dimensional target set with
perhaps partially conﬂicting directions (Buti and Giudice, 2002). So we can call
this as a ’Magic Polyeder’. The rational for some requirements are obvious. Com-
plex rules are likely to add noise and uncertainty to the system. Based on the aim
for more ’ﬁnancial sustainability’ we need rules which ensure the solvency, make
sense in the long–run and not encourage to pro–cyclical behavior. It’s also well–
known that numerical constraints as in the SGP imply ’one size ﬁts all’. Moreover
the four last points are more technical assumptions for a good rule. These ﬁnal
facts are more and more important in the actual reform discussion because the
enforcement mechanism fails in each observable situation. The greater the danger
of an external inﬂuence is, or the decision–actor to the national or supranational
level belongs, the higher the probability that the rules lose: credibility, eﬃciency
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and its disciplining character. All mentioned ingredients above are necessary for
an eﬃcient and good ﬁscal framework. But the ﬁnial rule (combination of the
ingredients) is only suﬃcient if it possesses credible sanction threats. The current
crisis in the Stability and Growth Pact emerged crucially because of the high inac-
curacies in the institutional credibility of the sanction mechanism. Having this in
mind the following proposal focuses mainly on the last four points and contrasts
them with the theoretical ﬁndings above. The next subsection characterizes the
modiﬁcation proposal more circumstantial.
All in all, Buti et al. (2003) conclude: ”...the EU ﬁscal rule appear to fare rel-
atively well against Kopits–Symansky criteria. Their strongest point is simplicity
while their weakest aspects concern enforceability.” But the Kopits–Symansky
criteria were devised for assessing the quality of domestic ﬁscal rules. The multi-
national character of EMU rules clearly aﬀect their design and implementation
in at least three missing respects:
First, national sovereignty and subsidiarity concerns had to be respected. This
imply that the rules had to be as neutral as possible vis–a`–vis the countries social
preferences which are heterogenous in the EU.
Second, there are many trade–oﬀ’s between the various criteria, namely be-
tween simplicity and ﬂexibility, between simplicity and adequacy, and between
ﬂexibility and enforceability. These trade–oﬀ’s are inﬂuenced by the multina-
tional nature of the rules. On the one hand, there may be a preference for
simplicity and transparency over ﬂexibility to allow peer pressure, central moni-
toring and prevent moral hazard. On the other hand, a multiplicity of countries
increases heterogeneity and dispersion of preferences with the consequence that
one–size–ﬁts–all ﬁscal rule is likely to be sub–optimal.
Third, the growing ﬁscal–monetary interaction in a MU (Dixit and Lamber-
tini, 2003) imply a close connection. Therefore a mechanism that discipline one
side without rewards for that eﬀorts is not eﬃcient. Moreover a sanction threat is
in that interaction framework nonsense because it helps rather the price–stability
nor the national state and it does not solve the main problem. Instead the impact
is contrary because it aggravate the situation of states with ﬁnancial problems.
Moreover Pollack (1997) identiﬁes three necessary ingredients aﬀecting the
likelihood that sanctions will imposed. In closing the gap between the economic
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and political science literature we review now these points:
First, Pollack (1997) mentions that the extent that principals preferences have
to converge for a secure imposition of sanctions. Second, there must be clear
decision rules governing the application of sanctions. Last but no least the ’default
condition’ where there is no agreement among the principals have to be known.
What we can learn from that literature is that clear and transparent institutions
as explained above in the economic analysis for ﬁscal policy are robust and of
primary need. Furthermore, it is necessary that all policy–makers in the ECOFIN
council have to be clear about national and supranational preferences and the
default condition.
6.1.3 Compliance: Inman’s criteria
Once a rule has been established, the right commitment technology has to be
devised in order to ensure compliance. Based on his analysis of US states, Inman
(1996) indicates four main criteria for compliance: timing for review, overrid-
ing, enforcement and amendment. Table 6.2 gives the characteristics of weak
and strong ﬁscal rules according to Inman’s criteria (see also Amtenbrink et al.
(1997)). In column four we assess the performance of EU rules especially the
Stability and Growth Pact.
Table 6.2: Speciﬁcation of Fiscal Rules
Speciﬁcation Weak Fiscal Rules Strong Fiscal Rules EU Rules
Rule Ex ante Ex post Ex post
Timing for review
Override Allowed Not allowed Not allowed
Majority rule
Enforcement
Enforcer Partisan Independent Partisan
Access Closed Open Closed
Penalties Small Large Large(?)
Amendment Easy Diﬃcult Diﬃcult
Source: Inman (1996) and Buti et al. (2003)
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An eﬃcient ﬁscal rule must be ex post and not ex ante. Ex ante rules apply
only to the beginning of the ﬁscal year and ex post rules require ﬁscal balance
at the end of the year. Second, a ﬁscal rule is strong when it cannot be over-
ridden or temporarily suspended by a simple majority vote. Third, rules have to
be enforced by an open and political independent, not partisan agency and/or a
court. Independence solve the problem of vote–trading, time–inconsistence, my-
opic behavior and enforce credibility in the rule. Finally, when the ﬁscal rules are
violated, there must be signiﬁcant sanctions. The penalties must be enforceable
and suﬃciently large. The main problem of the SGP is: tough and high sanction
threats, however zero probability of implementation because of several political
interference by ECOFIN council.1 Moreover when amendment of rules is too
costly, sticking to the current rules is more attractive than changing to a better
one.
Again, the multinational character of EU ﬁscal rule aﬀects Inman’s basic
features fundamental. In a supra–national context, is a higher risk of moral
hazard and a higher diﬃculty in monitoring ex ante policy announcements. Hence
in a multi–country set of rules, one has to stress the reputation eﬀects of the ’early
warning’ and excessive deﬁcit positions.2 Overall, the EU ﬁscal rule perform on
the paper quite well but in reality it under–perform in each situation.
6.1.4 Is the SGP an optimal ﬁscal rule?
In order to illustrate the optimality principles we have just described, we now
ask weather the SGP ﬁts them, and, if not, in which dimensions the SGP could
be improved (Fata`s et al., 2003). Among the ‘Kopits-Symansky’ principles de-
scribed in the previous subsection, it is clear that the SGP emphasizes the notion
of simplicity. The target for deﬁcits and debt are made to leave as little room
for interpretation as possible. Moreover, the SGP imposes uniform limits on all
member states, regardless of any diﬀerences in their long–term growth prospects
1Similar to treats against tax evasions.
2Reputation eﬀects are: early-warnings (blue letters) and/or compliance with the BEPG.
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or the actual level of debt. Regarding enforcement, there is a contradiction be-
tween a seemingly straightforward comparison of actual levels of deﬁcit and debt
with the ceilings deﬁned in the Maastricht Treaty, and the more complex process
subject to political inﬂuence that has emerged in practice.
1. The goals of the SGP are not transparent
As discussed in subsection 6.1, the current goals of the SGP is to safeguard the
sustainability of public ﬁnance in EMU. The SGP imposes its rules to prevent the
ratio of public debt to GDP from rising to unsustainable levels. In the meantime,
however, the goal has become less clear. The interpretation and implementation
of the ﬁscal policy framework have been moving away from the simple objective of
sustainability towards a more ambitious goal of ensuring that all countries follow
sensible ﬁscal policies.
The resulting lack of clear and unambiguous deﬁnition of the ultimate goal of
the current ﬁscal policy framework has led to diverging opinions as to whether the
SGP is adequate for what it is trying to achieve (see subsection 4.2). For those
who see the ultimate goal as sustainability, the current framework seems too
intrusive and aggressive. For those who see the more ambitious goal of enforcing
optimal ﬁscal policies, the rules fall short of preventing policies with negative
consequences for the economic performance of EMU. For example, the limits on
deﬁcits cannot remove pro–cyclical ﬁscal policy in good times unless one can
argue that such policies are going to lead to unsustainable deﬁcits in the future.
Moreover, they will prove pro–cyclical in bad times.
Finally, and for those who seek multiple goals, the recent events have proven
that it is very unlikely that one rule can achieve more than one objective. At-
tempts to make the rule achievable to several objectives can only lead to a lack
of transparency and dilution of the original principles behind the restrictions.
2. Strict limits on deﬁcits and debts are not ﬂexible enough
The notion of simplicity goes against the idea of adaptability to diﬀerent cir-
cumstances. Simple rules cannot take into consideration the diﬀerences in the
business–cycle position, changes in growth potential, or the need for reform
processes that might stretch over several years.
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3. Uniform rules are inadequate relative to ﬁnal goal
The 3% deﬁcit limit and the 60% limit were initial chosen to be consistent with a
stable debt ratio and a trend annual growth rate of nominal GDP of 5%. With 5%
growth, the increase in debt implied by a 3% deﬁcit exactly oﬀsets the reduction in
a debt ratio of 60%. It is now clear, however, that the EMU countries did not and
will not grow uniformly at a rate of 5% annually. Some countries achieved growth
rates signiﬁcantly above the rate; others, Germany, France and Italy in particular,
achieved less than that. If nominal trend growth is 2.5%, which is likely to be
the case in Germany today, deﬁcit must be only 1.5% of GDP to stabilize a debt
ratio of 60%. Thus, slow–growing countries like Germany, France and Italy can
experience rising debt ratios even if they stay below the 3% limit for the deﬁcit.
The current framework does not safeguard sustainability for these countries. At
the same time, the 3% limit is excessively tight for countries with high growth
trends, an issue which will be particularly contentious once the current accession
countries are full member of EMU.
4. There are serious problems with enforcement of the rules
These problems start with the fact that enforcement is left to ECOFIN, which
is not an independent or disintegrated body (von Hagen et al., 2003). Also, in
the run–up to EMU, there were very clear penalties that were received as being
large and avoidable by most members. But the system of penalties that is to be
applied now still has to be tested. Given that the process by which countries are
judged to be in breach of the Treaty’s provisions is not completely transparent,
and because diﬀerent countries are perceived to have been treated diﬀerently,
the SGP has suﬀered from a serious lack of credibility. These shortcomings have
led to a large number of reform proposals that aim to improving the SGP. Of
special interest is the view of the European Commission, because it highlights
the diﬃculty of resolving the contradiction inherent in the current framework.
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6.2 Political Economy of the Pact
”In fact the motivation of the SGP was largely political”
Alesina and Perotti (2004)
The scientiﬁc analysis about the European Monetary Union has been dom-
inated by (political) economists (Alesina et al., 2002). Political science is only
beginning to take up the issue.1 A political interpretation of the pact is that it
was proposed by former German ﬁnance minister Waigel in 1995 not primarily
as a response to the recognized need for enhanced ﬁscal discipline but, more pro-
fanely, in order to counter the growing fears of the German public about EMU
and to pre–empt moves of the opposition, poised to capitalize electorally on these
worries. The major political–economy argument in favor of the Stability Pact is
that it servers to guarantee the credibility of the political independence of the
ECB, whose price stability orientation (article 105 ECT) is called into question
by the inﬂationary eﬀects of ﬁscal policy — proof in the models and the FTPL
— if not openly jeopardized by bail–out demands. Nevertheless, the Pact can
be seen as a useful commitment technology of policymakers to their domestic
constituencies and a welcome source of external discipline of national economy
(Allsopp and Vines, 2002).
6.2.1 Non-Compliance
The problems of non–compliance within the Stability Pact are not surprising,
given alone the pact’s incompatibilities with some of the national ﬁscal–policy
arrangements across the Eurozone. It is possible to show that national ﬁscal
systems follow either a delegation approach or a contract approach. The delega-
tion approach is based on a hierarchical relationship that internalize the inherent
externalities in the monetary union. In contrast, the contract approach empha-
sizes horizontal connections. The SGP is based on a contract approach. There
1Cf the recent special issue of International Organisation 56, 4, 2002.
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are recent empirical evidence that the eﬀectiveness of the Stability and Growth
Pact depends strongly on the national implementation of the ﬁscal rules. Coun-
tries close to the deﬁcit limit, as Germany, France and Italy follows a delegation
approach. That approach is more easy to implement in larger countries but is
also more unstable (von Hagen, 2002). However, Portugal with a ’contract ap-
proach’ and small size, seems to be more willing to comply based on its rhetoric
cooperation with the EU–Commission. This is illustrated by the successful con-
solidation of budget deﬁcits in Portugal, in spring 2004. The consequences of
non–compliance would be a general undermining of the Stability Pact due to the
lost credibility, possibly triggering the whole range of problems associated with
ﬁscal looseness that the pact was designed to prevent.
From a political economy point of view is the Stability and Growth Pact surely
not the optimal solution. However, the Pact is still better than nothing. Those
states who currently undermine the Pact will have to show that they prefer a
superior alternative to the vacuum would leave. Therefore we have to search a
new disciplining scheme that is perhaps a kind of ‘incentive’ improvement.
6.2.2 Modes of economic governance in the EMU–Fiscal
Framework
The new trade–oﬀ’s and the new interaction interdependencies within the mone-
tary union raise a huge debate about the correct ’Modes of economic governance’.
We try to establish a new model approach, which explains the appearance of e–
governance. The model shows under which conditions e–governance is successful
and what are the necessary and suﬃcient ingredients. This is shown for the area
of ﬁscal–monetary interaction especially the Stability and Growth Pact. More
information exchange, monitoring and mutual control advance on the one hand
the application of ’New information and Communication Technology’ and on the
other hand the emergence of e–regulation and for this reason e-governance.1
1The section is based on the following published paper: ECEG-2004 Conference-
Proceeding on E-Governance; http://www.academic-conferences.org/eceg2005/2-
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Introduction
The most illustrating example in history of European Integration is certainly the
supranational Monetary Union, since 1999. The economic and political costs and
beneﬁts of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) haven been subjects
of lively public debate. A wonderful by–product for the economic profession has
been the emergence of a new research topic (Dixit, 2002). The EMU is involved
in many interactions for instance between the common monetary policy, the do-
mestic ﬁscal policies and some other related national policy ﬁelds. These new
interaction conﬂicts raises a huge debate about the correct ’Modes of economic
governance’ especially because of the current problems with the ’Stability and
Growth Pact’ (SGP). In the following paper we will analyze this topic in the
background of a further discussion about the transformation from e–Government
to e–Governance (Finger and Pcoud, 2003).
There are three diﬀerent governance solutions in the literature of governance
architecture (Aoki, 2001). Starting from this background we search an answer
to the following questions: ”Why does the hard co–ordination policy emerge in
ﬁscal policy and not in economic policy?” And ”What are the consequences for
an evolvement to more e–Governance onto a supranational level in Europe?”
The novelty in this approach is to show that the current structure of economic
governance in Europe advances the new methods of e–governance and that again
enforce crucially the structure of the national (e–)Government.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next subsection,
we present the existing diﬀerent ’Modes of Economic Governance’. In the section
’Model Framework’, we evaluate the prevalent forms of governance in the Euro-
pean Framework and analyze these in a simple model. We show what are the
consequences for an evolvement of e–governance. Thereafter, we discuss in more
detail the interaction between ﬁscal and monetary policy. We focus on an oppor-
tunity cost and beneﬁt analysis to show, that e-governance is the dominant ’mode
of governance’ in ﬁscal–monetary interaction in Europe. Finally, we conclude the
paper.
proceedings-eceg2004.htm.
149
6.2 Political Economy of the Pact
Modes of Economic Governance in Europe
The question of how to advance both eﬀective and legitimate modes of decision-
making and political action in and through the enlarged European Union is not
merely an academic one, but also discussed in mass media and in the national
parliament. The increasing salience of these issues stems from the adoption of
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which has opened up new interactions
and therefore opportunities for the co–ordinated pursuit of European citizens.
At Lisbon (2001) the European Council extended the scope of economic gov-
ernance within the European Union, ﬁrst by setting a new target set for the
EU’s economic development, i.e. ’to become the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge–based economy in the world, capable of sustainable growth with more
and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (EU-Council, 2000). Secondly, the
European Council implicitly incorporates other policy ﬁelds into the economic
strategy, like social policy, education policy and a new mode of governance, that
is the ’Open Method of Coordination’ (cf. Colligon, 2003). The new modes of gov-
ernance (cf. H. Wallace, 2000 and Kohler-Koch, 1999) in policy ﬁelds of macro-
economic policy–making diﬀers considerably from the ’traditional’ models of EU
governance, particularly from the regulatory model (Majone, 1996 and 2004)
and the ’Community method’ based on European Commission, European Coun-
cil, European Parliament and the European Court of Justice (Wallace, 2000).
New theoretical ﬁndings in the light of the theory of democratic experimentalism
(Eberlein and Kerwer, 2004) are recently coming up. They show that new modes
of governance lead to more eﬀective rules and more opportunities for political
participation. Additionally they present us how a voluntary mode of governance
can coexist with compulsory regulation. In that light we discuss now in more
detail the ’Future of Economic e–Governance’ (Lamy, 2004).
Supranational Policy–Making
In monetary policy treaty provisions, the ’European System of Central Banks’
(ESCB) as well as the ’European Central Bank’ (ECB) are complete indepen-
dent from high national and partisan inﬂuence. This kind of policy-making can
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be labelled as supranational. The primary aim of the ECB is to maintain ’price
stability’ (art. 105 ECT). Instruments, at least those concerning interest rate
and intervention operations, will be applied in the ESCB–Governing council af-
ter majority voting, but without a formal decision–making role (Eijﬃnger and
de Haan, 2000). Contrary to the monetary policy targets, ﬁscal policy will be
able to negatively inﬂuence the price stability through excessive debt and deﬁcit
accumulation (free–riding). That reﬂect the reason why we need an additionally
coordination mechanism like the SGP in a monetary union.
Policies of Co–ordination
There are three diﬀerent types of coordination policies — hard, soft, and open —
modes of governance (Issing, 2002; Linsenmann and Wessels, 2002). These three
modes of governance have their foundation in the associated policy ﬁelds: a)
Fiscal policy co–ordination (article 104 ECT), b) Economic policy co-ordination
(article 99 ECT), and c) Employment policy co-ordination (article 128 ECT).
In ﬁscal policy, member states have established distinct rules for coordination.
The basic rule article 104 ECT, completed by the ﬁfth protocol describes the
general targets. Since Amsterdam 1997, the ﬁscal framework is extended by the
well-known ’Stability and Growth Pact’, to put into practice the excessive deﬁcit
procedure for all ’Euro–member’ states haven been participated in the EMU. The
key ingredients of ﬁscal policy coordination are:
• Fixed targets
• Cyclical monitoring
• Information exchange
• Mutual control
• Council recommendations (i.e. early warning)
• Sanction mechanism
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Given the possibility of sanctions against sinner states, ﬁscal policy coordina-
tion puts considerable constraints on euro member states. The actual problems
of the SGP are based on two main diﬀerent reasons. First, institutional and
procedural inconsistencies and secondly content problems with the target values
and the time horizon. Besides of all drawbacks this mode of governance can be
labelled as hard co–ordination because of the binding procedures in the Maas-
tricht Treaty (supplementary protocols) and the two council regulations of the
SGP (EC-No 1466/97 and 1467/97). In contrast to the hard coordination of
ﬁscal policy, the procedures in the area of economic policy co–ordination, arti-
cle 99 ECT are soft. The main economic co–ordination procedure is the annual
’Broad Economic Policy Guidelines’ (BEPG). This framework has no direct legal
impact for member states and do not include any sanction mechanism as in the
ﬁeld of ﬁscal policy. The main points here are monitoring, bench–marking and
the publication of best practices. The modes of economic governance include
recommendations of the Council to member states which deviating from prin-
ciples of the BEPG’s. The BEPG should be on the center of coordination. It
consists of: (A) Cardiﬀ Process, (B) Luxemburg Process, (C) Cologne Process
and ﬁnally (D) Stability and Growth Pact. While ﬁscal and economic policy has
been incorporated into the Treaty in Maastricht, the employment part was ﬁrst
added in Amsterdam, 1997. The key diﬀerence is that article 128 ECT do not
foresee a formal recommendation of the Council to one member state in case of
non–compliance. All soft co–ordination logic is oriented towards the good will of
actors and works without any legal incentives. Since Lisbon the so–called ’Open
method of Coordination’ (OMC), was established. The key tool is based on peer
pressure (peer group review) and the EU’s institutions surveillance procedure.
This new mode of governance was underlined in the Laken Declaration of the Eu-
ropean Council and formulated as a broader long–term strategy. Apart from the
fact that there exists no real incentives in the OMC, a game theoretic perspective
show us a more ambivalent result. If the OMC implement the best practice in
European member states, then countries could have an intrinsically motivation
that her own system is moved to the European level. But there exists probably
an extrinsically motivation because an implementation of a national system onto
the European level saves the transformation costs. The other countries, which
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must transform her national systems onto the ’Best practice’ system, carry then
the whole costs. Therefore governments could have today an incentive to improve
the current national systems because they hope on the one hand that their own
system will in future be transformed at the European level and on the other hand
to save then the implementation costs of the new ’Best practice’ system. The new
challenges between the interaction of centralized European Monetary Policy and
decentralized Fiscal Policy need an adequate coordination mechanism like the
’Stability and Growth Pact’. But the current problems within the SGP induce
a search to ’New modes of economic governance’ or ’New modes of cooperation’
for the Euro-member states (Scharpf, 2003). The ﬁrst question is: Are there
more eﬃcient coordination mechanisms? And second: Which policy ﬁelds must
be more coordinated because of monetary–ﬁscal interaction?
Model Framework
The primary task of this section is, as stated, to identify several important types
of governance architecture and discuss their ﬁts with emergent of the ’New In-
formation and Communication Technologies (NICTs). First we note that there
can be only three generic modes of information–connectedness in either vertical
or horizontal relationship. Then we allocate these models to the existing modes
of governance and conclude with the consequences for e–governance in Europe.
Suppose that there are only two elementary political task units, denoted by P1
and P2 in an abstract domain. At this stage, take the two units as abstract enti-
ties, although it does not do any harm to imagine them as two policy objectives,
as we will assume later. The payoﬀ depends on the conﬁguration of the decision
choices of the policy task units, a1 and a2, as well as on the state of environments,
Es and E1, E2 and stochastic parameters like ’m’. The states Es and E1 aﬀect
the productivity condition at P1, and the states of Es and E2 aﬀect that at P2,
where Es is referred to as the systemic segment of the environment, and E1 and
E2 as idiosyncratic segments. Assume that idiosyncratic segments of environment
can only be observed by the relevant policy task unit, there are and only these
three–generic modes of information connectedness (modes of governance) among
the two units (Aoki, 2001).
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1. Hierarchical decomposition (HD). Here ′E ′s is observed only by P1, which
adjust then its own choice variable a1 according to its own estimates and
including its estimates about the idiosyncratic environment. The other part
is later informed.
2. Information assimilation (IA). Both policy task units monitor the systemic
area ′E ′s. Suppose that their observations ’Ei’ (i=1,2) are correlated so that
they beneﬁt from assimilation ’P1,2’ of the systemic segment of environ-
ments.
3. Information encapsulation (IE). Both polity task units observe both sys-
temic and idiosyncratic areas independently. Additionally is here assumed
that the observation errors are uncorrelated and each party ’hidden’ some
information from the others.
The question is now: Which of the three modes exists in the European eco-
nomic framework? And what are the implications for e–governance? The ﬁrst
question is partial answered above. The three modes of European economic gov-
ernance — hard, soft and open — are diﬀerent about the political ﬁelds and in
their scope. The typical characteristics in ﬁscal–monetary interaction is on the
one hand the hard co–ordination framework with sanctions and on the other hand
the huge amount of information assimilation, exchange, peer–review and mutual
control. These features explains that in ﬁscal policy at least two or more actors
monitor the environment and co–ordinate their policies onto the European level
because of high correlations, growing ’spill–over’ eﬀects (free–riding behavior)
and ﬁnally increasing interactions within the European monetary union. That
are the criteria in the model of information assimilation above. Now it is possible
to analyze the consequences in more detail.
The ﬁrst important Proposition labelled to Cremer (1992) in that framework
is: If the tasks of the units are complementary, the information assimilation mode
is more eﬃcient than the information encapsulation mode. Intuitively, if two tasks
are complementary, it is always desirable to adjust the choice variables of both
units in a coordinated manner in response to changing environments to maximize
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payoﬀs. This objective can essentially better achieved by assimilating the infor-
mation for decision choices by both agents. In the European Monetary Union you
can see a strong evolution of information exchange and assimilation. This is seen
also in economic policy through the system of ’Broad economic policy guidelines’.
Moreover in ﬁscal policy that system is more pronounced particularly through the
Stability and Growth Pact and the quarterly ’Stability programmes’. Moreover
it is clear that information assimilation require time and eﬀort, but if there is a
signiﬁcant degree of similarity in the information–processing capacity and their
communication costs in pooling sample observations and constructing a common
perception about the environmental conditions are relatively low, the information
assimilation mode is also more eﬃcient than hierarchical–decomposition (Aoki,
2001). The conjunction of the Proposition by ’Cremer’ and the last by ’Aoki’ im-
ply a dominance of the information assimilation mode for certain circumstances.
Mainly in ﬁscal policy especially within the Stability and Growth Pact the com-
mon perceptions are very clear because of detailed target deﬁnitions and their
exceptions. Thus the communication costs are relatively low solely they are all
explicit in the ﬁscal framework. The implications for e–governance are now pre-
sented in the following two Propositions, which are intuitively clear and close to
Aoki (2001).
Proposition 6.1. Whenever the use of ’New information and communication
technology (NICT) can reduce the disparity of information–processing capacity
across the policy task units, the relative advantages of the hierarchical–decomposit-
ion mode diminishes against the information–assimilation mode, assumed the pol-
icy tasks are complementary.
That is a very strong Proposition, which show us that the scope of e–governance
in the European economic and ﬁscal framework raises with the application of
NICT because of more information–assimilation (Proof: 2Pi = P1 + P2 < P1,2,
which results through assimilation and NICT). As we have argued above that
information–assimilation is the dominate mode in Europe, we see from Proposi-
tion 1 that more applications of the NICT could induce an additionally advantage
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of information–assimilation and so an enforcement of e–governance in Europe. To
make the last point more clear look to the next proposition.
Proposition 6.2. If the correlation between the environments of the policy task
units is very high, and if they are additionally characterized through free riding
then information–assimilation is optimal organized through NICT or e–governance.
The idea behind the proposition is that in an environment with strong inter-
actions like that in the monetary union between ﬁscal- and monetary policy the
information–assimilation mode is necessary (cf Cremer–Proposition) and optimal
organized through NICT i.e. e–governance. One conclusion is that the current
mode of governance system in Europe supported by communication technology
enforces perhaps the development of e–governance at the supranational level.
Surely that scenario depends on many other environmental conditions like that
described in the model by Finger and Pe´coud (2003). But this case study in a
very special but open ﬁeld — because of the strong interdependences of economic
and ﬁscal inﬂuences within other policy ﬁelds — show us how e–governance will
emerge. From this perspective we outline an inductive model for a complete
evolvement towards e–governance.
Empirical evidence: An opportunity cost and beneﬁt analysis
On the basis of the model, we assess now the implications in monetary–ﬁscal
interaction for the development in e–governance. Why does ’hard coordination’
emerge in ﬁscal policy and not in economic policy? The answer depends crucially
on expected costs and beneﬁts and transaction–cost arguments like that from
Coase (1937). Monetary and ﬁscal policies are highly interdependent (cf FTPL).
These incorporations increases even with the establishment of a monetary union.
On the one hand explain these facts why ﬁscal rules in the monetary union
originated and one the other hand why in the whole economic policy area only
soft and open policies arises. Additionally there exist one important diﬀerence
between the consequences of both policies: While a weak price stability and
high inﬂation (high volatility) have a strong and permanent eﬀect in monetary
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policy because of the future expectations about the monetary policy relevant
variables, is the danger in economic policy rather temporary. The costs of ups and
downs in the business cycles appear to be less in comparison to long–run inﬂation
costs (De Grauwe, 2003). Starting with the model which we have observed: The
supranational unity P1 with the primary aim preserving price–stability and the
twelve national units P2i (with i = 1, ..., 12) which manage the national economic
policy with their last policy instrument ﬁscal policy e.g. tax, debt and deﬁcit
policy. The task of both entities are correlated and even complement because
stable prices are a precondition for growth (Buti, 2003). Moreover high debt
policy a2i implies also higher sanctions a1i. In order to evaluate the opportunity
costs of governance in ﬁscal policy, we compare the following: First, the sanction
costs a1i with inﬂation costs through debt policy a2i. The decision to hard co–
ordination like that of the Stability and Growth Pact implies that the opportunity
costs are mainly inﬂation. Typical inﬂation costs are shoe leather costs, menu
costs and so on (De Grauwe, 2003). These costs are very diﬃcult to assert but
empirical studies and historical experience show that they are higher than the
opportunity costs of the current sanction fees within the Stability and Growth
Pact (De Grauwe, 2003). The current sanction fees in the Stability and Growth
Pact are in a maximum level 0.5% to GDP (see chapter 2). Rational economic
actor’s choice that alternative, which minimize the opportunity costs. That imply
in this case to take the current Stability and Growth Pact because it minimizes the
opportunity costs. So it is rational for the member countries to implement hard
coordination in ﬁscal policy. Moreover there is in ﬁscal policy more asymmetric
information than in economic policy, which reinforced the diﬀerences.
While in economic policy the state compare ’recession costs’ with the costs
of more coordination and sanction fees, they decided for ’soft’ coordination. The
following two points explain that: (1) the costs of ups– and downs in the business–
cycle are only ’temporary’ and (2) the loss of sovereignty in economic policy —
no reaction possibility to idiosyncratic shocks — induces prohibitive high costs.
To minimize opportunity costs imply in that ﬁeld only ’soft’ coordination without
binding thresholds as in ﬁscal policy. Both policy task units P1 and P2 observe
in ﬁscal–monetary interaction their systemic environment ES and decide about
inﬂation a1 and debt policy a2. It is obvious that these decisions are correlated.
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Moreover higher debt induce a higher inﬂation so that they are also comple-
ment. Within such a constellation information–assimilation as described above is
dominant and NICT improve the situation. Summing up: Monitoring, informa-
tion exchange and information assimilation is very strong in the European ﬁscal
framework. More tasks, more interactions and more member countries in future
increase the necessity to manage the situation in that ﬁeld. That is certainly only
done with more information–assimilation and with more NICT. But these devel-
opments might induces a new cascade to e–governance in economic regulation in
Europe.
The current debate about eﬃcient modes of economic governance in the
European ﬁscal framework particularly the reform debate about the Stability
and Growth Pact is perhaps an illustrating case study for the evolvement of e–
governance in regulation policy. As we show in our paper the current development
and architecture of economic policy in Europe advance e–governance because of
the advantage in ‘New information and communication technology’ in the area of
information assimilation. That dominance has a strong implication for possible
developments in e–Government and e–Democracy in Europe.
6.2.3 International Political Economy
In recent years emerge a new research program — so–called ‘International Polit-
ical Economy’ (IPE) — in political science to explain European Integration with
more appropriate methods. There have been claims that International Relation
(IR) would no longer be useful for explaining European integration (Jachtenfuchs,
2001). So IPE would oﬀer a suitable body of literature to explain European in-
tegration. The agenda of IPE follows a clear multidisciplinary approach and
overcome the dichotomy of ‘rationalists’ and ‘constructivists’ (Pollack, 1999) or
the ‘rationalists’ and ‘reﬂectivists’ (Smith, 2001). Verdun (2004) motivate that
new approach further.1
1Good overview is given by Verdun and Jones (2004): The Political Economy of European
Integration, Theory and Analysis.
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To understand the dichotomy of idiosyncrasy and integration, i.e. despite high
integration in the monetary union, there coexists a huge amount of distinctive
national character or idiosyncrasies. We use now the IPE approach in line with
Jones (2004) to explain the consequences for the EMU. The EMU is characterized
through central monetary policy (highly integrated) and totally dezentral ﬁscal
policy with some interactions and linkages as the SGP. So that dichotomy is no
more conspicuous and surprising than in the EMU. Our case study to the SGP
from a IPE perspective is therefore very promising. The idea of that relation-
ship is based on Karl Polanyi’s (1957) analysis of the ’double-movement’ behind
the social embeddedness of market institutions. With that work it is possible
to explain both why countries diﬀer in some speciﬁc areas and how European
unit might contribute to national diversity. Therefore, Polanyi (1957) explains
the causality that runs from integration to idiosyncrasy. The simplest example
is the family: High integrated but each member is idiosyncratic. However, what
happens on the state level? The new institutionalism tells us countries remain dif-
ferent because institutions matter. That imply in the European ﬁscal framework
national diﬀerences are idiosyncratic because institutions matter as for example
tax system, transfer system, federal system, social and security system. All sys-
tems have been build diﬀerent and diﬀer between the European countries. That
is perhaps the political perspective of Polanyi’s ’double movement ’ for the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact. That paradox is conﬁrmed in the whole bunch of political
and sociological literature as in the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice,
2001) and in Scharpf’s and Schmidt’s expression ’diverse response to common
challenges’ (Dalton, 1968; Myrdal, 1956). Indeed (Myrdal, 1956):
”It is a paradox that only a well–integrated community can abide by
the rules of economic competition.”
Is that also true in the EMU? The ”new” eﬀects are the interactions between
the integrated and disintegrated part. However, that is the missing part and
really overseen in Myrdal’s analysis. Therefore, we can conclude that there is a
dichotomy in each integrated framework but interactions between them imply the
need of governance or rules to organize the competition between the nation states.
That rules are the SGP. So we have to ﬁnd a ”new” or ”novel” political economic
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argument for an Stability and Growth Pact. Garrett (1995, 1998) analyze the
impact of monetary integration and found more likely a convergent inﬂuence on
ﬁscal policy. But Jones (2003) concludes that Garret avoid Polanyi’s results.
Therefore, Jones (2003) argues that there are more likely diﬀerential responses to
monetary integration as anticipated in the logic of the ’double-movement’. But
despite that Jones (2005) says:
”...the Stability and Growth Pact can only be viewed as an added
constraint. When the emphasis shifts to focus on divergent reactions
(...) the importance of agreeing standards for ﬁscal performance in-
creases.”
Again we have an argument for an SGP also with the dichotomy relationship
between idiosyncrasy and integration. Summing up: The persistence of national
idiosyncrasy forces us to reconsider the process of integration, especially within
the EMU. Using the insights of IPE and Polanyi’s and Myrdal’s work, it is pos-
sible to construct an interpretation of events in Europe which illustrate that
idiosyncrasy and integration are two elements in the integration process. The
great virtue of such an interpretation is that it focuses attention on the diverse
reactions of groups within countries to common features at the European level.
6.3 Development of the Fiscal Framework
In this section we state some well known properties of the essential spectrum in the
form applicable to the situations arising later. We start with a few deﬁnitions and
introduce notation and terminology that is consistent throughout this chapter.1
The need to reform the SGP became more and more obvious in the course
of 2002. A number of economists have made diﬀerent and sometimes contradic-
tory proposals. Thus there are many coordination mechanisms, which transform
non–cooperative constellations into cooperative one. The current reforms can be
categorized into:
1The section is based on the following published papers: ATINER-Conference
Proceeding 2003.
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• Radical reforms like more market or more central co–ordination
• Modiﬁcation reforms to a new target structure and
• Modiﬁcation reforms on the basis of the current Pact.
Moreover there exist diﬀerent advantages and disadvantages but for all dis-
tinguishing proposals some basic principles are necessary for a good interaction
management. The question is, weather the mechanisms are also suﬃcient? This
is certainly in general open. But it depends on the assumption and the struc-
ture of interaction. The radical reform proposals are connected with fundamental
changes of the ﬁscal policy framework. For example ’Tradable Deﬁcit Permits’
(Casella, 2001), ’Rating Agencies to evaluate national Debt’ (Eichengreen, 2002)
and all proposals to a closer ﬁscal policy coordination or centralization at the Eu-
ropean level (Heise, 2002; Euromemorandum, 2003). The suggestions by Casella
(2001) and Eichengreen (2002) aim towards a market solution that works eﬃcient
and solves the interaction problem. The other direction is to solve the problem
eﬃciently with a future European economic government. But the knowledge
that these radical reforms need either a majority around the European countries
and/or a closer political union makes both directions in the near future probably
unlikely.
On the other hand modiﬁcation proposals are only a change in the current
ﬁscal framework of ﬁscal policy in Europe. The reform alternatives in that ﬁeld
are: First to deﬁne a new target which transforms the only focus today (deﬁcit)
to a more–dimensional view and connects this with a wider time horizon. The
second group of reforms work close to the current Pact. But similar in all modiﬁ-
cation suggestions is, they plead for a non–partisan or more independent agency
(committee) establishment. In Table 1, we summarize the most prominent reform
proposals in each category.
Market Hierarchy Coordination
Radical Casella (2001), Heise (2002)
Reform Eichengreen (2002)
Modiﬁcation Wypolsz (2003), DeGrauwe (2003),
Reform von Hagen (1999) Buti(2003)
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An other prominent alternative is the ’Golden Rule’. Balassone and Franco
(2001) point out that the risk of revising the rules could harm the credibility of
the ﬁscal policy commitment to budget sustainability, which in turn may prevent
the adoption of the appropriate policy mix. The authors distinguish between
three types of ’Golden rules’:
(a) Proposal made by Modigliani et al. (1998). They are suggesting the use of
a net deﬁcit equal to net investment.
(b) German–Rule (Art. 115 of the Constitution), yearly deﬁcits are allowed up
to the level of gross investment in the federal budget.
(c) The UK–Rule in which public borrowing cannot exceed the level of net in-
vestment over the cycle.
The advantages of these drafts are that they can be inserted just–in–time
in the existing system of the European ﬁscal framework and the SGP. Besides,
the basic idea is always that the net deﬁcit should never be higher than the
public investment. Also Creel et al. (2002) and Mathieu and Sterdyniak (2003),
proposes to import this rule in the euro area:
’structural current government borrowing, i.e. excluding public in-
vestment, should be permanently in balance or in surplus’.
The ambiguity in the deﬁnition of public investment implies that their pro-
posal is diﬀerent to the three ’Golden rule’ cases mentioned above. In that tra-
dition Buiter and Grafe (2003) propose, that countries which have signiﬁcant
public investment needs not to cut government borrowing. They mention that
lowering public investment is harmful in terms of potential output growth if the
endogenous growth theory has some relevance. In the line with Buiter and Grafe
(2003), an analogical approach is the suggestion by Buiter (2003) to propose a
permanent balance rule. This rule leaves room for an active economic policy
in the short–run. It would allow countries with relatively higher output growth
and inﬂation to run higher public deﬁcits. To raise the intergenerational equity
and public spending, this rule cannot be ensured by an automatic rule (Buiter,
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2003) and it requires beforehand an optimal national ﬁscal rule (see also Box 1).
Based on these facts you can ﬁnd out three theoretical solution mechanisms for
’supranational–national’ interaction conﬂicts:
(a) Market,
(b) Hierarchy and
(c) Coordination.
The next sections of our article focus on the structure of eﬃcient ’coordination
mechanisms’. In spite Eijﬃnger (2003) has stated: ’In the end it will be more
hierarchy in the ﬁscal framework’, most similar to monetary policy but with an
other structure. We focus now on co–ordination mechanisms because we think
that a political union is in the near future really unthinkable. Moreover all people
in Europe know that we need a better Stability Pact as the current one to avoid
past drawbacks.
Box 1: Recent academic ideas for reforming the Stability and
Growth Pact
Fiscal–ﬁscal co–ordination: A new level of commitment: Pisani–Ferry
(2002) argues that Eurogroup should agree on a set of broad non–binding
policy principles outlining the operation of ﬁscal policy to complement the
ﬁscal–ﬁscal–monetary interaction.
Fiscal policy committees: Wyplosz (2002) and Ohr/Schmidt (2003)
proposes the creation of new independent ﬁscal policy committees in each
member states and on the EU level. These committees would have authority
over the deﬁcit in each country, but no inﬂuence on the size and composition of
expenditures or taxes. The committees would be given the long–term mandate
for maintaining debt at a certain target, but would be able to manage the
size of the deﬁcit in the short term to stabilize the economy.
New monitoring institutions: Several authors suggest that indepen-
dent bodies would be more credible in assessing whether discretionary ﬁscal
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policy compromised sustainability. Begg et al. (2002) argue that the EU
should also delegate the task of monitoring to an independent body. Fata´s
et al. (2003) and von Hagen (2003) propose the creation of an independent
European ﬁscal sustainability council to monitor the sustainability of member
states ﬁnances.
Allowance for public investments: Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)
argue that investment spending should be excluded from deﬁcit calculations
under the SGP. They argue this would increase transparency, permit quality
public investment, and prevent pro–cyclical tightening of ﬁscal policy in the
short–run. A permanent balance rule: Buiter and Grafe (2002, 2004) favor
a permanent balance rule , whereby the net present value of total future
government revenues should be at least equal to the net present value of total
future expenditure, including debt repayments. Although both sides of this
equation would be hard to calculate accurately, the authors see beneﬁts for
allowing a counter–cyclical policy and public investments outweighing any
implementation costs.
More clarity of monetary reaction function: Allsopp (2002) proposes
that a key requirement for eﬀective ﬁscal co–ordination is an ”appropriate and
transparent monetary policy reaction function.” The higher transparency in
that topic increase the understanding for the national ﬁscal authorities and
helps to ﬁnd the correct responds around the economic ﬂuctuations.
Tradeable deﬁcit permits: Casella (2001) propose the introduction of
tradeable permits to run deﬁcits. Countries that wanted to run higher deﬁcits
would have to buy such permits from other countries before they could do so.
A similar mechanism proposes Eichengreen (2003) with a ’rating agency’ to
evaluate the sustainability of national public ﬁnance.
A more pragmatic Pact: Buti et al. (2003) propose a collection on
measures designed to deliver on a more pragmatic interpretation of the Pact
including: modifying the interpretation of the ’close–to–balance or in surplus’
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rule on a country–by–country basis; take a better account of public sustain-
ability; improving transparency by distinguishing between long–lasting mea-
sures; a better monitoring on cash ﬂows; devising sanction for member states
not undertaking suﬃcient consolidation during economic up–turns; making
the implementation mechanism less partisan by strengthening the role of the
Commission in assessing compliance with the rules and in the application of
sanctions; no monetary sanctions but instead more ’mutual–supervision’ (De
Grauwe, 2003).
More co–ordination between ﬁscal–monetary policy: Heise (2002)
and Pinzler and v. Heusinger (2004) suggest a closer co–operation between
the ECB and the member countries ﬁscal policy. They propose the so–called
”move to the middle” as the only successful solution in EMU.
6.3.1 Taken reforms by the EU–Commission
Even the ’European Commission’ proposes the same changes for the ’Stability
and Growth Pact’. In June 2001, on a proposal from the EFC, the Ecoﬁn council
adopted the ﬁrst reform of the procedures (European Commission, 2002). The
main changes were:
1. a more eﬀective surveillance process,
2. the presentation of annual stability programs and
3. a closer insert in the framework of the BEPGs as well as a new focus on the
time horizon (medium–term) and target objectives like ageing populations.
On September 13, 2002, Pedro Solbes was speaking before the European Con-
vention and stated that the functioning of the EMU was satisfactory. However
the Commission proposed additionally three further reforms: (A) The Commis-
sion should be entitled to send recommendations directly to the States. (B) The
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Council should not depart from the Commission’s recommendations on BEPG’s
and on warnings addressed to member countries, unless acting by unanimity.
(C) Member countries concerned should not take part to the vote on warning.
Although on September 24, 2002 it was recognized oﬃcially, that the target of
close–to–balance was out of reach for 2004, the Commission did not intend to put
the Stability Pact into question:
”The experience of the early years shows that the question is not
about the framework itself, but how can the system be better managed
so that the rules are followed the 3% of GDP deﬁcit threshold that is
the cornerstone of our stability framework.”
Solbes reasserts the necessity to strengthen the ﬁscal policy co–ordination,
but especially within the Stability Pact. After Prodi’s words in ’Le Monde’ the
Commission presented a set of ’ﬁve’ new measures to strengthen the co–ordination
of budgetary policies, on November 21, 2002.
(a) The ’close–to–balance or in surplus’ target should be interpreted in terms of
cyclically–adjusted budget balances.
(b) National structural deﬁcits will have to be cut by at least 0.5% of GDP per
year, even more rapidly in countries with a high deﬁcit or debt, or ’favorable
growth conditions’.
(c) Avoid the occurrence of expansionary ﬁscal policies in times of favorable
growth.
(d) The Commission wishes to give its authorization for a ’small temporary
deterioration in the underlying budget position’ to the countries which un-
dertake structural reforms in line with the Lisbon strategy.
(e) The sustainability of public ﬁnance should become a core policy objective.
The Commissions proposal mentioned a necessity to transfer as many deci-
sions as possible from the national to the community level, from political to the
technocratic level. In this respect, the institutional logic is based on the model
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of the ECB, hence to increase its authority in detriment of the Member States.
After some political disputes, the Ecoﬁn Council (March 7, 2003) and the Euro-
pean Council (March 20-21, 2003) have ﬁnally adopted a proposal very close to
the Commission’s proposal. As Paul de Grauwe wrote in 2002:
(...) ”The stability pact is a vote of no conﬁdence by
the European authorities in the strength of the democratic
institutions in the member countries. It is quite surprising
that EU–countries have allowed this to happen, and that
they have agreed to be subjected to control by European in-
stitutions that even the International Monetary Fund does
not impose on banana republics.”
Paul De Grauwe, Financial Times, July 25, 2002
The most recent reform developments in the Stability and Growth Pact focuses
on the claim for more (a higher degree of) coordination (Pinzler, 2004 and Ceps-
Org., 2004). Unfortunately the coordination of monetary–ﬁscal policy within the
economic policy framework (BEPG’s) is not really realistic. The target of the
European Monetary policy is to maintain price–stability. The policy instruments
of the European Central Bank are independent from political inﬂuence. Because
of that reason the ECB is against each ’pre–coordination’ (ECB, 2000):
The role of the Eurosystem is determined by the stipulations of
the Treaty governing its status and activities, notably its indepen-
dence and the primary objective of maintaining price stability. As
a consequence, the Eurosystem cannot engage in any form of agree-
ment aimed at bringing about a predetermined ”policy mix”, since
this could commit the Eurosystem to pursue a monetary policy which
might conﬂict with the primary objective of price stability. The clear
separation of policy responsibilities between monetary authorities and
governments is rooted in the belief — conﬁrmed by decades of prac-
tical experience and a substantial body of economic research — that
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committing monetary policy–makers to the primary objective of main-
taining price stability helps signiﬁcantly to achieve price stability in a
credible and lasting manner. In this way, monetary policy will make
the best possible contribution to the broader economic objectives of the
European Union and its citizens. Since economic policy co–ordination
relates predominantly to co–operation among the Member States them-
selves, the ECB’s contribution to the overall co–ordination process lies
in a dialogue with competent European bodies, notably the Council of
Ministers and the Euro–11 Group, whereby views and information are
exchanged. In this dialogue, the prerogatives and independence of pol-
icy actors are respected.
The position of the ECB is clear, but in the current Convention proposal
(2004) is a clear attempt from the political side to get more inﬂuence in that
direction. However this development was criticized by the ECB (ECB–report,
2003). As a result of possible changes the ECB are only on the bases of the
current Stability and Growth Pact. The ECB sees the SGP as an key mechanism
for the policy co–ordination in the euro area. Furthermore, the ECB called the
SGP set up as the best mechanism for information sharing through the stability
programmes, and thereby aid the policy co–ordination laid down in the BEPG’s.
Moreover there is in process of ﬁscal–monetary co–ordination in EMU the oppor-
tunity for the EU–Commission and the chair of Eurogroup to attend the ECB
Governing Council meetings to enhance the understanding of the ECB reaction
function. There is some suggestion and evidence that this mechanism for infor-
mation sharing is not used to its full potential, and there is a scope for further
work on monetary–ﬁscal co–ordination issues.
6.3.2 Commission proposal after March, 2004
In June 2004 the EU–Commission proposed further changes on the ﬁscal frame-
work especially on the Stability and Growth Pact in reaction to the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction. The Commission believes that the EU frame-
work should be strengthened in order to (EU–Commission, 2004):
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1. combine ﬁscal discipline with economic growth considerations;
2. focus more on the sustainability of the member states public ﬁnances;
3. improve implementation.
The ideas to move forward include: rebalancing the role of the Broad Eco-
nomic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) with respect to the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP), bringing the budgetary policy coordination calendar more into line with
our general coordination cycle and ensuring the implementation of the BEPGs
through early warnings. Regarding the strengthening of the SGP implementation
called for by the European Council of 18 June experience to date shows that the
way forward could be built around the following pillars: (i) more focus on debt
and sustainability, (ii) more incentives for ﬁscal consolidation during periods of
economic growth, (iii) taking into account country–speciﬁc circumstances when
deﬁning the medium term budgetary objectives, (iv) taking more into account
economic developments when formulating recommendations for the correction of
excessive deﬁcit situations.
The Report on Public Finance includes a review of the objective of ﬁscal
discipline pursued with the objective of growth and how synergies can be improved
by making the EU framework for budgetary surveillance and economic governance
more eﬀective. By considering these issues, the Commission aims to lead the way
to improve economic governance and to focus on more speciﬁc orientations for
rejuvenating the framework and strengthening economic governance in the near
future.
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Table 6.3: Main Academic Reform Proposals
Critical issue Reform proposal Authors Institutional Implications
SGP is well-defined but Strengthen the SGP. Combine EU-Commission Reform only slightly
there is a bad enforcement. discipline with economic (2004) the SGP. No changes in
We have to strengthen the growth considerations. Focus the Treaty.
current rules. on the sustainability and
improve the implementation.
Numerical rules do not tackle Improve national budgetary Wypolsz (2002), Reform the Treaty, abolish
at source the budgetary procedures; create independent Wren-Lewis (2002) Excessive Deficit Procedure.
misbehavior; SGP needs a more Fiscal Policy Committee. von Hagen (2002) Amend Large
credible and non-partisan Strengthen financial Exposure Directive.
enforcement market discipline
The SGP pay too much attention Introduce expenditure rule; Mills and Quinet The golden rule requires
to the deficit, not to the move to golden rule. (2001), Brunila changes in the Treaty and
quality of public finance. (2002), Fitoussi the SGP. The only version
and Creel (2002) that is not inconsistent.
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Sustainability depends on the Introduce a Sustainability Pact; Pisani-Ferry The sustainability Pact or the
stock of debt, not on the move to a country-by-country (2002), Fatas et council requires changes in
deficit articulation of the al (2003) the Treaty. For some
close-to-balance target countries it replace the SGP
The 3% of close-to-balance Move to structural balance; Buiter and Grafe Abolishing the close-to-balance
target are arbitrary and introduce the notion (2002) requires changes in SGP;
inconsistent with an of Permanent Balance Rule abolishing the
appropriate fiscal stance 3% requires
changes in the Treaty
The SGP does not address Agree on the aggregate budget Casella (2001) Within the 3% threshold, it
the issue of the appropriate balance. Market solution via Eichengreen is not incompatible
fiscal stance for the deficit permits. Market solution (2002) with the current rules.
euro area via rating agency
Source: Herzog, B. (2004)
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Sims (2004) conclude in his recent economic analysis of the ECB central bank-
ing model:
”...EMU will need to develop ﬁscal institutions capable of prompt and
strong actions at a Europe–wide level. This is a tall order, so it may
not be ﬁlled any time soon, unless a ﬁnancial crisis forces some rapid
political innovation.
The last three years are crisis enough to develop the Stability and Growth Pact
further. However, the myopic behavior of politician in that issues dominante the
discussion without seeing the danger of a too weak ﬁscal framework.
6.3.3 General Reform Ideas
The ﬁscal policy framework in the euro area especially the Stability and Growth
Pact raises a number of problems. What is its real objective? Is the objective to
avoid that a country generates negative externalities on partner countries, then
the rules should bear directly on theses spill–overs. If the objective is economic
policy co–ordination, then the ECB and the Member States should discuss and
deﬁne openly the policies to be implemented within Europe, taken into consid-
eration the diﬀerent business cyclical developments in Member States. Finally,
if the objective is to adopt a common economic policy then a democratically
elected economic government of Europe is necessary (cf. Mathieu/Sterdyniak,
2003). Within a more precise comparison of the above suggestions, four main
points distill out:
1. Independence
2. Sustainability
3. Wider target set
4. Longer time horizon
172
6.3 Development of the Fiscal Framework
Now it is a matter of evaluating these four main points again more exactly,
analyzing it and bringing them in connection with the original proposals. Subse-
quently we look no more to the radical reform suggestions. Because of the top-
ical discussion above and the political weather condition — after the European
Union’s enlargement in May, 2004 — we think that a radical reform of the SGP is
not achievable anymore. Thus it is rather more likely to ﬁnd a majority to modify
the SGP in the existing framework. The ideal image of independence orientates
itself in the EU always by the model of the ECB. However, within the scope of
the discussed reform alternatives, ﬁscal policy in the EMU is relatively far away
from the entire independence model of monetary policy. It is rather a matter of
establishing a new committee which will deliver a plausible recommendation to
the Ecoﬁn–Council based on account of its expertise and independence. Diﬀerent
models are conceivable. Ohr and Schmidt (2003) propose a new committee to
enforce credibility and accountability for a better control and depoliticization of
the decision process. After the EU–Commission has assessed the deﬁcit and debt
criteria, the new committee evaluates the commission suggestion in reference to
the national and global economic conditions. Afterwards the decision passes the
Ecoﬁn council. Additionally this committee would negotiate directly with af-
fected countries and when required it imposes the sanction but only on the bases
of a more unambiguously economic criteria. The sanction would be no more ne-
gotiable by the Ecoﬁn council. This constellation awards a considerable indepen-
dence to the new council. Another model proposes Eichengreen (2003) to avoid
a bias towards an excessive deﬁcit over time. He suggests creating an indepen-
dent committee of ﬁscal policy experts that deﬁnes an index of budgetary levels.
Otherwise permitting the politicians and oﬃcials responsible to alter the index of
debt target would open the door to lobbying and backroom deal making. The new
committee works independent but with much limited power in comparison to the
proposal by Ohr and Schmidt as well as from Ricardo Hausmann, Juergen von
Hagen or Charles Wypolsz and Simon Wren-Lewis . Eijﬃnger (2003) proposes
also ’Non–partisan’ implementation of the rules. He says: ”A strong criticism
of the Treaty and the SGP is that enforcement is partisan: national authorities
are supposed to apply the rules to themselves, thereby having incentives for col-
lusion and horse-trading. In order to move to a non–partisan implementation
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(...) one has to distinguish between three types of decisions”; technical, political
and implementation (of sanction) decisions. The open question is weather the
implementation decision is a technical or a political decision. Eijﬃnger suggests
that the implementation decision is both a technical and a political one. So he
pleads to link the sanction decision between the ECOFIN–Council and the new
independent committee (Eijﬃnger and de Haan, 2000). Leading the implementa-
tion decision exclusively to the independent committee (EU–Commission) would
be unthinkable. Another possibility to overcome a complete independent council
would be to move from a Commission recommendation to a Commission proposal.
The diﬀerence is that the Council can move away from the Commission proposal
only with unanimity and not with a qualiﬁed majority as in the case of a Com-
mission recommendation (Eijﬃnger). Finally the last models of an independent
ﬁscal council or committee, are correlated with the new target of ’sustainability’
in public ﬁnance. The organization CEPR proposes explicitly such a sustainable
council that operates in entire independence. This council should receive no con-
crete political competence in contrast to the ECB. Rather it should make public
warnings and wake up with comments to the consciousness for public ﬁnances
which are unbearable on a continuing basis. The Ecoﬁn council covers sanctions
further. The advantage would be that the complete ﬁxation on the annual budget
deﬁcit in favor of a more long–term, sustainable and load–bearing consolidation
of the national public ﬁnance. A right draft of lasting ﬁnancial policy seems to
exist in none of the suggestions. The reason for that is perhaps that a sustainable
draft is brought immediately in connection with the ’Golden rule’. The last two
points in the list above — a wider target set and a longer time perspective —
is economically absolutely desirable. De Grauwe (2003) and Boﬁnger (2003) and
several other proponents suggest that. There is a ﬂood of opportunities:
• deﬁcit and debt targets
• consider also the inﬂation rate
• long–run view around the business cycle.
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But the main problem is that a change just in that dimension without looking
to the real problems of the ’Stability and Growth Pact’ covers the view. In No-
vember, 2003 the Pact has ’broken down’ not because of the 3% deﬁcit threshold,
but rather for the reason that some member states in the Ecoﬁn–Council are
dominated by other interests (partisan inﬂuence).
6.3.4 New Reform proposal: Synthesis
When a father calls his baby ugly, people take notice and expect to ﬁnd a seriously
aesthetically challenged child. When the President of the European Commission
calls the ﬁscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact ’stupid’ and ’rigid’ it is
clear that changes to the Pact are in the air (Buiter, 2003). In this sense we will
establish here a ’New Reform’ of the current Stability and Growth Pact. The
reform suggestion consists of a detailed analysis of all existing reform proposals
and the logic idea, that we have found in the analysis’s above. To explain the
last comment in more detail look now to ﬁgure 6.1. The starting point is a clear
’supranational target’ which has priority and is in consensus in all member coun-
tries around Europe. This is ’price stability’ because everybody beneﬁts from
a public good. The conﬂict comes about because there are partial sovereignty
rights in the hands of the member states, which can contradict (pressure) the
’supranational–target’. The knowledge that there is no majority for radical re-
forms like more market or centralization in the near future, requests to search for
a more eﬃcient ’co–ordination’ mechanism as the SGP. The middle plain called
’Stability and Growth Pact’ in ﬁgure 6.1 illustrates this.
Conﬂict coordination implies always disciplining. The arrows left and right
illustrate this. A negative disciplining mechanism like sanctions deteriorate (Dan-
ger) the supranational target in this constellation. On the other hand a positive
incentive mechanism helps to protect (secure) the supranational target. Addi-
tionally the ﬁndings in section 4 and 5 show that every disciplining task (consoli-
dation) must correspond with equal rewards. This means that every coordination
or interaction mechanism in that constellation should support both discipline and
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Cuts or positive sanctions Sanctions




Supranational Target




Coordination mechanism (Stability and Growth Pact)




National debt and deﬁcit target
Figure 6.1: Incentive scheme for the EMU
reward for the lost national sovereignty rights. Apart from the economically ab-
solutely desirable changes of the target variables and their application period
the decision procedure is certainly the most important one for the purpose of
’supranational targets’ and a sustainable ﬁscal policy (De Grauwe, 2003). All
other changes to a more–dimensional ’target set’ are pointless, provided that
there aren’t guaranteed and adequate penetrations available. Therefore we need
a more independent decision council to increase credibility and to enforce the
importance of ﬁscal policy in Europe. To strengthen the European ’ﬁscal policy’
and thus to generate an adequate opponent to monetary policy lies in the interest
of the whole European society. So we suggest a ’negative escape clause’. This
has the following function: If the ’supranational’ targets are excessively breached
by member states then the Ecoﬁn council will pass the decision–making capa-
bility to the independent council. The sanction mechanism is as described in
the current Pact not anymore monetary fees which would rather aggravate the
ﬁnancial situation of breaching states. Instead, it is an equivalent punishment
in the same amount but in a positive manner like binding budget consolidations.
A more modest solution for independence in the decision process is achievable
with a ’Vote- and Reputation function’ (Herzog 2004). The idea is as follows:
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Sanction decisions in the Ecoﬁn–council should crucially depend on the number
of votes from the countries with a prudent and sustainable ﬁscal policy. So the
number of votes should correspond with its reputation in ﬁscal policy. A country
with a prudent and sustainable ﬁscal policy structure should get more votes than
unsustainable and breaching countries. We construct a ’reputation index’, which
depends on inﬂation, debt and deﬁcit (perhaps growth) and calculate the amount
of votes for each country. A country with prudent ﬁscal policy means — low in-
ﬂation, low debt and deﬁcit — gets more votes than a country with a bad ﬁscal
policy. This mechanism induces two advantages: First it avoids vote–trading and
policy dealing in the Ecoﬁn council. Second it generates an intrinsically incentive
through a market mechanism to a more prudent and sustainable ﬁscal policy.
Therefore the Ecoﬁn council and the national member states keep their entire
sovereignty, as long as they trade according to the treaty. The cost of breaching
the Pact is also very high (out–in decision) but without aggravation of the eco-
nomic situation and with the advantage to make more credible and accountable
decisions. This enacts within that circumstances a more ﬁtting opponent to the
ECB and works against national ﬁnancial bankruptcy.
6.4 Fiscal federalism: A critical assessment
Modern research on ﬁscal federalism has focused mainly on the allocative and dis-
tributive consequences of a decentralized government structure (Wellisch, 2000).
At the heart of each discussion is the conﬂict to what extent a decentralized
provision and ﬁnancing of government services leads to externalities which in-
ﬂuence the level and the quality of public services in other jurisdictions (Feld
and Kirchgssner, 2001, 2003). Moreover it is intensively discussed whether such
external eﬀects in fact lead to economically important eﬃciency losses (Wilson
and Wildasin, 2004). Unfortunately, the assessment of the eﬃciency of ﬁscal fed-
eralism in the European monetary union becomes more complicated if political
economy arguments are considered. That imply, if the political economy problems
are neglected, the central government could provide public services in a diﬀeren-
tiated fashion according to diﬀerent local and regional preferences and eﬀectively
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internalize their externalities. Decentralized service provision would then only
be justiﬁed by the ’frustration costs’ which result from being outvoted. Scharpf
(2001) maintains that the problem solving capacity of cooperative federalism —
the German variant — is chronically suboptimal so that the capacity to innovate
in federalism is noticeably reduced. Because in recent years the second chamber
(Bundesrat) is partially responsible for the missing reforms in Germany. The same
is true for Switzerland the best exemplar for a totally federalized country. That
indicates limits of simple one–way decentralization. These controversial theoreti-
cal perspectives do not lead to unambiguous results as to the speciﬁc assignment
of ﬁscal competencies in a federal system (Feld and Kirchgssner, 2003).
In the EMU framework, is the ﬁscal behavior of a government basically con-
straint by exit and voice (Hirschman, 1970). Voice in the public sector can be
exerted by democratic decision–making procedures, like competitive elections,
referendum or voter initiatives, while exit requires the possibility of citizens mi-
grate and hence vote by feet (Romer, 1975). The literature on voice mechanism
starts with the famous median voter model (Breyer et al. 1993,1994). A related
approach focuses on the impact of federalism on government behavior as an inves-
tigation of the exit mechanism (Oates, 1972, 1985, 1999) (Bernnan and Buchanan,
1977; Buchanan, 1984). As argued by Brennan and Buchanan, the government
is able to behave like a revenue maximizing monopoly called a ’Leviathan’. In
a centralized system where only the federal level possesses taxing powers, it is
more diﬃcult to restrict such Leviathan behavior than in a strongly decentralized
system with considerable powers of state and local governments. Oates (1972)
argues that political agents have a better knowledge of the preferences of their
constituency if the ﬁscal power is decentralized, such that the provision of public
goods can be tailored more eﬃciently to their needs. That view favors a smaller
size of government areas. But anything in real live has a mixed blessing. Thus
Oates (1985) mentions, if local governments have more information about the
preferences of citizens than central governments and, therefore, public services
can be better tailored to the need of voters, this might increase their demand for
public spending leading to a larger share of government. The empirical ﬁndings
states that it is really diﬃculty in a multi-country union like EMU to establish
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an optimal rule inform as the Stability and Growth Pact. There is no clear argu-
ment in favor of or against more centralization or decentralization of ﬁscal policy
in the EMU. Therefore, we have to focus on the speciﬁc topics to evaluate the
trade–oﬀ’s to get a reasonable solution.
6.5 Lessons from the current reform debate
(...) ”if the euro increases the political integration to-
wards a fully-ﬂedged federal structure a diﬀerent and more
eﬃcient public ﬁnance system could be devised.”
Buti et al. (2003)
Each of the proposals above draws the attention to one or more potentially
serious problems with the design and implementation of the SGP. The suggestion
to implement institutional and procedural reform highlights the need for an inde-
pendent enforcer. The idea to move to a golden rule stresses the need to preserve
the growth aspect of the SGP. A number of proposals highlights the excessive
uniformity of the current rules. Taking into account the diﬀerent levels of public
debt points to the need to insert the sustainability dimension into the core of
the SGP. The proposal of establishing a market for deﬁcit permits tackles the
problem of the pro–cyclical bias in good times.
However, in our view, none of the proposals outlined above represents a Pareto
improvement: while appropriate to tackle some of the problems highlighted in the
debate, each of them does not solve all problems and may even aggravate some
of them. Some reform proposals present the same element of inﬂexibility of the
current regime (cf golden rule); others require estimates which may turn out prob-
lematic in a multinational context (debt sustainability pact; permanent balance
rule); others again require a decisive leap forward in the integration of ﬁscal policy
(procedural alternatives). The adoption of some proposals (procedural reforms)
would allow to tackle the transition problem by removing the deﬁcit threshold.
Nonetheless, of all this improvements can be achieved. In our view, key aspects
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are re–balancing sticks and carrots, think about the targets and aims in the EMU,
recognize ﬁscal–monetary interaction and enhance enforcement mechanisms.
The main result in that chapter is that there is no miracle solution to cure the
Pact’s weaknesses. If one takes into account the political economy of ﬁscal rules
in a multinational context, it is diﬃcult to envisage that, at the existing levels of
political integration between EMU countries, the solution would be dramatically
diﬀerent from that introduced in the 1990s. Despite the huge controversy in
the reform discussion, any radical change in the EMU ﬁscal framework would
be highly problematic from a political point of view. The obvious risk is that
ending up in a vacuum in which the old rules are called into question while the
agreement on a new set of rules fails to materialize. Moreover a radical change
is rather unlikely as a modiﬁcation based on the current Stability and Growth
Pact.
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Chapter 7
Whither ”Stability and Growth
Pact”?
(...) ’...the lack of a politically feasible alternative makes
it a second best solution that should not be undermined in
the present crisis.’
Heipertz, M. (2003)
The pace of integration amongst European Union (EU) member states has ac-
celerated considerably during the past decade, stimulated by the agreement from
the Single Internal Market and further enhanced by the process of forming an
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Since 1999, a discussion of ﬁscal policy
alternatives has focused upon whether individual member states will meet the
Maastricht convergence criteria (MCC) for membership, and whether the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact (SGP) will prove too restrictive in practice. Economic
sanctions are one increasingly common tool of coercion in disputes. However, an
open puzzle is: Why are economic sanctions so often imposed, though they are
unlikely to succeed?
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7.1 Law and Economics of the SGP rules
The role of legal rules in restoring eﬃciency in the presence of market failure
was critically examined in a seminal article by Roland Coase (1937). Prior to
Coase, the prevailing view among economists was that externalities like pollution
could only be internalized by means of government intervention, for example
by imposing ﬁnancial liability (a tax or ﬁne) on the polluter. However, Coase’s
analysis changed that by emphasizing the role of bargaining and transaction costs
in determining the ultimate allocation of resources against the background of legal
rules.1
First, the Coase Theorem implies that the social goals of eﬃciency and distrib-
utional justice are not necessarily incompatible, as is often assumed. Speciﬁcally,
when the rancher was liable for crop damage, he had to make damage payments
to the farmer. In contrast, when the rancher was not liable, the farmer had to
pay the rancher to keep the herd size from expanding beyond the eﬃcient level.
Thus, variations in the assignment of liability can be used to alter the distribution
of wealth without aﬀecting the allocation of resources. This leads to the second
important implication of the Coase Theorem: When bargaining costs are high,
the law matters for eﬃciency (Demsetz and Alchian, 1972).
In particular, it bears on the fundamental question of whether to structure
laws in the form of inﬂexible rules that dictate certain conduct or consequences
irrespective of circumstances, or whether to leave some discretion so that judges
can tailor outcomes to individual cases. In his classic treatise, Hart (1961) framed
the choice in this way:
”In fact all systems, in diﬀerent ways, compromise between two social needs:
the need for certain rules which can, over great areas of conduct, safely be applied
by private individuals to themselves without fresh oﬃcial guidance or weighing up
of social issues; and the need to leave open, for later settlement by an informed,
oﬃcial choice, issues which can only be properly appreciated and settled when they
arise in a concrete case.”
1This section is based on the following published paper: ECPR-Conference
Proceeding (online) 2004; http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-bologna/docs/473.pdf.
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But this world is of limited exchange for most problems confronting the law.
More pervasive is the existence of situations involving high transaction costs,
which prevent parties from bargaining around ineﬃcient rules and from resolving
disputes without legal intervention. In this more realistic setting, the law matters
for eﬃciency, so rules must give way to standards that allow a balancing of costs
and beneﬁts in individual cases. This realm will receive most of our attention in
this thesis.
This chapter and the next develop the economic model of european ﬁscal
rules, especially the SGP. The model is based on the proposition that the rules
of tort law are designed to give parties engaged in risky activities an incentive to
undertake all reasonable means of minimizing the costs arising from those risks.
For this reason, the economic model of accident is usually referred to as the model
of precaution. The purpose of this chapter is to develop this model in a general
way so as to derive a set of basic principles that apply broadly to diﬀerent areas.
The next sections then apply these results to speciﬁc areas, especially in ﬁscal
policy.
The total costs of high debts and deﬁcits consist of three components: the
damage suﬀered by all states (in euro terms); the cost of precautions against ac-
cidents by higher interest rates and inﬂation; and the administrative costs of the
tort system by the SGP. In this chapter, we focus on the ﬁrst two of these costs
as reﬂected in the model of precaution, while referring to administrative costs
only in qualitative terms. In Chapter 6 (modes of economic governance) we un-
dertake a detailed analysis of related administrative costs within an opportunity
cost analysis. As such, it will be a useful tool for identifying connections across
traditional legal boundaries.
Accident is breaching the 3% rule. Why? In our model the accident ist
often planned, however in normal situations output volatility is an economic
determinate and diﬃcult to forecast. Therefore to breach the rule is sometimes
unforeseen similar to an accident (cf chapter 5).
Society has many ways of controlling risks, including safety regulation, taxa-
tion, and even criminal penalties for risky activities. These are all examples of
”public” controls imposed by the government. This chapter is concerned instead
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with a private remedy — the right of accident victims to sue injurers for damages
under tort law.
The primary social functions of tort law are twofold: to compensate victims
for their injuries and to deter ”unreasonably” risky behavior. Although the eco-
nomic approach to tort law is not unconcerned with the goal of compensation,
its primary goal is optimal deterrence.
7.1.1 Analyzing the Rules
An economic model of legal rules is designed to minimize the total costs associated
with the risk of breaching the Stability and Growth Pact. Each EMU member
country invests x euro in precaution to avoid breaching the SGP. Moreover we
assume that the probability of breaching the rules p(x) and the sanction fee D(x)
are decreasing in x.1 This reﬂects the fact that greater precaution reduces both
the probability and severity of a breach.
The social optimum problem, as noted above, is to choose x — the right
amount of budget consolidation — to minimize the costs of precaution plus ex-
pected damages. Formally, the problem is to
min
x
x + p(x)D(x). (7.1)
The solution to this problem is best seen graphically in Figure 7.1. The cost–
minimizing level of care, labeled x∗, occurs at the minimum point of the total cost
curve.2 Formally, x∗ occurs at the point where the slope of the x curve equals the
(negative) slope of of the p(x)D(x) curve. The diﬃculty for each ﬁscal authority
is not only to ﬁnd the optimal x∗ but also to evaluate the likelihood of breaching
the threshold and the possible sanction fee. To include these facts, we extend
the baseline model presents here in the following section and analyze an eﬃcient
breach of the SGP.
1We assume further that they are decreasing at a decreasing rate. This means that precau-
tion has a diminishing marginal beneﬁt in terms of reducing the risk of breaching the thresholds.
2The optimal value is exactly like a Pigovian tax.
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xx∗
Fee
x
p(x)D(x)
x + p(x)D(x)
Figure 7.1: Social Optimum of Legal Rules
The Economic of Contract Law
Contract law provides the legal means by which people enforce promises to one
another. Promises come in all varieties, including promises to provide a good or
service in exchange for money, promise of marriage, promise to quit drinking or
smoking, and campaign promises by political candidates. But people who make
promises often wish to break them. The basic question underlying contract law
is what sorts of promises should be legally enforceable. This section begins the
analysis by describing the elements of a valid contract. In eﬀect, it answers the
question of what must be true of a promise for it to be legally enforceable. The
next section then asks when someone who has made a contract can legally break
it, and what the penalty should be for doing so.
Deﬁnition: A contract is a legal agreement, explicit or implicit, between two
parties to a transaction that allows either party to go to court to enlist the power
of the state to enforce the other’s promise (Laﬀont and Tirol, 1993).
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Critics: The paradigm underlying the economic theory of contract law is
therefore that of competitive markets. This is based on the well–known results
from microeconomic theory, the ”Invisible Hand Theorem”, that competitive mar-
kets maximize the gains from trade.
The preceding examined the question of what contracts are legally enforceable.
We argue that the various formation defenses ensure that the law will only enforce
contracts that were formed voluntarily and, hence, promise a mutual beneﬁt.
Contracts that appear mutually beneﬁcial at the time of formation, however,
may not be when the date of performance arrives.
Designing an eﬃcient remedy for the breach of enforceable contracts is the
subject of this chapter. We begin the analysis by arguing that the breach of a
contract is eﬃcient in those cases where the cost of performance turns out to
exceed the beneﬁt of performance. An eﬃcient remedy for breach should give
contractors an incentive to breach only in those circumstances. In addition, we
will examine the incentive–breach remedies create for parties to make investments
in preparation for performance. Finally, we consider the role of breach–remedies
in assigning the risk of breach in an optimal way. In examining the above issues,
we will focus primarily on money damages since these are the standard remedy
employed by courts.
Assume V is the individual value of sustainable ﬁscal policy and p is the price
to achieve sustainable targets in the SGP. Suppose each EMU member state made
a ’reliance investment’ of R to avoid the sanction fees from the SGP. Let ’C’ be
the variable cost of producing the good ’sustainable’ public ﬁnance. Finally, let D
be the court– or rule–imposed damage payment that the breaching country must
pay to the non–breaching countries. Our goal will be to determine the value of
D that induces the state to breach eﬃciently.
A condition for eﬃcient breach in this model is
C > V. (7.2)
To see this, look to the following table:
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Table 7.1: Breaching the SGP
State Breaching Country Sustainable Country Joint EMU retrun
Compliance V-R-P P-C V-R-C
Breach D-R -D -R
Source: Herzog (2003)
Now consider the actual breaching decision. Potential breaching countries are
indiﬀerent in breaching the SGP if:
D −R ≥ V −R − P ⇐⇒ D ≥ V − P. (7.3)
On the other hand sustainable countries beneﬁt from breach the SGP if:
P − C ≤ −D ⇐⇒ D ≥ C − P. (7.4)
Potential breaching countries set the sanction fee ’D’ equal to the value of
sustainable ﬁnance minus the price for achieving that goal. That implies that the
current breaching countries see a very low additional value of sustainable ﬁnance
or implicit price–stability and very high costs to achieve that objective in the
current situation (to stabilize or consolidate ﬁscal policy).
The next surprising ﬁnding is as follows: Primarily sustainable states follow
the breaching countries and also breach the SGP if the diﬀerence between costs
of sustainable stabilization minus the price of the SGP–rule is lower than the
sanction fee. Therefore a sustainable country will breach the SGP when the
beneﬁt of sustainable public ﬁnance exceeds the costs. The next question is how
it relates to actual remedies employed by institutions and courts.
7.1.2 Remedies for Bad Rules
There are four items that can explain the success of economic sanctions. Lacy
and Niou (2004) stress the following items: First, the player’s preference for the
issue under dispute and the imposition of sanctions are critically important in a
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sanction game. Second, threatening sanctions is as important as imposing sanc-
tions as a strategy in disputes (Lacy and Niou, 2004). When sanctions are likely
to be successful, it is the threat, not the imposition, of sanctions that changes a
target state’s behavior. Third, states that ignore the treat of sanction are unlikely
to change their behavior after sanctions are imposed. Fourth, sanctions that do
not change a target’s behavior may still be successful by enhancing the coercer’s
reputation as resolute player or by producing an outcome that the coercer prefers
to the status quo. The following subsections illustrate some opportunities to deal
with bad rules:
Elements of a Valid Contract
Having described the ideal contracting environment, we are now ready to con-
front the question of what contracts are enforceable. According to the law, an
enforceable contract must, ﬁrst and foremost, constitute a bargain. That is, it
must arise out of a mutual agreement between the two parties. This makes eco-
nomic sense since agreement by both parties signiﬁes that each expects to realize
some beneﬁt from the transaction.
But how does the law decide when there are mutual gains? Traditionally, three
elements must be present: oﬀer, acceptance, and consideration. Consideration is
a legal term used to describe the promises; this is what makes the transaction
mutual and hence enforceable.
Reasons for Invalidating Contracts
Now, we discuss how contract law deals with those contracts that fail to meet
the ideal. In general, our discussion will involve various rules that specify the
conditions that must be met for a contract to be enforceable. We see that in
sense cases, the rules can be interpreted as straightforward attempts to eliminate
sources of market failures as described above. However, we will also see that in
some cases the most eﬃcient rule will be far from obvious. The key questions in
this discussion is: Are there any circumstances in which it would be eﬃcient to
enforce damages that are excessive in expected terms?
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One might be when breach is hard to detect, as in the case of employee shirking
or malfeasance. To deter ineﬃcient breaches of this sort, damages would have to
be multiplied by the inverse of the probability of detection, like punitive damages
have been oﬀered as well. An argument in support of the nonenforcement rule is
that excessive damages may be a signal of mutual mistake or unconscionability
(Rea, 1984). It is a signal of mutual mistake if both parties miscalculated the loss
from breach, and it is a sign of unconscionability if one party miscalculated and
the other took advantage of that miscalculation. In either case, nonenforcement
is justiﬁed.
7.2 New Reform Elements
Frameworks for attaining ﬁscal policy are diﬃcult to design. Because government
spending can be aimed at redistributing wealth, as well as ﬁnancing public goods
and stabilizing the economy, the socially optimal level of spending is partly a
matter of preference. Given spending, the optimal ﬁnancing mix depends on
the state of the economy. Ex ante, it is impossible to describe every conceivable
state and to specify the optimal response for each one. Ex post, it is costly or
impossible to observe and verify the state and whether or not the speciﬁed policy
has been implemented. This is one argument for the idea that a ﬁscal framework
must be extremely simple to observe and verify, as for example simple numerical
restrictions. However, simple does not mean setting up unsatisfactory incentives
and designing bad and mishandling institutions.
7.2.1 Paradoxes of Economic Sanctions and the SGP
Studies of economic sanctions have long sought to explain why economic sanc-
tions so often fail (Baldwin, 1985; Blanchard and Ripsman, 1999; Galtung, 1967;
Hufbauer et al., 1990; Martin, 1992; Morgan, 1990; Pape, 1997). A large empiri-
cal literature, based primarily on data and work by Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott
(1990), illustrate whether sanctions usually succeed and under what conditions
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they fail. The observed data set shows failures of sanction enforcement in many
cases. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott’s optimistic view of sanctions is that they
succeed in only about one-third of cases, but Pape (1998) pessimistic view holds
that they succeed in at most 5% of cases. One of the big mysteries arising in
the empirical literature on economic sanctions is: If sanctions are prone to failure
and costly to enforce, why are they so often applied in international disputes?
Moreover in the unrealistic case of games with complete information, sanctions
should never be imposed because you expect to impose then only if you never
breach the rules. However, this is not the case in reality. To analyze this in more
detail Lacy and Niou (2004) build a game theoretic model. They found that if
sanctions are threatened, they may not be imposed, and, if imposed, they may
not be successful. This ﬁnding is not only true in international struggles as they
show, it is also what we see in the European ﬁscal framework, especially for the
Stability and Growth Pact. The current reform discussions are straightforward
in that direction to make the rules less successful if sanctions are imposed against
breaching states. Moreover the analysis shows that sanctions are not more potent
than the political will behind them. In line with these paradoxes in the economic
sanction literature we have found similar developments in our own work. A recent
development in the European Fiscal Framework induces the following paradoxical
characteristics:
(A) The EMU countries were in the middle of the adjustment process when
they were hit by a international depression in the year 2000. Of course the
individual countries were hit diﬀerently, but the absurdity of the SGP is that the
harder a economy is hit the more it is forced to restrict its ﬁscal policy. This has
a damaging eﬀect on the country itself, but also contagious consequences for the
neighboring countries, which starts a vicious cycle within EMU because countries
now have no macroeconomic policy instrument left to be decided on at their own
discretion. Some proponents to the SGP would argue in line with the statement,
however there is a problem:
The fall–oﬀ of the economic growth in the years 2001 and 2002 to-
gether with the huge budget problems which Germany and France ex-
perienced is a good illustration of the intention behind the Stability
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and Growth Pact. Because, if these countries had acted in accordance
with the aim of the Pact and adjusted the budget to the requirement of
’near to balance’ during the period 1999-2001, where the growth was
favorable, then, today, they would have had no problems with the 3%
upper limit of the budget deﬁcit. (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2003)
(B) The economic analysis above also shows the diﬀerence in the incentives
for big and small countries. So it is a paradox that the EU-Commission in its
reform proposal tends to have more lax attitudes towards the bigger countries.
This could be interpreted as a renouncement of the SGP but this asymmetry is
totally misleading as argued in chapter 5.
7.2.2 New Incentive Framework: Positive Mechanism
In this section we present a theoretical foundation for incentive based coordina-
tion and interaction mechanisms.1 All economic transactions need governance.
Much of economic theory assumes that an oﬃcial legal system provides this ser-
vice. This assumption implies that the law works perfectly and costlessly (Dixit,
2001). In the reality of economic life societies have developed alternative modes
of governance. Understanding of these modes leads to a better understanding of
the oﬃcial system, and even more importantly, of the interrelations among the
modes — Can alternative governance modes do as well as, or perhaps even better
than, the oﬃcial law? Are diﬀerent modes mutual substitutes, or can they be
complements? Every institution is designed to maximize social welfare and solve
two basic problems: It must discourage free riding and it must credibly promise
not to misuse the information, for example for extortion. Similarly to Dixit (2001)
one can describe the solution to this problem as follows: On the left hand are the
expected immediate gains from deviation, conditional on meeting a type without
a public Bad label (reputation loss), and on the right hand side are the expected
future costs of the deviation. The conclusion from this analysis is that an eﬃcient
mechanism balances the beneﬁts of breaching the SGP and the imposed costs.
1This section is based on the ATINER-Conference paper, 2004.
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In speciﬁc constellations in which the public detection probabilities are high self–
governance works automatically and no coordination or intermediation is needed.
But if the probabilities for detection are both low and the other side cheats then
a two–side intermediation (co–ordination) can help. Now we develop a ’national–
supranational’ interaction model with an eﬃcient coordination agency. A new
ﬁnding in the model is that the national incentive structure to consolidate the
ﬁnancial budget must be rewarded by the supranational level or the agency. We
consider the simple case of an indivisible public project (good) that has value S
for national consumers. Each member state of a monetary union can realize the
project. Its cost function is
C = δ − e (7.5)
where ’δ’ is an eﬃciency parameter1 which can be described as the costs of
deﬁcit and debt accumulation. The parameter ’e’2 is the household consolidation
eﬀort. For expositional simplicity we will assume that eﬀorts remain strictly
positive over the relevant range of equilibrium eﬀorts. This can be justiﬁed,
because the member countries are obliged in their stability programs for steadily
consolidations and at the same time the SGP prescribes a well–balanced or even
surplus budget. A ﬁrst question is: What is the optimal consolidation eﬀort? Let
U be the nation’s utility level:
U = ζ − ψ(e) (7.6)
The utility increases with ’ζ ’ a transfer from the supranational (or agency)
level like ’price stability’ and it decreases with disutility3 ’ψ(e)’ from national
consolidation because of the partial loss of sovereignty rights in ﬁscal policy. Now
we assume that the coordination agency is a Stackelberg leader and makes a take–
it–or–leave–it oﬀer to the member states. The agency maximizes the following
1Cf. Adverse selection rate. But because of the Stability programs that parameter is
observable.
2Cf. Moral hazard rate.
3With ψ′(e) > 0 for e > 0 and ψ′′(e) > 0, and satisﬁes ψ(0) = 0 and lime→∞ ψ(e) = +∞.
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welfare function:
W S = S + U − (1 + λ)[ζ + δ − e] (7.7)
Under complete information1 — that is, knowing d and observing e — the
agency would solve and maximize social welfare (Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993). Now
substitute in the welfare function as deﬁned by (7.7), the utility function (7.6),
then after some trivial transformations you yield:
max
U,e
[S − (1 + λ)(δ − e + ψ(e))− λU ] (7.8)
subject to U ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0 denoting the shadow cost of public ﬁnance. The
solution of this problem is
ψ′(e) = 1⇐⇒ e ≡ e∗ (7.9)
U = 0⇐⇒ ζ = ψ(e∗) (7.10)
That is, the marginal disutility of eﬀort, ψ(e), must be equal to marginal cost
of savings, one. Furthermore the existence of a shadow cost of public ﬁnance
implies that the national member state receives no rent (U = 0).
Proposition 7.1. In the optimal scenario, the supranational reward ’ζ’ is equal
to the equilibrium disutility of consolidating the budget.
Proof 7.1. Solution set 
More interesting for our purpose, the agency can oﬀer the member state a
ﬁxed–rate contract (with a = ψ(e∗)):
ζ(C) = a− (C − C∗) (7.11)
1The main general economic conclusions are: (1) Asymmetric incentives (information) al-
lows the regulated actors (nation) to enjoy a rent. (2) Asymmetric incentives (information)
reduces the power of the incentive schemes (eﬀort decreases).
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Proposition 7.2. The ﬁxed–rate incentive contract is eﬃcient and implies that
the consolidation eﬀort is set at e = e∗.
Proof 7.2. ζ(C) = ψ(e∗)− (e− e∗) and for the equilibrium e = e* result ζ(C) =
ψ(e∗) 
Proposition 7.3. The supranational reward must correspond proportionally with
disutility.
Proof 7.3. The derivative of ζ(C) is: dζ
de
= ψ′(e∗) = 1 > 0 and d
2ζ
de2
= ψ′(e∗) > 0

Proposition 7.2 and 7.3 imply that an eﬃcient ’supranational–national’ coor-
dination mechanism must also include a corresponding ’reward’ for the budget
consolidation eﬀort of every participating member state (Tsebelis, 1990). This
implies no negative incentives like sanction fees, but rather positive incentives as
described in our proposal for the SGP. This result is consistent with ﬁndings in
other models by Heinemann and Huefner (2002) as well as Fuchs and Lippi (2003).
The novel part in our modelling is an explicit design of a coordination agency
(SGP) in a stylized monetary–ﬁscal interaction framework. In that framework
we analyze eﬃcient incentive mechanisms like the Stability and Growth Pact in
Europe. The main ﬁnding is that all interaction environments, which restrict
one policy side (ﬁscal policy) but allow gains to the other side (monetary policy,
price–stability), only work eﬃciently with equivalent ’rewards’.
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7.3 Vote- and Reputationfunction
7.3.1 Key determinants
In theory it would be possible to apply appropriate market design and mecha-
nisms to a huge number of common policy decisions, coordinating ﬁscal positions,
for example. Many such mechanisms have been shown to possess desirable prop-
erties and some are simple enough that real world applications could at least
be considered (Lane, 2003). The common weakness of such mechanisms is that
they rely on proﬁt maximization, which may be problematic in government in-
teractions because the government’s goals cannot be reduced to monetary gains.
Money is the most natural candidate, but it is ill–suited to political application.
Is there any alternative?
Thus it seems very natural for an economist to look for voting rules or inter-
action mechanisms where votes would function as prices, or more precisely would
be equivalent to resources spent to bring about desired outcomes. The classic
scheme considered by the literature is ’logrolling’; the possibility of trading votes
(Irlenbusch and Sutter, 2003). Under certain circumstances, logrolling may in-
deed increase eﬃciency, but it also induce some weaknesses: First, trading votes
is illegal in all democratic countries and second, it then only leads to eﬃcient
outcomes if ’prices’ (votes) are fully ﬂexible, which can only be correct in a full
Coasian bargaining framework.
A pioneering alternative to vote trading, shifting votes not interpersonally,
but intertemporally is done by Casella (2001). In other words, Casella creats a
system of storable votes. This implies that each committee member is allowed
to save his votes for future decisions and so increase his relative weight in future
deliberations. Intuitively, the possibility of shifting votes across time should allow
individuals to smooth their voting utility, or in other words to equate the expected
marginal return of casting one’s vote (Casella, 2001). Thus the intertemporal
arbitrage of voting implies possible eﬃciency gains.1
1Casella show this for the case of two interaction agents.
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Starting from the idea in the subsection above we now develop a ’Vote- and
Reputationfunction’ in the ECOFIN council, which can be a real substitute for a
more independent council. We suggest this novel mechanism as a promising alter-
native for the current SGP because it remedies the current enforcement problems
and is not a radical reform proposal like delegating the decisions to an independent
council or market mechanism. The main advantage is that it sets the right in-
centives for sustainable ﬁscal policy and needs no negative sanction mechanism.
Second, it minimizes or eliminates ’logrolling’ in the current ECOFIN-Council
even though all decisions are taken in that council. As deﬁned, sustainable ﬁscal
policy reputation in the EMU depends on a three–dimensional vector ’r’, based
on past ﬁscal reputation with:
• deﬁcit and debt levels,
• inﬂation development and
• growth rates.
The ﬁscal reputation vector ’r’ is correlated with votes in the ECOFIN coun-
cil. So all countries compete for votes in the council, where their relative voting
power depends on their ﬁscal reputation. Therefore, this mechanism implies a
kind of competition for votes.1 Moreover we assume that each agent (government)
has the possibility as described above of saving votes intertemporally. This gen-
erates the incentive for states to accumulate votes for situations in which they
are absolutely necessary. The advantages of the mechanism are also explained
above. However, modelling this functional form implies some interesting ﬁndings
that are summarized in the following Propositions.
Proposition 7.4. A vote–reputation mechanism ’r’ improves the welfare of all
’normal’ countries in the decision process.
1An Experimental Analysis of Voting in the Stability and Growth Pact in the European
Monetary Union was done by Irlenbusch and Sutter 2003.
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Member states must choose ‘No sanction’ or ’sanction’ against ’sinner’ states.
Ex ante each state votes with probability 1/2 and with varying intensity ψ, where
ψ is drawn from a distribution F (ψ) deﬁned over the support [0,1] and is iid.
across time and individuals.
Proof 7.4. A reputation mechanism is similar to storable votes (Cassela, 2001)
where the votes are accumulated intertemporally. Thus, we indicate W as the
expected value of the one–period game and W˜ as the value of the corresponding
two–period game. The two–period welfare–decision without a reputation eﬀect
is: You win the case if your probability is greater than 1/2 plus the coin choice
(1/2 ∗ 1/2 = 1/4). Formally, this is
W˜ = W + δW (7.12)
W˜ =
3
4
∫ 1
0
ψdF (ψ) + δW (7.13)
On the other hand, if you incorporate reputation eﬀects r(0, 1) the expected
welfare changes and yields:
EW˜ =
∫ r
0
ψdF (ψ)
(
2 + F (r)
4
)
+
∫ 1
r
ψdF (ψ)
(
3 + F (r)
4
)
+ δW (7.14)
For all r(0, 1) the last term is bigger than equation (7.13) above because the
function is concave 
All countries with middle term reputations, meaning, reputations between
(0, 1) (normal countries) improve their welfare. The rim reputation zero and one
is unrealistic to achieve for a more dimensional target set. In the next proposition
we show an additional attribute of our ’New’ decision mechanism.
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Proposition 7.5. The ﬁscal–reputation ’r’ decreases over time. Moreover struc-
tural, economic and political breaks also imply a decrease in ﬁscal reputation.
The fact that each member country will maximize its proﬁts and votes in the
ECOFIN-council implies that countries in indiﬀerent situations storage votes for
situations in which they are more important like the case of ’excessive deﬁcit
procedures’. Similar to the literature about ’political business cycles’ (Drazen,
2000) our ’Vote- and Reputationfunction’ implies incentives to increase reputation
by decreasing ’r’ over time, if a new and important decision is imminent. The
conjuncture of all implications imitates an independent council because there
exists competition about votes and the vote decisions depend on ﬁscal reputation.
The ECOFIN council, that indent to use our ’Vote- and Reputationfunction’ is
approximative the equivalent of an independent council or committee; however
with the advantage of further political bargaining in the decision process. This
incentive scheme reduces on the one hand logrolling and on the other hand take
into account a more long–run perspective for political agents and is enforced with
a reduced amount of partisan inﬂuence in the ECOFIN–Council.
7.4 Summary
It is again worth to mentioning that ﬁscal policy in a monetary union is the
only policy instrument left to the member countries for individual demand man-
agement policies. However, ﬁscal policy is currently controlled by a number of
supranational laws and limitations through the acceptance of the Stability and
Growth Pact. The primary aim of our own reform proposal developed in this
chapter is to go beyond that view.
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Conclusions
If the rules are considered necessary in a decentralized ﬁscal frame-
work and no alternative solution is found clearly superior to the SGP,
policy–makers should aim at safeguarding the SGP while improving its
implementation and its incentive structure.
Buti et al. (2003)
8.1 Summary
Designing an optimal framework is diﬃcult; credible enforcement requires sim-
plicity. If the framework is too simple, however, it may produce sub–optimal
outcomes, as in the above scenarios, and incentives for a subsequent renegotia-
tion of the framework.
The stability of the common currency needs an appropriate framework for
ﬁscal policy to maintain the sustainability of public ﬁnance. At the heart of the
current political struggles over the ﬁscal policy framework of EMU seems to be
the diﬃculty of translating long–run objectives into meaningful day–to–day ﬁs-
cal policies. As we have indicated in our thesis, there are theoretical, empirical,
operational and institutional reasons why this problem cannot be solved by the
current Stability and Growth Pact. The current simple rules focusing strictly
on numerical values with an aggravating sanction mechanism and a non–credible
199
8.1 Summary
sanction scheme are not appropriate for the monetary–ﬁscal interaction frame-
work. We show theoretically, in chapter 4 and 5 that strict compliance is not
achievable under the current SGP. Moreover analyzing the ingredients of macro-
economic institutional structures in chapter 2 and their necessary and suﬃcient
components in chapter 6 illustrates the challenges for the new design of the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact.
The increasing necessity for ﬁscal rules in a monetary union where monetary
policy is centralized and ﬁscal policy is decentralized is suﬃciently explained from
a theoretical perspective and from the historical record. Furthermore, preliminary
empirical evidence, unfortunately with restricted data sets, illustrates that the
quality of public ﬁnance and the structure of public consolidation softened with
the beginning of monetary union in 1999; this has important implications for
both the short–term and the longer–term economic growth perspective.
The institutional and political economic analysis in chapter 6 and 7 again
reveals several trade–oﬀs. We have therefore argued that the enforcement (and
implementation of sanctions) of the Stability and Growth Pact requires on the one
hand a strict disciplining structure but on the other hand a reward mechanism
instead of negative money sanctions. Hence this mechanism is embedded in our
proposal of the so–called ’Vote- and Reputationfunction’. One can imagine this
new mechanism like a binding budget consolidation scheme. Hence, we propose
a more credible and adequate enforcement mechanism for sanction threats and
deal with real incentives for consolidation in good times. Our theoretical ﬁndings
and the empirical observations from 2002 to 2005 show that there is a gap be-
tween ﬁscal consolidation incentives between bigger and smaller countries. Hence
the current ﬁscal framework works diﬀerently between countries with diﬀerent
national ﬁscal policy rules (von Hagen et al., 2002). To solve the main trade–oﬀ
and the drawbacks in the current system our reform proposal is a promising al-
ternative without radical changes. Basically the ’Vote- and Reputationfunction’
seems to be a new idea that is either overlooked and/or really clever. However
the current reform discussion is not open to such a creative proposal because the
political will is more for the abolishment of the ﬁscal framework or a fully ﬂexi-
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ble framework.1 But as shown above, the more ﬂexibility in the ﬁscal–monetary
interaction framework or monetary union, the more free–riding and moral haz-
ard is apparent. Therefore, the primary objective of the SGP is unobtainable.
Von Hagen (2004) concludes in a recent empirical assessment of European ﬁscal
policy: ”...there is a need for controlling deﬁcits more eﬀectively.”
Some readers may ﬁnd our proposal unrealistic for the EMU as it is today.
Even so, we also have the extension of the monetary union to the Middle and
Eastern European countries in view. It seems to me that such an enlargement is
not too far away. However, the challenges of how to manage a monetary union
with more than 12 members is internalized in our reform proposal. Thinking
beyond the current framework is necessary to evaluate the success of the monetary
union. Hence, our proposal and solution scheme is also a practical mechanism in
a bigger monetary union. To avoid the risk of political haggling, the provisions
of the EDP and the SGP should be amended to clarify the authority.
Whatever steps are taken in the future, we should focus on the real issues
as sustainability and enforceability. The basis for a credible framework is an
independent assessment of public ﬁnance, in a transparent and accountable man-
ner. Therefore, giving the European Commission greater authority in the current
framework could be a step in the right direction. However, it is really unlikely
to occur and again it does not necessarily solve the suﬃcient goals of an eﬃcient
and appropriate European Fiscal Framework.
8.2 Out look
(...) ’The Stability and Growth Pact is a gift of the sky’
Wim Duisenberg (FAZ, 12. November 2004)
The institutional framework of the European Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) is ﬁrmly rooted in monetary as well as ﬁscal discipline through the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact. The creation of EMU not only entails the adoption of
1Cf the current reform of the SGP, decided in the ECOFIN-Council on March 21, 2005.
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a single currency but also represents a fundamental change in the overall policy–
setting of the participating countries. This new policy regime involves radical
changes in the way public and private agents behave.
EMU poses unique challenges for the management of ﬁscal policy. Most par-
ticularly, policy–makers in EMU have to maintain budgetary discipline, ensure
cyclical stabilization and step up economic eﬃciency, as well as achieving an
appropriate mix between monetary and ﬁscal policy.
To face such challenges and ensure a smooth functioning of EMU, member
states agreed on a set of institutional arrangements and procedures in the Treaty
of Maastricht and in the Stability and Growth Pact, in Amsterdam 1997. The
Treaty laid down the ﬁscal criteria for joining EMU and established the Ex-
cessive Deﬁcit Procedure that restrains budget deﬁcits and promote sustainable
public debt. The Stability and Growth Pact was implemented to clarify the
Treaty provisions and ensure the continuation of ﬁscal discipline in EMU. How-
ever, the recent experience with the enforcement problems in the current SGP
induced a new research agenda in economics. The new ﬁeld was called: European–
Macroeconomics or Fiscal–Monetary interaction in a Monetary Union.
The rationale of EMU’s ﬁscal rules can largely be found in the ’ﬁscal failures’ in
Europe in the last three decades: a lack of ﬁscal discipline resulting in persistent
deﬁcits and mounting stock of debt; pro–cyclical bias in the conduct of ﬁscal
policy which has accentuated business cycle swings, rather than smoothing them
out; and a rising share of the public sector in the economy coupled with steadily
increasing tax burden which has hampered eﬃciency and job creation. Mainly
for correcting these failures, the SGP is important per se. It is also a condition
for a smooth functioning of EMU. Sound public ﬁnances are required to protect
the independence of the European Central Bank.
There are many possibilities for further research in this really new and chal-
lenging area. From a theoretical perspective there are some promising model
extensions as mentioned in the papers in chapter 4 and 5. However, more inter-
disciplinary approaches such as we have taken up here are also necessary to close
the gap between economic evidence and political implications and practicability.
Besides this, there are many further promising extensions for future research.
The main and most important one is a closer empirical evaluation of the results
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and theoretical ﬁndings. Today this line of research is very diﬃcult because of
the too small data sets and time periods since the beginning of monetary union
in 1999.
This thesis analyzes and advances the economics of European ﬁscal policy
and the Stability and Growth Pact as well as ﬁscal–monetary interaction in the
European Monetary Union. Particular attention is devoted to some of the out-
standing challenges policy–makers face in EMU and within the SGP, especially
the interaction of ﬁscal authorities trying to discipline and stabilize the output
and the relationships between ﬁscal and monetary authorities.
All in all, this thesis is on the one hand a ﬁrst attempt and on the other hand
a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate on economic and ﬁscal policy in
Europe. This work will help to improve the understanding of the eﬀects, roles,
impacts and limitations of ﬁscal policy — as sustainable public ﬁnance — in the
European monetary union and all in reference to the ”EUROPEAN STABILITY
AND GROWTH PACT”.
203
Chapter 9
Summary in German
Die vorgelegte Dissertation1 befasst sich mit Interaktionskonﬂikten, welche im
Spannungsfeld zwischen zentralisierter Geld– und dezentralisierter Fiskalpolitik
in der Europa¨ischen Wa¨hrungsunion seit dem Jahr 1999 aufgetreten sind. Dabei
fokussiert sich die Analyse auf den ”Stabilita¨ts– und Wachstumspakt”, der im
Jahre 1997 mit dem Vertrag von Amsterdam implementiert wurde. Diese In-
teraktionsproblematik wird einerseits im Rahmen neuer theoretischer Ansa¨tze
untersucht, und zum anderen werden die theoretischen Ergebnisse zur Bewer-
tung und Entwicklung neuer Reformoptionen fu¨r den bestehenden ”Stabilita¨ts–
und Wachstumspakt” herangezogen.
Die Dissertation bietet somit verschiedene Neuerungen: Erstens wird hier eine
Fragestellung untersucht, welche eher nicht zum Mainstream in der o¨konomischen
Theorie za¨hlt, da die Interaktionsproblematik von Geld–, Fiskalpolitik und Sta-
bilita¨ts– und Wachstumspakt im europa¨ischen Kontext erst im Verlaufe der let-
zten Jahre erkannt und aufgegriﬀen wurde. Zum Zweiten wird der pre-embryonale
1Die Zusammenfassung in deutscher Sprache dient zur Erfu¨llung der Anforderung gema¨ß §6
Abs. 6 der Promotionsordnung fu¨r die Fakulta¨t Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Uni-
versita¨t Bamberg vom 14. Juli 1982, zuletzt gea¨ndert durch die ”Achte Satzung zur A¨nderung
der Promotionsordnung fu¨r die Fakulta¨t Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Universita¨t
Bamberg vom 31. Juli 2002”.
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Modellierungszustand im Rahmen bestehender Interaktionsmodelle erweitert und
die Wirkung des ”Stabilita¨ts– und Wachstumspaktes” explizit analysiert. Drit-
tens werden zwei neue Fragestellungen aufgeworfen und die dazugeho¨rigen the-
oretischen Modelle entwickelt und analysiert. Basierend auf der o¨konomischen
Analyse wird Viertens eine ”neuartige” Reformalternative zur Diskussion gestellt.
Dabei werden die bisherigen Implementierungs– und Anreizprobleme minimiert
und zudem unberu¨cksichtigte trade–oﬀs im institutionellen Gefu¨ge handhabbar
gemacht.
Das Scheitern der pra¨ventiven und disziplinierenden Vorschriften und Artikel
des aktuellen Stabilita¨ts– und Wachstumspaktes entfachte eine heftige Refor-
mdiskussion in Wissenschaft und Politik. Die Entscheidungen des ECOFIN–
Rates sowie die Klage vor dem EuGH sorgten in den letzten Jahren erheblich
fu¨r Wirbel und Furore. Aber auch von allerho¨chster politischer Seite wurde
der Stabilita¨tspakt unter Beschuss genommen. So sagte der ehemalige EU–
Kommissionspra¨sident Romano Prodi: ”Der Pakt ist dumm, wie alle Regeln, die
rigide sind.” Die daraus hervorgehende Reformdebatte wurde zum Teil sehr kon-
trovers gefu¨hrt. Allerdings mangelte es bei dieser Reformdiskussion an fundierten
o¨konomischen Analysen, die vor allem die ”neue” supranationale Interaktion-
sstruktur mit beru¨cksichtigen. Nicht selten wurden Reformvorschla¨ge entwick-
elt, die auf der Grundlage eines rein nationalstaatlichen Institutionengefu¨ges
basierten. Trotz der nun abgeschlossenen Reform des Stabilita¨ts– und Wachs-
tumspaktes am 20. Ma¨rz 2005, sind viele Probleme ungelo¨st oder sogar weiterhin
noch nicht hinreichend von der politischen Klasse erkannt.1 Um so mehr ist es
notwendig, mit der vorliegenden Arbeit die Probleme transparent darzustellen
und Lo¨sungsvorschla¨ge aufzuzeigen, welche die Stabilita¨t der bestehenden und
die bevorstehende Erweiterung der Wa¨hrungsunion hinreichend beru¨cksichtigen.
Die Arbeit ist wie folgt strukturiert: Nach einer kurzen Einleitung in Kapitel
1 wird der europa¨ische Fiskalrahmen, insbesondere der Stabilita¨ts– und Wachs-
tumspakt sowie die notwendigen Bestandteile von eﬃzienten Fiskalregeln in Kapi-
1Wie die Verletzung des Stabilita¨ts– und Wachstumpaktes auch im Jahr 2005 zeigen wird.
Dies hat die EU-Kommission in ihrem Fru¨hjahrsgutachten berechnet.
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tel 2 dargelegt. Kapitel 3 illustriert die wichtigsten Schwachpunkte und identi-
ﬁziert zentrale Zerfallsindikatoren im Rahmen einiger historischer Wa¨hrungsunio-
nen. Die Kapitel 4 und 5, das Herzstu¨ck der Arbeit, bestehen aus einer Pa-
perkollektion mit verschieden Modellansa¨tzen. Die letzten beiden Kapitel wid-
men sich sta¨rker der Reformdiskussion des Stabilita¨ts– und Wachstumspaktes.
In Kapitel 6 werden die wichtigsten Reformoptionen genannt und nach Krite-
rien evaluiert. Im letzten inhaltlichen Kapitel 7 ist eine neuartige Reformalterna-
tive dargestellt, welche zum einen die bestehenden Anreiz- und Implementierung-
sprobleme behebt, zum anderen die neu aufgefundenen Fehlfunktionen beru¨ck-
sichtigt. Zum Schluss entha¨lt Kapitel 8 eine kurze Zusammenfassung und einen
Ausblick der gesamten Arbeit.
Der Aufbau der Arbeit im Einzelnen gliedert sich wie folgt:
Kapitel 1: Die einleitenden Bemerkungen zur Fragestellung und deren Erla¨uter-
ungen dienen der Motivation und illustrieren die Intuition der vorliegenden Ar-
beit. Am Ende des Abschnitts wird die detaillierte Struktur der Arbeit aufgezeigt.
Kapitel 2: Zuallererst werden Kriterien fu¨r eine eﬃziente makroo¨konomische
Regel dargestellt. Daran anschließend werden die institutionellen Strukturen des
europa¨ischen Fiskalrahmens beschrieben und deren trade–oﬀs kritisch analysiert.
Hierbei wird auch auf die bestehende Literatur Bezug genommen.
Kapitel 3: Der erste Teil stellt kurz die wichtigsten historischen Wa¨hrung-
sunionen dar. Dabei fokussiert sich die Betrachtung auf das Interaktionsproblem
von Geld- und Fiskalpolitik. Hierbei werden mittels einer historischen Institu-
tionenanalyse zwei zentrale Ergebnisse erarbeitet: A.) Entscheidend fu¨r den Zer-
fall oder Fortbestand in fru¨heren Wa¨hrungsunionen war immer der politische
Wille. Potentielle Konﬂikte oder Streitigkeiten fu¨hrten in einem supranationalen
Kontext sehr oft zu einer Erosion und spa¨ter zum Zerfall der Wa¨hrungsunio-
nen. B.) In allen historischen Wa¨hrungsunionen (Lateinische–, Skandinavische–
und O¨sterreich–Ungarische Wa¨hrungsunion) waren Streitigkeiten u¨ber die Fis-
kalpolitik das Zu¨nglein an der Waage und der beste Indikator fu¨r deren Zusam-
menbrechen. Daraus ableitend wird deutlich, wie wichtig ein nachhaltiger Fiskal-
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rahmen und Interaktionsinstitutionen fu¨r eine stabile Wa¨hrungsunion sind. Ins-
besondere zeigt sich diese Problematik auch in der Europa¨ischen Wa¨hrungsunion.
Kapitel 4: Die beiden folgenden Kapitel widmen sich der o¨konomischen Analyse
und stellen das Herzstu¨ck der vorliegenden Arbeit dar. Jeder Unterabschnitt
besteht aus separaten Papers (d.h. Kapitel 4 besteht aus vier verschiedenen
Ansa¨tzen). In Abschnitt 4.1 werden die bestehenden Interaktionsmodelle zwis-
chen Geld– und Fiskalpolitik mit dem Stabilita¨ts– und Wachstumspakt (SWP)
erweitert. Dabei zeigt sich, dass es sogar trotz des aktuellen Stabilita¨ts– und
Wachstumspaktes zu einer Akkumulation von Schulden kommen kann. Dieses
Ergebnis besta¨tigt, dass sowohl der Anreizmechanismus als auch der Sanktions-
mechanismus im gegenwa¨rtigen Stabilita¨tspakt ungenu¨gend sind. Des Weiteren
folgt, dass das Ziel einer nachhaltigen Fiskalpolitik mit dem bestehenden SWP nur
unzureichend abgesichert wird. Der Aufsatz in Abschnitt 4.2 schließt an die kon-
troverse Nachhaltigkeitsdiskussion in der EWU an und stellt eine neue Deﬁnition
sowie eine innovative Modellierung von Nachhaltigkeit zur Diskussion. Auf deren
Grundlage wird in Abschnitt 4.3 eine ”Flexibilisierung” der Nachhaltigkeitsdi-
mension modelltheoretisch diskutiert. Es zeigt sich, wenig u¨berraschend, dass eine
Flexibilisierung nur dann ”Wohlfahrtsgewinne” ergibt, wenn mehr als notwendig
konsolidiert wird und damit eine Art ”Hyper-Nachhaltigkeitshaushalt” vorliegt.
Im letzten Abschnitt 4.4 wird dann ein vollsta¨ndig neuer Modellierungsansatz
zur Diskussion gestellt. Dabei steht die Beschreibung der institutionellen In-
teraktionen im Vordergrund, was mit dynamischen Diﬀerentialgleichungen for-
muliert wird. Das Kernresultat ist dabei: Eine unabha¨ngige Geldpolitik im
Spannungsfeld zwischen Fiskalpolitik und Stabilita¨ts– und Wachstumspakt in
einer Wa¨hrungsunion ist enorm limitiert in der Ausu¨bung von Disziplinierungs-
maßnahmen gegenu¨ber expansiver oder nicht nachhaltiger Fiskalpolitik. Zusam-
mengenommen besta¨tigen alle Modellergebnisse die Notwendigkeit eines Fiskalrah-
mens wie des Stabilita¨ts– und Wachstumspakts. Allerdings kann auch gezeigt
werden, dass der bestehende SWP–Mechanismus nicht hinreichend fundiert funk-
tioniert und einige trade–oﬀs im jetzigen Interaktionsgefu¨ge u¨berhaupt keine
Beru¨cksichtigung ﬁnden.
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Kapitel 5: Das folgende Kapitel befasst sich mit der Frage1, warum mo¨glicher-
weise große La¨nder mehr Probleme mit dem Stabilita¨ts– und Wachstumspakt
haben. Der neu entwickelte Modellansatz liefert dazu eine mo¨gliche theoretis-
che Erkla¨rung. Das theoretische Ergebnis ist erstaunlich robust, da einerseits
die aktuellen Entwicklungen in der Europa¨ischen Wa¨hrungsunion, aber auch
in der Afrikanischen Wa¨hrungsunion identisch mit den theoretischen Vorher-
sagen sind, andererseits aber auch erste empirische Studien diesen Zusammen-
hang besta¨tigen. Das in diesem Kapitel entwickelte Modell, schließt eine wichtige
Lu¨cke in der aktuellen Diskussion u¨ber die ”SWP–Su¨nderla¨nder” und erkla¨rt
theoretisch ein ungelo¨stes ’stilisiertes Faktum’2 der empirischen Makroo¨konomie.
Kapitel 6: Die Kapitel 6 und 7 wenden sich der qualitativen Reformdiskussion
zu. Dabei wird in Kapitel 6 zuna¨chst die bestehende Reformdiskussion aufgear-
beitet und systematisch kategorisiert. Des Weiteren werden dann die verschiede-
nen Reformvorschla¨ge anhand eines erweiterten Kriterienkatalogs evaluiert und
die Problemfelder kritisch diskutiert. Dabei wird deutlich, dass es keine gute
und eﬃziente Fiskalregel zugleich geben kann. Vielmehr hat jede Regelform Vor-
und Nachteile bzw. zwischen den Anforderungskriterien liegen ”trade–oﬀs” und
”Konﬂikte”. Damit ist klar, dass keine Interaktionsregel in der Europa¨ischen
Wa¨hrungsunion fu¨r die Fiskalpolitik einen Anspruch auf Allgemeingu¨ltigkeit oder
Optimalita¨t erheben kann.
Kapitel 7: In diesem Kapitel wird nach einer ‘Law and Economics–Analyse’
von Fiskalregeln ein Reformvorschlag fu¨r den nun ”reformierten” Stabilita¨ts- und
Wachstumspakt dargestellt. Die entwickelte Reformoption versucht zum einen
die bestehenden Implementierungsprobleme mit dem Sanktionsmechanismus zu
beheben und zum anderen das Ziel einer nachhaltigen Fiskalpolitik sta¨rker zu
gewichten. Trotz dieser holistisch anmutenden Ziele, kann im Rahmen meiner
Reformoption die Entscheidung weiterhin im ECOFIN–Rat getroﬀen werden und
kommt somit ohne eine Delegation der Kompetenzen aus. Die Idee ist, dass die
1Eine Zusammenfassung in deutscher Sprache der hier dargestellten Forschungsergebnisse
wurden von mir in der Vierteljahrszeitschrift fu¨r Wirtschaftsforschung 2004, Nr. 4 publiziert.
2Negative Beziehung zwischen ’Output Volatilita¨t’ und ’government size’(Fata´s and Mihov,
2001).
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Stimmenanzahl oder Stimmengewichtung von der Fiskalreputation der letzten
Jahre abha¨ngig gemacht wird. Damit erreicht man einen besseren ‘Link’ zwischen
zunehmender Entscheidungsmacht bei nachhaltiger Finanzpolitik und leichterer
Sanktionsimplementierung bei inha¨renten Haushaltsproblemen.
Kapitel 8: Das letzte Kapitel besteht aus einer Zusammenfassung und Schluss-
betrachtung, welche mit einem Ausblick u¨ber die zuku¨nftigen Entwicklungen
dieser noch jungen Forschungsrichtung endet.
Es kann nicht bestritten werden, dass die hier dargestellten Essays zum Teil
recht unterschiedliche Modellansa¨tze zum Inhalt haben. Dennoch hebt sich eine
Gemeinsamkeit in allen Papers hervor: Zum einen ist jeweils der Fiskalrahmen
der ”Europa¨ischen Wa¨hrungsunion”, insbesondere der Stabilita¨ts– und Wach-
stumspakt, im Fokus. Zum anderen wird dieses Gravitationsfeld eher mittels
polit–o¨konomischer Modelle analysiert. Zudem sind die Ergebnisse in den ver-
schiedenen Modellansa¨tzen ziemlich robust. So zeigt sich zum Beispiel der trade–
oﬀ zwischen großen und kleinen La¨ndern konsistent in drei verschiedenen Model-
lansa¨tzen. Des Weiteren besta¨tigen alle Modellanalysen die Notwendigkeit und
Reformbedu¨rftigkeit des aktuellen ”Stabilita¨ts– und Wachstumspaktes”.
Das Versta¨ndnis fu¨r die institutionellen Interaktionen in der Europa¨ischen
Wa¨hrungsunion ist nicht nur eine Herausforderung fu¨r die zuku¨nftige o¨konomis-
che Forschung, sondern auch ein Feld, auf dem theoretisch und empirisch noch
so manche Lu¨cke zu schließen ist. Die vorliegende Arbeit soll einen ersten Schritt
zur Vervollsta¨ndigung und Schließung dieser Lu¨cke aufzeigen, da bisherige Un-
tersuchungen zum Teil theoretische Fehleinscha¨tzungen deduzierten, indem sie
explizit den Stabilita¨ts– und Wachstumspakt nicht beru¨cksichtigten.
Daru¨ber hinaus entfachte die preka¨re Lage einiger nationaler Finanzhaushalte
in den letzten Jahren einerseits eine Diskussion u¨ber die Wirksamkeit nationaler
Fiskalpolitik und andererseits u¨ber das supranationale Korsett des Stabilita¨ts–
und Wachstumspaktes. Jedoch ist diese Symbiose nicht mit der nun geschehenen
vollsta¨ndigen ”Flexibilisierung”, bestehend aus dem Herausrechnen der Kosten
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der Europa¨ischen Politikziele und Internationalen Solidarita¨t, zu lo¨sen. Voraus-
sichtlich wird die nun verabschiedete Reform des Stabilita¨ts– und Wachstumspak-
tes eher der falsche Weg fu¨r eine erweiterte, besta¨ndige und stabile Europa¨ische
Wa¨hrungsunion sein.
Das hier zusammengetragene Material sollte nicht als die letzte Antwort auf
die ero¨rterten Fragen verstanden werden. Vielmehr ist dieser Beitrag eine erste
Approximation bezu¨glich neuer Fragestellungen im europa¨ischen Gravitations-
feld und beleuchtet einige Problemfelder und Lu¨cken in der bestehenden Lit-
eratur. Des Weiteren ist die interdisziplina¨re Verknu¨pfung von o¨konomischer
Theorieanalyse und politik–o¨konomischer Institutionenbetrachtung ein notwendi-
ger und viel versprechender Ansatz fu¨r ein tieferes Versta¨ndnis der bestehenden
und zuku¨nftigen Interaktionsproblematik. Die weitergehenden Verﬂechtungen
und Verwebungen der nationalen mit der europa¨ischen Ebene werden zunehmend
Konﬂikte bringen und damit supranationale Institutionen zu deren Lo¨sung vo-
raussetzen. Die vorliegende Analyse des Stabilita¨ts– und Wachstumspaktes kann
daher auch als eine erste ‘Case–Study’ fu¨r die bevorstehenden und zuku¨nftigen
Interaktionsprobleme in der Europa¨ischen Wirtschafts– und Wa¨hrungsunion ver-
standen werden.
210
Appendix A
Appendix A
A.1 Mathematical Appendix: Section 4.1
A.1.1 Fiscal-Monetary Interaction Model: Technical Ap-
pendix
Derivation of normalized output equation
Output of a representative ﬁrm in country i (i = 1, .., n) is given by Cobb-Douglas
technology (Dixit/Lambertini 2002, Hefeker 2002, Gros and Hefekter (2002), Gros and
Hefekter (2003)):
Yi = K
1−η
i ∗ Lηi eξ, 0 < η < 1 (A.1.1)
where Li is labor and ξ represents a common shock with E[ξ] = 0.1 The capital
1i.e. because of homogeneous assumption a idiosyncratic shock is useless.
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stock K is constant and normalized to one. Firms maximize their proﬁts:
Π = Pt ∗ Lηi,teξ(1− τi,t)−Wi,tLi,t, (A.1.2)
where τi,t is output tax, Pt is price level and Wt is wage rate. Both variables (Pt,Wt)
are assumed uniform across the union.
Determine the labor demand, the competitive ﬁrm takes price and wage as given.
So it results:
∂Π
∂Li,t
= 0⇔ Pt ∗ η ∗ Lη−1i,t eξ(1− τi,t)−Wi,t = 0. (A.1.3)
The optimal labor demand is:
L∗i,t =
[
Pt ∗ (1− τi,t) ∗ η
Wt
]( 1
1−η )
∗ e ξ1−η . (A.1.4)
Substituting this result into Yt = L
η
i,te
ξ and log-linearizing it yields:
lnYi,t =
η
1− η︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:z
[
lnPt + ln(1− τi,t) + lnη + (ξ)− lnWt
]
+
ξ
1− η︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:µ
. (A.1.5)
For convenience, I approximate ln(1−τ) ≈ −τ . Because of Trade-union Stackelberg
leadership ln(W ) is equivalent with r∗t + ln(P et ). This is the claim of the trade union.
Then it is:
lnYi,t = z[ln(Pt) + (−lnPt−1 + lnPt+1)− (r∗t + ln(P et ))− τi,t + ln(η)] + µ
⇐⇒ lnYi,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:yˆi,t
= z
[
ln(
Pt
Pt−1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:πt
− ln( P
e
t
Pt−1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:πet
−τi,t − r∗t + ln(η)
]
+ µ.
Finally it results:
yˆi,t = z ∗ [πt − πet − r∗t − τi,t + ln(η)] + µ. (A.1.6)
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Solution of inﬁnite-horizon discretionary model
Now we take the present discounted value of (A.1.11) for all t to yield the period-t
intertemporal government ﬁnancing requirement and deﬁne the SGP-function. This
results in:
Ft +
T∑
ξ=t
(1+ρ)−(ξ−t)
µξ
z
=
T∑
ξ=t
(1+ρ)−(ξ−t)
[
(y¯t−yt)1
z
+(x¯t−xi,t)+ (πt−πet )
]
(A.1.1)
where
Ft ≡ (1 + ρ)dt−1 + Gt (A.1.2)
Gt ≡
T∑
ξ=t
(1 + ρ)−(ξ−t)[Kξ + 1SGPξ ] (A.1.3)
Here Ft stands for the deterministic component of the intertemporal government
ﬁnancing requirement.
Optimization of monetary and ﬁscal policy
The ECB selects πt so as to minimize (π∗ = 0):
LMt =
1
2
[
απ,Mπ
2
t + [z(πt − πet − τt) − µt − y¯t]2
]
+ βEt[LMt+1] (A.1.4)
Because Et[LMt+1] not depend on πt, the ECB ﬁrst-order condition is:
απ,Mπt + z[z(πt − πet − τt)− µt − y¯t] = 0 (A.1.5)
The explicit loss function of the government is deﬁned as above through
LFt =
1
2
∞∑
ξ=t
βξ−tF Et
[
αππ
2
ξ + (yi,ξ − y¯i,ξ)2 + αx(xi,ξ − x¯xi)2
]
(A.1.6)
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The government select τt and dt so as to minimize the loss function above. Again
the ﬁrst-order conditions and the budget constraints are (1SGP = 1S):
∂LFt
∂τt
=0⇐⇒ −z[z(πt − πet − τt)− µt − y¯t] + αx(xt − x¯t) = 0
(A.1.7)
∂LFt
∂dt
=0⇐⇒ αx(x¯t − xt) = β
∂LFt+1
∂dt
(A.1.8)
xt + (1 + ρ)dt−1 + 1S =τt + dt (A.1.9)
and the transversality condition that:
lim
n−→∞
(
1
1 + ρ
)ξ−t
dξ+1 = 0 (A.1.10)
and the complete budget constraints is:
Kt + (1 + ρ)dt−1 + 1S = (τ +
y¯t
z
) + dt + (x¯t − xt) (A.1.11)
The complete system of equations is now used to solve the variables. First we solve
for given debt policy and thereafter we solve for the debt policy.
Derivation of outcomes for given debt policies
Take the expectations form (A.1.7; A.1.8; A.1.11) yields:
απ,Mπ
e
t − z2[τ et −
y¯t
z
] = 0 (A.1.12)
z2[τ et −
y¯t
z
] + αx(xet − x¯t) = 0 (A.1.13)
Kt + (1 + ρ)dt−1 + 1S = (τ e +
y¯t
z
) + det + (x¯t − xet ) (A.1.14)
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The solution of the expectation system are the following equations:
πet =
1/απ,M
P
[Kt + (1 + ρ)dt−1 − det + 1S ] (A.1.15)
(x¯t − xet ) =
1/αx
P
[Kt + (1 + ρ)dt−1 − det + 1S ] (A.1.16)
(y¯t − yet ) =
1/z
P
[Kt + (1 + ρ)dt−1 − det + 1S ] (A.1.17)
with P := 1
z2
+ 1αx . Now calculate the diﬀerence system (g
d = g− ge) for the ﬁrst-order
conditions. The results are:
απ,Mπ
d
t + z[z(π
d
t − τdt )− µt] = 0 (A.1.18)
−z2[πdt − τdt −
µt
z
] + αxxdt = 0 (A.1.19)
0 = τd + ddt − xdt (A.1.20)
The analoge solution procedure as above give me:
πdt = −
(
1/απ,M
P ∗M
)
(ddt −
µt
z
) (A.1.21)
xdt =
(
1/αx
P ∗M
)
(ddt −
µt
z
) (A.1.22)
ydt =
(
1/z
P ∗M
)
(ddt −
µt
z
) (A.1.23)
(A.1.24)
with P ∗M :=
1
αx
+ 1
z2
+ 1απ,M . The addition of both components solve the system for a
given debt policy. After some calculation it results:
πt =
1/απ,M
P
[Kt + (1 + ρ)dt−1 − det + 1S ] +
(
1/απ,M
P ∗M
)
(
µt
z
− ddt ) (A.1.25)
(x¯t − xt) = 1/αx
P
[Kt + (1 + ρ)dt−1 − det + 1S ] +
(
1/αx
P ∗M
)
(
µt
z
− ddt ) (A.1.26)
(y¯t − yt) = 1/z
P
[Kt + (1 + ρ)dt−1 − det + 1S ] +
(
1/z
P ∗M
)
(
µt
z
− ddt ) (A.1.27)
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Solution of the whole model for public debt
To evaluate
∂LFt+1
∂dt
we forward (A.1.25-27) by one period and substitute it in the following
equation:
1
2
Et
[
αππ
2
t+1 + (yt+1 − y¯t+1)2 + αx(xt+1 − x¯t+1)2
]
(A.1.28)
The derivation with respect to dt of the above expression is:
Et
[
αππt+1(1 + ρ)
1/απ,M
P
+ (y¯t+1 − yt+1)(1 + ρ)1/z
P
+ αx(x¯t+1 − xt+1)(1 + ρ)1/αx
P
]
(A.1.29)
combine with (B.7) and deﬁne β∗ := β(1 + ρ) is
αx(x¯t − xt) = β∗Et
[
πt+1
απ/απ,M
P
+ (y¯t+1 − yt+1)1/z
P
+ (x¯t+1 − xt+1) 1
P
]
(A.1.30)
now combine this with (A.1.25-A.1.27) and with QM := απα2π,M
+ 1
z2
+ 1αx yields:
[Kt + (1 + ρ)dt−1 − det + 1S ] +
(
P
P ∗M
)
(
µt
z
− ddt ) = β∗
QM
P
[Kt+1 + (1 + ρ)dt − det+1 + 1S ]
(A.1.31)
The solution of this equation is calculated in two steps. First take the expectations
Et−1 from the equation above. The is then
[Kt + (1 + ρ)dt−1 − Et−1[dt] + 1S ] = β∗QM
P
[Kt+1 + (1 + ρ)dt − det+1 + 1S ] (A.1.32)
and solve that term to Et−1[dt] is:
Et−1[dt] =
[Kt + (1 + ρ)dt−1 + 1S ]− β∗QMP [Kt+1 − Et−1[dt+1] + 1S ]
1 + β∗(1 + ρ)QMP
(A.1.33)
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In the second step we calculate the diﬀerence (A.1.31)-(A.1.32), hence
P
P ∗M
(
µt
z
− ddt ) = β∗
QM
P
(Et−1[dt+1]− Et[dt+1]) + β∗(1 + ρ)QM
P
ddt (A.1.34)
isolating ddt is
ddt =
[
1
1 + β∗(1 + ρ)P
∗
M
P
QM
P
]
µt
z
+
[
β∗ P
∗
M
P
QM
P
1 + β∗(1 + ρ)P
∗
M
P
QM
P
]
(Et−1[dt+1]− Et[dt+1])
(A.1.35)
To ﬁnd an explicit solution for ddt , we use (A.1.33) forwarded by ξ periods. After
substraction from the expectation a period before, we obtain:
Et[dt+ξ ]−Et−1[dt+ξ] =
(1 + ρ)(Et[dt+ξ−1]−Et−1[dt+ξ−1]) + β ∗ QMP (Et[dt+ξ+1]− Et−1t[dt+ξ+1])
1 + β∗(1 + ρ)QMP
(A.1.36)
The solution for this is found with the following trick. Deﬁne Et[dt+ξ+1]−Et−1[dt+ξ+1] =
Et[dt+ξ ] − Et−1[dt+ξ ], ∀ξ ≥ 1. Substitute this in the equation above and write the
result in respect to  yields:
β∗
QM
P

2 − [1 + β∗(1 + ρ)QM
P
]+ (1 + ρ) = 0 (A.1.37)
to solve this quadratic equation yields the to solutions:  = (1+ ρ) which is impossible
because of the transversality condition and ∗ = 1
β∗QM
P
. Using that solution in the
equation above, we can it rewrite as,
Et[dt+1]− Et−1[dt+1] = 1
β∗QMP
ddt (A.1.38)
Setting this result in (A.1.35) yields ﬁnally the result for ddt as:
ddt =
[
1
1 + P ∗P [β
∗(1 + ρ)QMP − 1]
]
µt
z
(A.1.39)
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Derivation of an explicit solution for Et−1[dt]
From (A.1.17) and forwarded by ξ the following both equations results,
(yt+ξ − Et−1yt+ξ) = 1/z
P
[Kt+ξ + (1 + ρ)Et−1dt+ξ−1 − Et−1dt+ξ + 1St+ξ]
(A.1.40)
(yt+ξ+1 − Et−1yt+ξ + 1) = 1/z
P
[Kt+ξ+1 + (1 + ρ)Et−1dt+ξ − Et−1dt+ξ+1 + 1St+ξ+1]
(A.1.41)
See that with the use of (A.1.31) forwarded for Et−1dt+ξ are
[Kt+ξ + (1 + ρ)Et−1dt+ξ−1 − Et−1dt+ξ + 1St+ξ ]
= β∗QMP
[
(1+ρ)[Kt+ξ+(1+ρ)Et−1dt+ξ−1+1St+ξ]+[Kt+ξ+1−Et−1dt+ξ+1+1St+ξ+1]
1+β∗(1+ρ)QM
P
]
similar is
Kt+ξ+1 + (1 + ρ)Et−1dt+ξ − Et−1dt+ξ+1 + 1St+ξ+1]
=
[
(1+ρ)[Kt+ξ+(1+ρ)Et−1dt+ξ−1+1St+ξ]+[Kt+ξ+1−Et−1dt+ξ+1+1St+ξ+1]
1+β∗(1+ρ)QM
P
]
Hence it result the following relationship for ’y’:
(yt+ξ+1 − Et−1yt+ξ + 1) = 1
β∗QMP
(yt+ξ − Et−1yt+ξ) (A.1.42)
and
(xt+ξ+1 − Et−1xt+ξ + 1) = 1
β∗QMP
(xt+ξ − Et−1xt+ξ) (A.1.43)
Combining now these two results with the intertemporal budget requirement yields:
Ft =
∞∑
ξ=0
(1 + ρ)−(ξ)
[
(y¯t+ξ − Et−1yt+ξ)1
z
+ (x¯t+ξ − Et−1xt+ξ)] (A.1.44)
Ft =
∞∑
ξ=0
(
1
β∗(1 + ρ)QMP
)(ξ)[
(y¯t − Et−1yt)1
z
+ (x¯t − Et−1xt)
]
(A.1.45)
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with an explicit deﬁnition of the sum the last equation is
[
(y¯t − Et−1yt)1
z
+ (x¯t − Et−1xt)
]
=
[
β∗(1 + ρ)QMP − 1
β∗(1 + ρ)QMP
]
Ft (A.1.46)
Hence,
(y¯t − Et−1yt)1
z
=
1/z2
P
[
β∗(1 + ρ)QMP − 1
β∗(1 + ρ)QMP
]
Ft (A.1.47)
(g¯t − Et−1gt)1
z
=
1/αx
P
[
β∗(1 + ρ)QMP − 1
β∗(1 + ρ)QMP
]
Ft (A.1.48)
with ζ1 :=
[
β∗(1+ρ)QM
P
−1
β∗(1+ρ)QM
P
]
Ft deﬁned.
Computation of Et−1dt. From (A.1.2) with (A.1.46) is:
Kt + (1 + ρ)dt−1 − Et−1d− t + 1S = ζ1[(1 + ρ)dt−1 + Gt] (A.1.49)
isolating Et−1dt yields:
Et−1dt =
1
β∗(QM/P )
dt−1 + Kt + 1St − ζ1
∞∑
ξ=t
(1 + ρ)−(ξ−t)(Kξ + 1Sξ ) (A.1.50)
=
1
β∗(QM/P )
dt−1 +
(Gt −Gt+1) + [1− β∗(QM/P )]Gt+1
β∗(1 + ρ)(QM/P )
(A.1.51)
Final outcomes
πt =
[
1/απ,M
P
]
ζ1Ft +
[
1/απ,M
P ∗M
]
ζ2
(
µt
z
)
(A.1.52)
y¯t − yt =
[
1/z
P
]
ζ1Ft +
[
1/z
P ∗M
]
ζ2
(
µt
z
)
(A.1.53)
x¯t − xt =
[
1/αx
P
]
ζ1Ft +
[
1/αx
P ∗M
]
ζ2
(
µt
z
)
(A.1.54)
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and
dt =
1
β∗QMP
dt−1 +
(Gt −Gt+1) + [1− β∗(QM/P )]Gt+1
β∗(1 + ρ)(QM/P )
+ ζ3
(
µ
z
)
(A.1.55)
with
ζ2 :=
(P
∗
M
P )[β
∗(1 + ρ)QMP − 1]
1 + (P
∗
M
P )[β
∗(1 + ρ)QMP − 1]
and
ζ3 :=
1
(P
∗
M
P )[β
∗(1 + ρ)QMP − 1]
. (A.1.56)
Explicit debt optimization in the two-period model
In this appendix we present the solution of a two period model of monetary-ﬁscal
interaction with the SGP. The assumptions and deﬁnitions are given.
Backward solution from t = 2 is:
∂LM
∂π2
= 0⇐⇒ απ,Mπ2 + z2[π2 − πe2 − τi,2 −
µ
z
− y2
z
] = 0 (A.1.1)
and
∂LF
∂τ2
= 0⇐⇒−z2[π2 − πe2 − τi,2 −
µ
z
− y2
z
] + αx,s(xi,2 − x¯2) = 0 (A.1.2)
and
K¯2 +(1+ ρ)di,1 +φL(di,1− D¯) = (τi,2+ y¯2
z
)+κπ2 +
φR
n− 1
n∑
j=1,i=j
(dj,1− D¯)+ (x¯2−xi,2)
(A.1.3)
Now take the expectations form the three equation above. This result in:
απ,Mπ
e
2 + z
2[−τ ei,2 −
y2
z
] = 0 (A.1.4)
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−z2[−τ ei,2 −
y2
z
] + αx,s(xei,2 − x¯2) = 0 (A.1.5)
The solution of equation system above is:
κπe2 =
κ/απ,M
S
[K¯2 + (1 + ρ)di,1 + φL(di,1 − D¯)− φ
R
n− 1
∑
(dj,1 − D¯)] (A.1.7)
with S := 1αx,s +
1
z2 +
κ
απ,M
and
(x¯2 − xei,2) =
1/αx,s
S
[K¯2 + (1 + ρ)di,1 + φL(di,1 − D¯)− φ
R
n− 1
∑
(dj,1 − D¯)] (A.1.8)
and
( ¯yi,2 − yi,2) = 1/z
S
[K¯2 + (1 + ρ)di,1 + φL(di,1 − D¯)− φ
R
n− 1
∑
(dj,1 − D¯)]. (A.1.9)
Set this results in the loss function we ﬁnd the second-period deterministic function
for the monetary and ﬁscal authority:
LMD2 =
S∗
2S2
[
K¯2 + (1 + ρ)di,1 + φL(di,1 − D¯)− φ
R
n− 1
∑
(dj,1 − D¯)
]2
(A.1.10)
LFD2 =
P
2S2
[
K¯2 + (1 + ρ)di,1 + φL(di,1 − D¯)− φ
R
n− 1
∑
(dj,1 − D¯)
]2
(A.1.11)
with S∗ := 1απ,M +
1
z2
and P := απ,Sαπ,M +
1
z2
+ 1αx,s .
The solution of the system is derived in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we calculate the
deterministic components of the policy instruments (i.e the expected values). While in
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a second step, we calculate the stochastic components of the policy instruments.The
next step is to solve the diﬀerences of the equation system. This yields the following
equations:
απ,Mπ
d
2 + z
2[πd2 − τd2 −
µ2
z
] = 0 (A.1.12)
−z2[πd2 − τdi,2 −
µ2
z
] + αx,sxdi,2 = 0 (A.1.13)
τdi,2 + κπ
d
2 − xdi,2 = 0 (A.1.14)
The solution of that system yields:
πd2 =
1/απ,M
S + 1απ,M
(
µ2
z
)
(A.1.15)
xdi,2 = −
1/αx,s
(S + 1απ,M )
(
µ2
z
)
(A.1.16)
ydi,2 = −
1/z
(S + 1απ,M )
(
µ2
z
)
(A.1.17)
Now substitute the solution values in the loss function. Thus results are:
LMS2 =
S∗
2(S + 1απ,M )
(
σ2µ2
z2
)
(A.1.18)
LFS2 =
S∗ + 1αx,s
2(S + 1απ,M )
(
σ2µ2
z2
)
(A.1.19)
The next step is now to solve the model in period one. The loss functions in period
one are:
LM1 =
1
2
[
απ,Mπ
2
1 + [z(π1 − πe1 − τ1)− µ− y¯1]2
]
+ λs
(
LMD2 + L
MS
2
)
(A.1.20)
LF1 =
1
2
[
απ,Mπ
2
1 + [z(π1 − πe1 − τ1)− µ− y¯1]2 + αx,s(x1 − x¯1)2
]
+ λs
(
LFD2 + L
FS
2
)
(A.1.21)
Optimize these two functions results in:
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∂LM1
∂π1
= 0⇐⇒απ,Mπ1 + z2[π1 − πe1 − τ1 −
µ
z
− y¯1
z
] = 0 (A.1.22)
∂LF1
∂τi,1
= 0⇐⇒− z2[π1 − πe1 − τ1 −
µ
z
− y¯1
z
] + αx,s(x1 − x¯1) = 0 (A.1.23)
∂LF1
∂di,1
= 0⇐⇒αx,s(x¯1 − x1) = λFU [(1 + ρ) + φL] (A.1.24)(
K¯2 + (1 + ρ)di,1 + φL(di,1 − D¯)− φ
R
n− 1
∑
(dj,1 − D¯)
)
(A.1.25)
with λFU := λF PS2 and the budget constraint in period one
K¯1 = (τi,1 +
y¯1
z
) + κπ1 + di,1 + (x¯1 − xi,1) + (φL − φR)D¯ (A.1.26)
The same procedure as in period one solve that system. In Step 1 we take the
expectations from the four equations above and solve it to the key variables. This is:
απ,Mπ
e
1 + z
e[−τ e1 −
y¯1
z
] = 0 (A.1.27)
−ze[−τ e1 −
y¯1
z
] + αx,s(xe1 − x¯1) = 0 (A.1.28)
αx,s(x¯1 − xe1) = λFU [(1 + ρ) + φL]∗ (A.1.29)
∗
(
K¯2 + (1 + ρ)dei,1 + φ
L(dei,1 − D¯)−
φR
n− 1
∑
(dj,1 − D¯)
)
(A.1.30)
K¯1 = (τ ei,1 +
y¯1
z
) + κπe1 + d
e
i,1 + (x¯1 − xei,1) + (φL − φR)D¯
(A.1.31)
The solution is
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κπe =
κ/απ,M
S
[K¯1 − (φL − φR)D¯ − dei,1] (A.1.32)
(x¯1 − xe1) =
1/αx,s
S
[K¯1 − (φL − φR)D¯ − dei,1] (A.1.33)
(ye1 − y¯1) = −
1/z
S
[K¯1 − (φL − φR)D¯ − dei,1] (A.1.34)
dei,1 =
[
1
1 + u(1 + ρ + φL)
]
(K¯1 − uK¯2 − (1− u)(φL − φR)D¯ + u φ
R
n− 1
∑
(dj,1))
(A.1.35)
with u := λPS . Now take the diﬀerence of the system and solve it. That yields
απ,Mπ
d
1 + z
2[πd1 − τd1 −
µ1
z
] = 0 (A.1.36)
αx,sx
d
1 − z2[πd1 − τd1 −
µ1
z
] = 0 (A.1.37)
−αx,sxd1 = λFU [1 + ρ + φL]2ddi,1 (A.1.38)
τdi,1 + κπ
d
1 + d
d
i,1 − xd1 = 0 (A.1.39)
The solution is:
πd1 =
1/απ,M
1
απ,M
− S( 1
u(1+ρ+φL)
)
(
µ1
z
)
(A.1.40)
xd1 =
1/αx,s
1
απ,M
− S( 1
u(1+ρ+φL)
)
(
µ1
z
)
(A.1.41)
From (A.1.37) results τd1 and from (A.1.38) d
d
1. The combination with the expec-
tations are the results in period 2.
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Proofs
Result (i)
Part (a) follows directly from,
∂di,1
∂λ∗
=
−[1 + ρ][K¯2](1 + λ∗[1 + ρ]2)− (K¯1 − λ∗[1 + ρ]
[
K¯2 − D¯
]
)[1 + ρ]2
[1 + λ∗[1 + ρ + φL]2]2
< 0.
(A.1.42)
with the assumption that di,1 > 0. Part (c) results in,
∂di,1
∂ρ
=
−λ∗[K¯2](1 + λ∗[1 + ρ]2)− (K¯1 − λ∗[1 + ρ]
[
K¯2 − D¯
]
)2λ∗[1 + ρ]
[1 + λ∗[1 + ρ + φL]2]2
< 0.
(A.1.43)
Proof of Proposition 3
If di = dj , then
di,1
[
1+λ∗[1+ρ+φL][1+ρ+(φL−φR)]
]
= K¯1−(φL−φR)−λ∗[1+ρ+φL][ ¯K2 − (φL − φR)D¯](A.1.44)
For derivation of the results in part (a) and (b) in Proposition 3 to φL and φR notice
that only the numerator is important for the sign. Thus a use the following mark ∝ to
indicate that the sign of both sides are identical.
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Part (a):
∂di,1
∂φL
∝ (1− [λ∗(K¯2 − (φL − φR)D¯) + λ∗[1 + ρ + φL](−D¯)])[[1 + λ∗[1 + ρ + φL]2]2]−
(A.1.45)
[K¯1 − (φL − φR)− λ∗[1 + ρ + φL][ ¯K2 − (φL − φR)D¯]][λ∗[1 + ρ + (φL − φR)] + λ∗[1 + ρ + φL]] < 0
(A.1.46)
with φL = φ
R
2 and d1 > 0.
Part (b):
∂di,1
∂φR
∝
[
1 + λ∗[1 + ρ + φL][1 + ρ + (φL − φR)]
]
+ (A.1.47)
[K¯1 − (φL − φR)− λ∗[1 + ρ + φL][ ¯K2 − (φL − φR)D¯]]λ∗[1 + ρ + φL] > 0
(A.1.48)
Part (c):
∂di,1
∂D¯
= − λ
∗[1 + ρ + φL](φR − φL)
1 + λ∗[1 + ρ + φL][1 + ρ + (φL − φR)]
⎛
⎜⎝ >
≤
⎞
⎟⎠ 0, if
⎛
⎜⎝ φL > φR
φR > φL
⎞
⎟⎠
(A.1.49)
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A.2 Mathematical Appendix for 4.2 and 4.3
A.2.1 Sustainability Model within the SGP: Technical Ap-
pendix
Deﬁnition of Sustainability: Model Approach
Now we are ready to deﬁne the problem formally:
max
u
∫ ∞
0
ln[u(t)]e−δtdt (A.2.1)
s.t. d˙ = r ∗ d
(
1− d
k
)
−u r > 0, k > 0 (A.2.2)
dt=0 = d0 (A.2.3)
The parameter ’r’ can interpreted as debt growth, ’k’ represent the whole ﬁnancial
budget revenues (on GDP) and ’δ’ is a discount rate. Additionally we assume that r >
δ > 0 which is normal for that problems. The functional form of the budget constraint
(A.2.2) is the typical modelling approach in resource economics.1 Moreover we transfer
the ’Maximum Sustainable Yield’ (MSY) concept here for debt d∗ < dMSY = k/2.
To solve this problem we use a ’Hamilton function’. From optimal control theory —
a ﬁrst-order necessary condition — is known as the maximum principle or pontryagin
principle. Denoted by H, the Hamiltonian is deﬁned as
H˜ = ln[u] + λ(t)
[
rd
(
1− d
k
)
−u
]
(A.2.4)
1F (d) = rd
(
1− dk
)
.
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For the problem 4.17 and with the Hamiltonian deﬁned (H˜ = Hert) in (A.2.4) the
maximum principle conditions are
∂H˜
∂u
=
1
u
− λ = 0 (A.2.5)
λ˙− δλ = −∂H˜
∂d
= −λr
[
1− 2d
k
]
(A.2.6)
d˙ =
∂H˜
∂λ
= rd
(
1− d
k
)
− u (A.2.7)
First, after the derivation of the ﬁrst-order condition equation (A.2.5) yields:
µ˙ = − 1
u2
u˙ (A.2.8)
this in connection with the second ﬁrst-order condition is:
µ˙ = δµ− µr
[
1− 2d
k
]
= − 1
u2
u˙ (A.2.9)
Isolation u˙ yields the condition below:
d˙ = rd
(
1− d
k
)
− u (A.2.10)
u˙ = −u
(
δ − r
[
1− 2d
k
])
(A.2.11)
The solution of this diﬀerential equation system result in the optimal debt path d∗
and the optimal consolidation path u∗. The results are (u˙ = d˙ = 0):
d∗ =
k(r − δ)
2r
(A.2.12)
u∗ =
k
2
(r2 − δ2) (A.2.13)
228
A.2 Mathematical Appendix for 4.2 and 4.3
Because of the transversality condition (TC) limt→∞ λ(t) → 0; we can proof that
the path are stable with an unique equilibrium. Because: H˜ = Hert ⇒ H = e−rtln(u)+
λ[rd(1 − dk )− u]→ 0, because of the TC.
Derivation of the CCB function
The general CCB function is
UCCB = λ
(
−π
2
2φ
)
+(1−λ) 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
1−(1+πe−π)b1i−ψ(d2i−d¯2i)+ ψ
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j
(d2j−d¯2j)
]
(A.2.1)
The following transformation yields,
UCCB = (1−λ)
(
−π2
2φ
(1−λ)
λ
)
+ 1n
∑n
i=1
[
1−(1+πe−π)b1i−ψ(d2i−d¯2i)+ ψn−1
∑n
j=1,j(d2j−
d¯2j)
]
(A.2.2)
Making the sum explicit and with α := φ(1−λ)λ ≥ 0 result in:
UCCB = (1−λ)
(
−π
2
2α
)
+
[
1−(1+πe−π)b˜1i
]
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
−ψ(d2i−d¯2i)+ ψ
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j
(d2j−d¯2j)
]
(A.2.3)
and then
UCCB = (1− λ)
(
−π
2
2α
)
+
[
1− (1 + πe − π)b˜1i
]
+
([
−ψ(da2i − d¯a2i)−
ψ
n− 1(d
a
2i − d¯a2i)
]
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
ψ
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j
(d2j − d¯2j)
])
(A.2.4)
and this yield
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UCCB = (1− λ)
(
−π
2
2α
)
+
[
1− (1 + πe − π)b˜1i
]
+
([
− nψ
n− 1(d
a
2i − d¯a2i)
]
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
nψ
n− 1(d
a
2j − d¯a2j)
])
(A.2.5)
Now it is trivial to see that the last term is zero and only the ﬁrst term stay. So it
result the ﬁnal form:
UCCB = − π22α + 1− (1 + πe − π)b˜1, α := (1−λ)φλ ≥ 0.(A.2.6)
Solution of the Nash equilibrium
Applying the speciﬁcations in the text, we get,
(ei − k2 ) = [1 + ψ(1− δ)](ξ − (ξ − 1)E[f1i]), ∀i (A.2.1)
and
(1− p)ξ − (ξ − 1)E[fi,t] = −p(ξ − 1)E[f2,t] + µ︸︷︷︸
:= α
2
φn(1−ψ)
E[b˜], ∀i (A.2.2)
We consider a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which each government’s strategy will
be a function of i. In general is the solution also a function of its estimates about
the other countries shocks and preferences, and estimates about other governments
estimates about j∀j. But to solve this n-player game in that general fashion would
become intractable. So we following also the approach from Beetsma and Jensen (2003)
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that the governments strategy depends only on the realization of i, but not on the other
shocks.
Therefore, we assume the following set of equilibrium strategies:
b1i = B −Bi (A.2.3)
ei = D −Di. (A.2.4)
The equal set for the cross-country average debt and consolidation eﬀort will be
given by,
b˜1 = B −B˜i (A.2.5)
e˜i = D −D˜i. (A.2.6)
After subside the four strategies in the equation (4.40), the realizations of public
consumption are:
f1i = 1 + ˜ + (D −Di) + 2(D −D˜i + (B −B˜i)
+
(
n
n− 1ψ − 1
)[
[Bi −B˜] + [Di −D˜]
]
+
(
n
n− 1ψδ − 1
)[
(˜− i) + [Di −D˜]
]
(A.2.7)
Similar for f2i yields:
f2i = 1− (B −B˜−
(
1− n
n− 1ψ
)
(B˜−Bi)
(A.2.8)
In the next step we calculate the expectations of (A.2.7) and (A.2.8). We need
these expressions to solve the strategies above for its coeﬃcients. From (A.2.7) follows:
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E[f1i] = 1 +
1− 2D −B
n
i + D −Di + 2D +
(
n
n− 1ψ − 1
)([
n− 1
n
]
Bi+[
n− 1
n
]
Di +
(
n
n− 1ψδ − 1
)([
n− 1
n
]
Di −
[
n− 1
n
]
i
)
(A.2.9)
and thus after some calculation
E[f1i] = 1 + 3D + B + [(1 − ψδ) − (1 − ψ)B − [2 − ψ(1 + δ)D]i. (A.2.10)
Similarly, from equation (A.2.8) we calculate:
E[f2i] = 1 − B + n− 1
n 
i +
1
n
Bi −
(
n
n− 1ψ − 1
)(
n− 1
n
Bi +
n− 1
n
Di
)
(A.2.11)
and after some calculation,
E[f2i] = 1−B + (1− ψ)Bi (A.2.12)
Finally, we need the government i’s expectation of average debt. From (A.2.8) we
ﬁnd:
E[b˜] = B −B 1
n
i. (A.2.13)
Explicit ﬁrst-order conditions
Now insert the expressions for E[f1i], E[f2i] and E[b˜1] into the ﬁrst-order conditions
(A.2.1) and (A.2.2). This yields:
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(1− p)ξ − (ξ − 1)
(
1 + 3D + B + ([(1 − ψδ) − (1− ψ)B − [2− ψ(1 + δ)D]i
)
=
= −p(ξ − 1)
(
1−B + (1− ψ)B
)
+ µ(B −B 1
n
i) (A.2.14)
and
D −Di − k2 = ξ[1 + ψ(1− δ)] − [1 + ψ(1 − δ)](ξ − 1)∗
∗
(
1 + 3D + B + [(1− ψδ) − (1− ψ)B − [2− ψ(1 + δ)D]i
)
(A.2.15)
Step 1: Solution for shock coeﬃcients
When (A.2.14) and (A.2.15) must hold of all values i, we have that the following must
hold:
−(ξ − 1)
(
(1− ψδ) − (1− ψ)B − [2− ψ(1 + δ)]D
)
= −p(ξ − 1)[(1 − ψ)B − µB 1
n
(A.2.16)
D = [1 + ψ(1 − δ)](ξ − 1)
(
1− ψδ) − (1− ψ)B − [2− ψ(1 + δ)]D
)
(A.2.17)
Now change (A.2.17) so that:
D
(ξ − 1)(1 + ψ − ψδ) =
(
1− ψδ) − (1− ψ)B − [2− ψ(1 + δ)]D
)
(A.2.18)
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From substitution (A.2.18) in (A.2.15) results:
− D
(1 + ψ − ψδ) = B[−p(ξ − 1)(1 − ψ)−
µ
n
(A.2.19)
D = B(1 + ψ − ψδ)[p(ξ − 1)(1 − ψ) + µ
n
] (A.2.20)
Notice that up to now we deﬁne Θ := (1 + ψ − ψδ)[p(ξ − 1)(1 − ψ) + µn ]. This is
only to simplify the following calculation. Next we substitute (A.2.20) back in (A.2.16).
That yields,
−(ξ−1)(1−ψδ)+(ξ−1)(1−ψ)B +(ξ−1)[2−ψ(1+δ)]ΘB = −B[p(ξ−1)(1−ψ)+ µ
n
],
(A.2.21)
isolating this term to B is:
B =
(ξ − 1)(1− ψδ)
(ξ − 1)(1− ψ) + (ξ − 1)[2− ψ(1 + δ)]Θ + [p(ξ − 1)(1 − ψ) + µn ]
> 0. (A.2.22)
Combined with (A.2.20), we recover the expression for D:
D =
(ξ − 1)(1− ψδ) ∗ (1 + ψ − ψδ)[p(ξ − 1)(1− ψ) + µn ]
(ξ − 1)(1 − ψ) + (ξ − 1)[2− ψ(1 + δ)]Θ + [p(ξ − 1)(1 − ψ) + µn ]
> 0. (A.2.23)
Step 2: Solution for average consolidation and debt
Now with B and D given by (A.2.22) and (A.2.23), respectively, (A.2.15) and (A.2.17)
reduce to
(1− p)ξ − (ξ − 1)
(
1 + 3D + B
)
= −p(ξ − 1)(1 −B) + µB (A.2.24)
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and
D − k
2
= ξ[1 + ψ(1 − δ)] − [1 + ψ(1− δ)](ξ − 1) ∗
(
1 + 3D + B
)
(A.2.25)
From this two conditions above we compute the solution for B and D. Thus it
follows from (A.2.24),
D
[
1+3(ξ− 1)[1+ψ−ψδ]
]
=
k
2
+ ξ[1+ψ−ψδ]− (ξ− 1)[1+ψ−ψδ](1+B), (A.2.26)
isolating now this term to ’D’ result in:
D =
k
2 + [1 + ψ − ψδ](1 + B)
1 + 3(ξ − 1)[1 + ψ − ψδ] . (A.2.27)
The sign from D depends crucial from the sign of ’B’ which is no calculated. But
before we deﬁne X := 1+3(ξ−1)[1+ψ−ψδ] > 0, for simplifying the further calculation.
From backward substitution of D from (A.2.27) into (A.2.24) identify ’B’:
(1−p)ξ− (ξ−1)
(
1+3
k
2X
+3
[1 + ψ − ψδ]
X
(1+B)+B
)
= −p(ξ−1)+B[p(ξ−1)+µ].
(A.2.28)
Isolating the B part yields:
B
[
µ+p(ξ−1)+(ξ−1)+3(ξ−1)[1 + ψ − ψδ]
X
]
= (1−p)ξ−(ξ−1)
(
1+3
1
X
[
k
2
+[1+ψ−ψδ]
])
+p(ξ−1)
(A.2.29)
and thereby
B =
(1− p)ξ − (ξ − 1)
(
1 + 3 1X
[
k
2 + [1 + ψ − ψδ]
])
+ p(ξ − 1)[
µ + p(ξ − 1) + (ξ − 1) + 3(ξ − 1) [1+ψ−ψδ]X
] (A.2.30)
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Inserting this value of B back into (A.2.27) then provides the solution for D:
D =
k
2 + [1 + ψ − ψδ]
(
1 +
(1−p)ξ−(ξ−1)
(
1+3 1
X
[
k
2
+[1+ψ−ψδ]
])
+p(ξ−1)[
µ+p(ξ−1)+(ξ−1)+3(ξ−1) [1+ψ−ψδ]
X
] )
1 + 3(ξ − 1)[1 + ψ − ψδ] . (A.2.31)
Finally using (A.2.31), (A.2.30),(A.2.7) and (A.2.22), we obtain
fi1 = 1 + ˜ + ei + 2e˜ + b˜ +
(
n
n− 1ψ − 1
)[
B(i − ˜) + D(i − ˜)
]
+
(
n
n− 1ψδ − 1
)
[
(D − 1)(i − ˜)
]
fi1 = 1 + ˜ + ei + 2e˜ + b˜ + F1(i − ˜)
(A.2.32)
with Fi =
(
n
n−1ψ − 1
)[
B + D] +
(
n
n−1ψδ − 1
)[
(D − 1)
]
≥ 0 and similar for ’f ′i2
f2i = 1− b˜1 −
(
1− n
n− 1ψ
)
[−B(i − ˜)]
f2i = 1− b˜1 + F2(i − ˜)
(A.2.33)
with F2 =
(
1− nn−1ψ
)
[B]. Notice that it is trivial seen, if (ψ, δ) = ( nn−1 , 1), then
F1 = F2 = 0.
Derivation of the results
(a) Simple derivation of ’B’ and ’D’ shows the result. First look at the term ’B’:
B =
(ξ − 1)(1 − ψδ)
(ξ − 1)(1 − ψ) + (ξ − 1)[2− ψ(1 + δ)]Θ + [p(ξ − 1)(1 − ψ) + µn ]
(A.2.34)
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The sign of the derivation of ’B’ depends only from the numerator because the
denominator is always positive in a quadratic form. The symbol  indicate that
the right-hand side has the same sign as the left hand side. Thus we analyze now
only the numerator of the derivation.:
∂B
∂δ
 (A.2.35)
−ψ(ξ−1)(ξ−1)(1−ψ)+(ξ−1)[2−ψ(1+δ)]Θ+[p(ξ−1)(1−ψ)+µ
n
]−(ξ−1)(1−ψδ)(−ψ(ξ−1))Θ
(A.2.36)
= Θ(ξ − 1)(1 − ψδ) − [(ξ − 1)(1 − ψ) + (ξ − 1)[(1 − ψδ) + (1− ψ)] + p(ξ − 1)(1 − ψ) + µ
n
]
= (Θ− 1)(ξ − 1)(1 − ψδ) − 2(ξ − 1)(1 − ψ)− p(ξ − 1)(1 − ψ)− µ
n
< 0
(A.2.37)
because we know that 1 > Θ > 0. Now the same procedure for ’D’. It follows
trivial,
∂D
∂δ

∂B
∂δ
Θ + B(−ψ)[p(ξ − 1)(1 − ψ) + µ
n
] < 0 (A.2.38)
(b) In that result we ﬁnd out what are the eﬀect of a change by the ’MSY’ values.
Furthermore we take the derivative from ’D’ and ’B’ to ’k’. The results are:
∂D
∂k
=
1
2[
(ξ − 1)(1 − ψ) + (ξ − 1)[2 − ψ(1 + δ)]Θ + [p(ξ − 1)(1 − ψ) + µn ]
]2 > 0
∂B
∂k
=
−3(ξ − 1) 12X
(
(ξ − 1)(1 − ψ) + (ξ − 1)[2 − ψ(1 + δ)]Θ + [p(ξ − 1)(1− ψ) + µn ]
)
(
(ξ − 1)(1 − ψ) + (ξ − 1)[2 − ψ(1 + δ)]Θ + [p(ξ − 1)(1 − ψ) + µn ]
)2 < 0
(A.2.39)
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Proposition 6
Government i’s equilibrium expected utility as a function of the stability pact parame-
ters is given by:
VF i(ψ, δ) ≡ E
[
−1
2
(ei − k)2 + u(f1i) + pu(f2i)− (αb˜1)
2
2ψ
]
(A.2.40)
where u is deﬁned by (4.44) and f1i, f2i are understood to be evaluated for the equi-
librium outcomes. Diﬀerentiating VF i(ψ, δ) with respect to ’k’ yields:
∂VF i(ψ, δ)
∂δ
= E
[
1
2
(ei − k2 )
∂D
∂k
+ u′(f1i)
[
3
∂D
∂k
+
∂B
∂k
]
+ pu′(f2i)
[
−∂B
∂k
]
− α
2
φ
b˜1
∂B
∂k
]
(A.2.41)
the sign is exact then negativ if we assume ei = k2 . That imply that if the consoli-
dation eﬀort is equal the MSY level; then a greater threshold value ’k’ induce welfare
gains. But we deﬁne a sustainable equilibrium so that ei < k2 . In that constellation
the sign is indeﬁnite (positive or negative). It depends crucial from ’p’ the re-election
probability and the debt stock ’b’.
Extended solution of the Nash equilibrium
f1i = 1 + ˜ + ei + 2e˜ + b˜ +
(
n
n− 1ψ − 1
)
[(b˜− bi,1) + (e˜− ei)]+
+
(
n
n− 1ψδ − 1
)
[(˜− i) + (e˜− ei)] (A.2.1)
f2i = 1 + ei − e˜− b˜−
(
n
n− 1ψ − 1
)
[(b˜− bi,1) + (e˜− ei)] (A.2.2)
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From the few new assumptions above the model framework, these two time-constraints
are very diﬀerent to Beetsma and Jensen (2003).
Model solution
The optimal behavior of the government of country i, in terms of the choice of eﬀort
and debt issuance, is characterized by the following necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst-order
conditions:
∂UF
∂ei
= 0⇐⇒ s′(ei) = E[u′(f1i)[1 + ψ(1− δ)] + pu′(f2i)[ψ]]
⇐⇒ s′(ei) = [1 + ψ(1 − δ)]E[u′(f1i)] + pψE[u′(f2i)], ∀i (A.2.3)
∂UF
∂bi
= 0⇐⇒ 0 = E[u′(f1i)[1 − ψ] + pE[u′(f2i)][−(1 − ψ)]− E[α
2
φ
b˜1]
⇐⇒ E[u′(f1i)[1− ψ] = pE[u′(f2i)](1− ψ) + E[α
2
φ
b˜1], ∀i (A.2.4)
While condition (A.2.4) correspond to that in the basic model, condition (A.2.3)
which guides the optimal consolidation eﬀort level, already hints the new eﬀect. It
equates the government’s marginal cost of consolidation through eﬀort to the expected
marginal gain from period one and two (in terms a lower debt level close to the equilib-
rium MSY values). The stronger is the response of the reference debt level (δ ↑) to the
observed state of the economy and the weaker is the ’excessive deﬁcit procedure’ (ψ ↓)
and the re-election probability (p ↓), the smaller is this expected marginal gain. These
reactions are crucial new ﬁndings for ’sustainable debt policy’ within the Stability and
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Growth Pact’.1
1Cf. This result show that the re-election probability is very important. A reform proposal
which deﬁne a debt level per law for all diﬀerent Government is from that perspective desirable
but not real implementable because a new government implement their own consolidation level.
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A.3.1 Institutional Interaction Model:
Taylor Series approximation
The second-order Taylor Series approximation for the both solutions (Bronstein et al.,
1997):
x(t) =
ζ1
ζ2
+  ∗ sin[ωt], ∧ y(t) = ζ3
ζ4
+ δ cos[ωt], (A.3.1)
can be done for x(t) with,
lnx(t) = ln
[
ζ1
ζ2
+  ∗ sin[ωt]
]
≈ ln
[
ζ1
ζ2
]
+
ζ2
ζ1
∗ ∗ sin[ωt]− 
2 ∗ sin2[ωt]
2
∗
(
ζ2
ζ1
)2
+O(3),
(A.3.2)
and for y(t),
ln y(t) = ln
[
ζ3
ζ4
+ δ ∗ cos[ωt]
]
≈ ln
[
ζ3
ζ4
]
+
ζ4
ζ3
∗δ∗sin[ωt]− δ
2 ∗ cos2[ωt]
2
∗
(
ζ2
ζ1
)2
+O(δ3).
(A.3.3)
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A.4.1 Why bigger countries have more problems with the
SGP: Technical Appendix
Substituting X+G−T into the value of p, and replacing p in equation (5.1), we obtain
the loss function:
L =
Λ
2a2
[a + G + X − T ]2 + 1
2
(T )2. (A.4.1)
Then, the optimal value of taxes is equal to T ∗ = ζ[a+G+ X] where ζ = Λ/(a2 +Λ).
Substituting T ∗ into equation (A.4.1) yields
L =
Λ2
2a2
(
(1− ζ)(a + G + X)
)2
+
1
2
(ζ[a + G + X])2 (A.4.2)
L =
[
Λ
a2 + Λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ζ
∗
(
a2
a2 + Λ
)
+ ζ2
]
1
2
(a + G + X)2 (A.4.3)
this is now
E0L
∗ = E0
(
ζ
2
)
[a+G+X]2 = E0
(
ζ
2
)
[a+G+((1−ψ)Y +(ψ)[E0[Y ]+pΓS ])]2 (A.4.4)
Derivation of the separating equilibrium
Consider a class of separating equilibrium. The weak government compares
E0L
W (W,ψ = 1) ≤ E0LW (T,ψ ≤ ψS); (A.4.5)
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that inequality is equivalent to
E0[X − Y (GH) + Y (GH)]2 ≤ E0[X − ψY (GH ) + (1− ψ)µ + ψY (GL)]2 (A.4.6)
0 ≤ ψ2(λ2 + σ2)− 2(αλ + σ2)ψ + σ2. (A.4.7)
The ‘only’ solution is now:
ψ ≤ ψS = σ
2 + λα−√λ2α2 + σ2λ(2α− λ)
σ2 + α2
(A.4.8)
where α := a + GH + Y (GH), λ := Y (GH) − Y (GL). A separating equilibrium of
the tough government thus exists if and only if the tough government is willing to slow
the consolidation down to ψS . This happens if
E0L
T (T,ψS) ≤ E0LT (W,ψS < ψ¯ ≤ 1), (A.4.9)
E0[a + GL + (1− ψS)Y + ψSE0Y ]2 ≤ E0[z + ψ¯λ + (1− ψ¯)u]2 (A.4.10)
E0[z + (1− ψS)u]2 ≤ E0[z + ψ¯λ + (1− ψ¯)u]2, (A.4.11)
and thus the incentive compatibility constraint is satisﬁed if
(1− λS)2σ2 ≤ (1− ψ¯)2σ2 + ψ¯2λ2 + 2ψ¯βλ, (A.4.12)
where β := a+GL+Y (GL). The necessary condition for equation (A.4.12) also crucially
depends on σ2 and λ.
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Derivation of the pooling equilibrium
In a pooling equilibrium both governments choose the same Consolidation; i.e., the
forward output rate is equal to
E0Y = [Y (GL) + (1− q)λ]. (A.4.13)
A pooling equilibrium exists if and only if ψP satisﬁes the incentive compatibility
constraint of the weak government, E0LW (Pool, ψS) ≤ E0LW (W,ψ = 1). This requires
ψP =
σ2 − (1− q)λβ
σ2 + (1− q)2λ2 ≥ ψ
W :=
σ2 + λαq −√λ2q2α2 + σ2λq(2α− λq)
σ2 + λ2q2
. (A.4.14)
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